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ABSTRACT
This research explores the origins of information systems innovation through two case 
studies of groupware projects. The thesis argues that the study of the origins of projects 
has an important role in explaining the subsequent events during the more formal 
implementation activity. This is particularly so in the case of groupware, where a 
substantial literature has emerged describing and analysing the unpredicted outcomes of 
such projects. The research is based on a model of systems adoption as a continuous 
process, and with the choices and decisions taken at an early stage with regard to 
technology having significant effects on the adoption across time. The analysis of the 
early stages of a project can be significant in explaining subsequent levels and degrees 
of system use. It is argued that in order to provide a more complete description of the 
adoption process one needs to go back to the origins of a project and to examine the 
choices and decisions made during that period. This period of initiation of groupware 
projects has received little attention in CSCW research and scarcely more in the broader 
IS field. The purpose of this thesis is both to address this absence of scrutiny and to 
argue for its significance.
The thesis presents a detailed review of CSCW and related literature, and explores how 
and to what extent the initiation of projects has been considered and addressed within 
this field. The thesis then develops a research framework to explore initiation, based on 
a synthesis of the contextualist approach with a cognitive model based on Orlikowski’s 
notion of technological frames. The thesis then applies the framework in the analysis of 
two interpretive case studies of the initiation of groupware projects. These case studies 
were conducted in the British Oxygen Company (BOC) and the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS).
These studies produce an account of initiation activity that offers a particular emphasis 
on how time plays multiple roles in the process, linking content, context and process. 
These roles include, in addition to conventional ‘clock time’, time as an indicator, time 
as an era, and time as measurement and control. The findings also illustrate the duality 
of individuals’ technological frames; that is, individuals’ frames are both the basis and 
the consequence of the choices and decisions made by those same individuals. The 
analysis explores how and to what extent changes in the organisational or cultural 
setting (context and process) can have an impact on frames of reference, and how they 
are shared and communicated.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 R esearch  sco pe
Various issues surround the early stages of an information system (IS) project. They 
include project definition, requirement collection and specification, decisions about 
acquisition and development, and allocation of resources (financial and human 
resources). Previous research has discussed these issues selectively from a number of 
perspectives notably from that of technology (Galegher and Kraut, 1990; Gallupe and 
McKeen, 1990; Hollingshead, et al., 1993; Whisler, 1970), of business strategy 
(Boynton, et al., 1992; Drucker, 1988; Martin, 1998; Rockart, et al., 1996; Porter and 
Millar, 1985; Schein, 1996), of economics (Benson, et al., 1990; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 
1998; Ciborra and Olson, 1998; Opper and Fersko-Weiss, 1992; Threlkel and Kavan, 
1999; Venkatraman, 1994), and of organisations (Coombs and Hull, 1995; Davenport 
and Short, 1990; Grint and Willcocks, 1995; Keen, 1991; Taylor, 1995). Each of these 
perspectives rests on an assumption that an IS project occurs as a result of rational 
behaviour. In this analysis it is thereby assumed that the initiation of an IS project 
originates from problems within the current system (technological perspective), the 
needs for strategic alignment of IS with business (strategic perspective), the wish to 
increase productivity or to reduce cost (economic perspective), or the desire to make 
changes in organisation (organisational perspective); and that the adoption of a 
particular information system reflects an organisation’s best interests.
Based, however, on experience of investigating user requirements in a financial services 
company, this thesis argues quite otherwise: that, in contrast to these rational models of
IS adoption, the acquisition of a particular information system is equally likely to 
originate from the deliberation of a few individuals. This deliberation will reflect 
individuals’ perceptions and problems with a given technology rather than an 
organisation’s overall rationality. It is maintained therefore that the ideas and 
decisions about what is to be achieved and what technology offers are explored and 
shaped at the early stage of a project; and that understanding of the initial and ongoing 
deliberation related to the decisions and choices made about an IS project becomes a 
source of explanation for phenomena observed in the post-implementation environment. 
In the light of this argument this thesis investigates and focuses on the issue of how the 
perception and expectation o f individuals influence the decisions taken with regard to 
the initiation and acquisition o f a specific information system. This will be achieved 
through a social cognitive approach that provides important countervailing insights into 
decisions about a specific system.
This thesis is both original and challenging on a number of accounts. First, it shifts 
attention from the rational (both technological and organisational) dimension to the less 
well represented social cognitive dimension. It emphasises the role of individuals’ 
cognitive properties (i.e. experience, knowledge, perception, and expectation) in the 
process of making decisions and choices about technology. Second, the thesis provides 
evidence which illustrates the dynamic nature of these cognitive properties and 
highlights the shifts in the initial ideas and notions of the technology and the impacts of 
these shifts on individuals’ attitudes towards the technology over time. Third, its focus 
on the origins of an IS project gives historical consideration to the phenomena observed 
in the later phases of the project. This challenges the implicit assumption that the 
technology only comes alive after its implementation.
According to the definition given by the UKAIS (1997), information systems are:
“the means by which organisations and people, utilising information technologies gather,
process, store, use and disseminate information” (p.5).
By this definition, a wide range of information technologies is then qualified to be 
called information systems. For the purpose of this research it is important to narrow 
the range of technologies to a specific type serving specific purposes. By so doing, it is 
possible to compare and contrast the processes of forming perceptions and expectations
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as well as the choices and decision-making in different organisations. Groupware is 
chosen with this context.
In the late 1980s there was a growing interest in the design, implementation and use of 
technical systems which support people working cooperatively, and a group of 
researchers and practitioners gathered to discuss the topic. This special interest group 
later became a community engaged in discussion of related topics and technology, and 
the subject became known as computer supported cooperative work (CSCW). Systems 
including software and hardware developed and designed within this context became 
known as groupware.
Groupware is designed to support group work in an integrated way. Such systems have 
been described in these terms:
“[...] they put coordination technology into the hands of the group members, giving 
them access to the positive aspects of coordination -  not just preventing collisions, but 
enabling collaboration” (Grief 1988: 9).
Put another way, groupware is not something that stands alone but serves as a standard 
platform that allows users to exchange information uniformly; and to have similar levels 
of consistent support for users’ collaborative work needs.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the interest of groupware extended beyond academia 
and was introduced to the commercial sector. The trend is said to stem from an 
increasing attention to business process engineering (BPR), an emphasis on teamwork 
to achieve flexibility, the speed of globalisation, and booms in the software and 
hardware industries (Lloyd, 1994). The introduction of Lotus Notes in 1989 which 
marketed itself as a groupware to help companies to bring together their expertise 
around the world certainly pushed discussions of the topic further in academia, in 
business and in commerce.
A number of common assumptions are made and shared in the CSCW community: (1) 
to enhance or enable group work, (2) to improve communication, (3) to create a 
common platform for information sharing, and (4) to remove time and place restraints. 
The specific assumptions and expectations of groupware in these communities provide a 
well-defined range of information systems for analysis. Moreover, it allows 
investigators to examine and even challenge the assumptions made by organisations
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about technology. For example, whether organisations adopt groupware for the reasons 
assumed by academia or the IT/IS industry; whether organisations’ decisions about 
groupware adoption emerge from a process of IS projects; and whether organisations 
understand the implications of groupware when they choose to introduce groupware. 
Besides, although the groupware chosen as the subject for the case study it is believed 
that the experiences and lessons learned from how individuals and organisations 
understand and form their understandings and interpretations of this technology provide 
valid insights and can be applied to studies of other information systems.
The present study employs a case study research method in the empirical work to help 
to understand the subject area. This method provides an understanding both of the 
content of an object/event and the process over time of the mutual influence between the 
object/event and its context (Walsham, 1993). Three case studies have been carried 
out; a preliminary study and two main studies.
The preliminary case study was conducted in a well-established financial group in 
Taiwan -  Jardine Fleming (JF). The study was commissioned in 1996 by a senior 
manager in the business division in order to identify potential areas in which the 
company could benefit from Lotus Notes. One of the two main case studies was 
carried out in the British Oxygen Company (BOC Group), a UK-based and world- 
leading industrial manufacturer. The company’s Lotus Notes project was established to 
support its marketing sector reform in 1994. During the two years of experiences with 
groupware (i.e. Lotus Notes) information systems personnel as well as users learned 
about the system, in a hard way at the beginning, but their learning curves started to 
take off once they became familiar with the system and developed understanding. The 
other main case study was undertaken in the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). 
The Bank completed its WORKGROUP project a year before the case study was carried 
out, and had seen initiated and set up to replace the old electronic mail system in the 
Bank. Telling a different story, the project in the Bank was claimed by the team to be 
the most successful project ever in the Bank’s IS history.
The rest of this chapter introduces the preliminary case study of JF Taiwan and 
discusses issues that emerged from the study. The chapter ends by presenting the 
organisation of this thesis.
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1.2 Preliminary  case  study
The study presented here is based on fieldwork in the course of a project with Jardine 
Fleming, a Taiwan-based financial company. The project was commissioned by a 
senior manager to generate a report of whether Lotus Notes would bring value-added 
benefits to the company from its implementation. The project started in July 1996 and 
was completed with a report at the end of August. It involved two months staying on 
site and working side-by-side with other employees.
This case study was chosen to be presented as a preliminary not the main case study of 
this research for a number of methodological reasons.
The main methodological concern is data continuity. The project was commissioned by 
the senior manager in JF Taiwan and carried out prior to the decision to investigate the 
present research topic (indeed the present research topic emerged from the observations 
made in the project) therefore the data collected during the project was collected solely 
for the purposes of the JF Taiwan project. That is, the data was collected according to 
the requirements of the senior manager and not those of the current research and 
therefore if used the data would have been partial.
The second concern is the stage at which the project had reached in the company. The 
project at JF Taiwan was at its initial and exploratory stage which on the surface can be 
said to be an appropriate candidate for being the main case study of the present thesis. 
However, it is this initial and exploratory stage that raised our concern about suitability. 
The project carried out in JF Taiwan was at its early stage of development and a final 
decision about implementation had not been made at that time. Hence it is not possible 
for us to examine the choices and decisions about the system from an historical point of 
view. In other words, no examination was able to be made concerning the process of 
how the decision makers’ perceptions and expectations formed, reformed, and changed 
over time.
1.2.1 Organisational background
The main data sources came from observations, interviews, and informal conversations 
(e.g. lunch, coffee breaks, dinners] with staff. Interviews with personnel were open- 
ended and intended to gather information of their job contents and needs, technologies
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used in their jobs, and their perceptions of problems and expectations of the new 
information system. During these conversations, it was possible to make suggestions 
about the new system. A significant limitation of the interview technique emerged 
when it was found that employees were cautious with what they said since they felt that 
the contents of the interviews might be fed back to the senior manager and they might 
compromise their positions. Informal conversations with employees as well as 
observations1 of interactions and overhearing conversations between individuals 
therefore became important sources of ‘unofficial’ views of problems.
Jardine Fleming Taiwan is a well-known financial service company in Taiwan and its 
major business activity is to sell local and overseas funds and mature bonds. The 
company’s largest shareholder is JF Hong Kong whose activities cover investment 
management, securities broking, corporate finance, capital markets and banking. JF 
Hong Kong itself is a joint venture owned equally by a London based investment bank 
and art international trading house. Relatively speaking, JF Taiwan has a closer business 
relationship with JF Hong Kong than with the London based investment bank and 
international trading house. This is not only because of JF Hong Kong is the direct and 
major shareholder in JF Taiwan, but also because of financial legislation in Taiwan.
Under the current legislation no financial company in Taiwan can act on behalf of their 
clients to invest in overseas financial markets directly, so funds and mature bonds 
operations have to be carried out outside Taiwan. JF Hong Kong naturally became the 
candidate to managing and operating JF Taiwan’s local investors’ investments in 
overseas financial markets. In terms of selling overseas funds and mature bonds to 
local investors JF Taiwan can be described as a big sales department of JF Hong Kong 
since it only receives commission fees by selling overseas funds and mature bonds 
instead of managing fees2. It is also responsible for promoting, for dealing in overseas 
funds, and answering funds related questions from investors.
At the beginning of the fieldwork direct observation was the only option to collect information. 
Employees suspected that I was there to spy on them on the behalf of the senior manager and it was only 
sometime later they found that I was ‘harmless’ and gradually accepted me as a part of the working force; 
at this point, participating observation became possible.
2 Fund managing fee is counted as the major income in a financial service company like JF Taiwan.
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Figure 1.1: Organisational structure
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The company has three branches in Taiwan, in addition to the Taipei headquarters. 
These branches are distributed in different cities: the North, the Midland, and the South, 
to serve the regional customers. The power is centralised in the company, that is, the 
Taipei office gives orders and has absolute authority to determine business decisions 
and activities for these three branches. Communication between the headquarters and 
branches relies on the traditional communication tools including internal and external 
telephone lines, fax machines, face-to-face meetings. It was only since early 1996 that 
the Southern and Northern branches had installed cc:Mail™, which connects them with 
the Taipei headquarters.
Five departments were involved in this project, all of which except the information 
systems (IS) department are said to play critical roles in the company’s daily business 
operations. These four other departments were fund administration, sales 
administration, sales, and marketing. Fund and sales administration departments are 
responsible for processing the administrative work of local investments transactions and 
if these investments are interested in overseas markets, they then pass them to JF Hong 
Kong. The sales department consists of four sales groups: Banking, Private, Institution, 
and International. Each of them targets different market groups; for example, Banking 
targets ordinary investors so its job is to negotiate with high street banks to encourage 
them to promote and sell funds and mature bonds for the company over the counters. 
Because each group has its target clients and pursues different interests there are not 
many interdependencies between these groups. The marketing department consists of 
two divisions: Customer Service and Research. Customer Service division is divided
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into further two groups: Telephone Centre and Marketing. The former answers phone 
calls from clients who have questions, requirements, or complaints, and the latter is 
responsible for planing various business activities and promotions, and public relations. 
In the research division the primary task is to study and analyse financial markets 
around the world, and generate weekly and monthly market reports for both internal use 
and clients.
1.2.2 Project History
Lotus Notes was recommended by JF Hong Kong to JF Taiwan in early 1996. The 
system had been used in Research Departments both in JF Hong Kong and London and 
allows their market analysts to share information and have discussions on line. JF Hong 
Kong, convinced by its ‘successful’ experience with Lotus Notes, recommended JF 
Taiwan to develop applications within the system.
Before this suggestion was made to JF Taiwan, the IS department had run the first and 
only pilot application on Lotus Notes which involved Fund, Sales Administration, and 
Marketing departments. The application was designed to allow departments to submit 
their requests for IS service via the network. This pilot project was new to both users 
and the IS department. At the beginning, users found themselves struggling with the 
application since there was no technical support from the IS department, no user manual 
for reference, and bugs in the application. However, when the bugs were gradually 
sorted out and users were becoming familiar with the application they started to see 
benefits in it. One benefit was that with the application people kept both electronic and 
paper copies of the same requests whereas before only one copy was kept and was often 
lost in the process. With dual copies of the request form people could now provide 
electronic evidence to the IS department to prove that the department received requests 
but never delivered the services required. This pilot project stopped running six months 
later because the server broke down and was never fixed.
The pilot project running on Lotus Notes was the IS department’s initiative and did not 
involve the senior manager; but the second introduction originated the senior manager 
who expressed her interest in having Lotus Notes in the company since JF Hong Kong 
‘recommended’ them to do so. In early 1996 JF Taiwan had its first e-mail system, 
cc:Mail, to assist internal communication with its dispersed branches and with JF Hong
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Kong. In general, people especially the senior manager were satisfied with the system, 
and believed that Lotus Notes, which is also Lotus’ product, would be equally good for 
them. They expected that Lotus Notes would solve problems of information sharing 
and communication, and increase coordination between departments. The employees 
also expected Lotus Notes to replace the existing information systems and allow them to 
access information freely and immediately.
1.2.3 Findings
Three groups of people were interviewed: senior management, IS personnel, and 
potential users. The senior management group included the managing director, a senior 
manager in charge of market research, a general manager in charge of marketing, and a 
manager dealing with administration of transaction. The IS personnel group included 
an IS manager who was assigned to the Lotus Notes project, and two other people who 
worked on the project. The three IS people had technical backgrounds and had worked 
as computer support staff for most of their careers. The potential users group included 
employees from departments into which senior management was considering 
introducing Lotus Notes. These departments included a sales department which 
comprised five different divisions, a sales administration department which processed 
details of sales of funds and bonds, and a marketing department which included research 
and marketing divisions.
When senior management and potential user groups talked about the problems which 
they had in mind and their expectations of Lotus Notes, it was first found that their 
problems and expectations coincided with what has been described within CSCW 
literature. For example, they were having problems with information sharing and 
communication because of the dispersed locations between departments, and hoped that 
the new technology could improve the situation. However, under close scrutiny these 
problems and expectations were not, in nature, the same as those described in the 
literature. Comments on the perceptions of each group -  senior management, potential 
user, and IS personnel -  in relation to the problems and expectations of Lotus Notes are 
now presented.
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Senior management
The primary reason for senior management to consider the adoption of Lotus Notes was 
that the system was recommended by JF Hong Kong. The latter was the company’s 
major shareholder and the Managing Director (MD) felt that politically the company 
needed to consider the recommendation. As the Managing Director said: “they 
suggested the system, so we considered the system.”
Their recent experience with Lotus cc:Mail was another reason which drove senior 
management to consider Lotus Notes. Lotus cc:Mail was the first e-mail system which 
the company had ever had and which was used for communicating between branches in 
Taiwan and between JF Taiwan and HK. Before the introduction of electronic mail, 
surface mail and fax machines were the primary means of communication. The MD 
expressed her satisfaction with Lotus cc:Mail and believed that Notes would achieve a 
similar outcome because it was a product of Lotus.
There was a general feeling in the company that the IS department had seen unable to 
deliver the service which people wanted. Indeed, it was known to the company that the 
MD was unhappy with the service provided. An interviewee from a user department 
who often attended IS-related internal meetings said
“It is not unusual that the MD and the IS manager spend most of their time shouting at 
each other in meetings.”
The MD expressed her view of the IS service in the company as follows:
“The IS department never gives me what I want. For example, this time I simply want 
them to design a computer-generated report which can tell me each sales person’s 
monthly, quarterly, and annual sales records, and now see how many months have passed 
and I still have not got it.”
The dissatisfaction with the current level of service provided by the IS department along 
with the company’s experiences with cc:Mail meant that the MD expected that Lotus 
Notes would change the current problem situations since she had a strong belief that 
“computers can solve any problem”.
Potential users
Most employees interviewed had never heard of Lotus Notes before, and those that had 
heard about it did not know what it was about. Their expectations of Notes came partly
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from the problems that they had encountered in their work and partly from a brief 
introduction which the researcher provided at the beginning of each interview.
Various problems with the current systems were described by the employees, among 
these the problem of information sharing was mentioned most of the time. However, 
definitions and interpretations of the problem differed from one employee to another 
depending on the interviewee’s status (e.g. rank, department, and job content) in the 
company. For example, a market researcher who specialised in Asian financial markets 
saw the problem of information sharing in the context of not being able to access on­
line reports, figures and diagrams generated by the HK company. She therefore 
expected that the future system, Notes, would enable her to access the on-line research 
data which she needed. A different market researcher in the same office who 
specialised in European and Russian markets had a different view of the problem. For 
the MD, information sharing was not a problem but finding information was. Other 
people in the company complained that information on marketing activities organised 
by the different sales divisions was not widely shared within the company. This caused 
embarrassment. The sales people sometimes felt that customers knew more than they 
did, for example one interviewee mentioned:
“Sometimes customers called and asked us when such and such activities will take place 
and where, and we did not have a clue what the customers were talking about because the 
activities were organised by other divisions and they did not inform us what was going 
on.
Despite the fact the employees knew little about the system and how it could help them 
in their jobs, most of them welcomed the idea of Notes. This attitude could be 
interpreted as a result of the fact that employees were not happy with the current system 
and in common with the Managing Director they also had a conception that all the 
current problems could be solved by a new computer system. It was not unusual that 
the current AS400 system crashed at least twice a week and that each time the crash 
could last about half a day. Employees who needed to use the system to check, 
calculate, and report transactions were frustrated with the interruptions caused by the 
system's lack of stability. Others found switching between the AS400 and Windows 
working environments was not easy.
A further reason for some employees to welcome the system was that they expected that 
it would enable them to access information stored by the HK company such as data and
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progress of transactions. Currently, because of banking and investment law in Taiwan, 
all the overseas funds were managed and handled by the HK company and JF Taiwan 
was only responsible for promoting and selling overseas funds to local people. When 
sales were completed administrators in Taiwan then sent the details of the transactions 
to the HK company; after that JF Taiwan had no rights of access to the information 
about the transactions. Employees in Taipei hoped that the new system could give them 
greater control over local transactions so that they did not need to rely on the HK 
company to answer customers’ enquiries about their investments.
IS personnel
The IS project manager was not enthusiastic and optimistic about the idea of having 
Notes. The manager was more knowledgeable about mainframes especially IBM 
AS400 and did not know much about the PC working environment. It was not until 
early 1996 that he had started to learn to develop applications within a Windows 
environment. Since it was not his field, the introduction of client-server computing 
was conceived by him to be a threat to his position in his department. Other IS 
personnel were unfamiliar with and not keen on the idea of Notes. Due both to their 
own lack of interest and incentive to adopt Notes the IS personnel put little effort into 
promoting Notes project within the company. Consequently, the majority of employees 
had never heard of Notes despite the fact that the system had been considered for 
sometime before this case study was carried out.
The project manager considered that groupware could only be used by small groups of 
people within the organisation, although one application developer argued that the 
system could be used in a wider arena such as the organisation as a whole. The manager 
also perceived that Notes was useful in terms of automating workflow processes. The 
project manager’s perception of Notes as being limited to its being used by small groups 
of people and of Notes being a workflow system led to the development of a pilot 
application which was designed to change the processing of requests for IS services 
from paper-based to electronic-based. The pilot application was up and running for 
about three months until the server broke down; from then on no other application was 
developed in Notes. In fact Notes server was never repaired.
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1.2.4 Discussion and implications
The assumed rationales for groupware adoption described in other research papers were 
not found in this case study. Even if organisations cite to users the vendors’ 
advertisement about groupware applications, they are likely to interpret the system in 
the organisational context in order to pursue their own agenda. The observations of the 
case study also illustrates that organisations’ decisions about groupware adoption do not 
necessarily reflect a match between their “real” needs and abilities of groupware; but 
more individualistic interests. It was noted that expectations held by individuals were 
influenced by their previous experiences with other technology which were both good 
(e.g. experiences with cc:Mail) and bad (e.g. frustration with the current system). The 
findings also suggest that individuals’ expectations of Notes were not built upon the 
technology itself but on their own perceptions of how problem situations should be 
resolved. Furthermore, the observations suggested that individuals’ perceptions and 
understanding are formed and reformed over time on the basis of their personal 
experiences and knowledge and are constructed through social and organisational 
interactions; and that perceptions of problems and understandings of technology change 
over time according to individuals’ surrounding environment.
These observations have a number of implications for further research. It has been 
observed that individuals’ interpretation of problems, and knowledge and experience of 
technology have influences on their expectations of technology and which in turn forms 
a part of the reason for adopting new technology. Thus, in order to understand the issue 
of why particular technology is chosen (i.e. groupware) the focus of the investigation 
should be on these cognitive properties.
It was also noted that decision makers could have made decisions about groupware 
adoption without any previous knowledge about the technology. Then it becomes 
important to understand on what basis that a particular information system is chosen and 
why, if one wants to know and make sense of what is observed in a post­
implementation environment. This leads to another issue that whether the outcome of 
information system observed in post implementation stage is a reflection of the 
selection of inappropriate solutions to organisational problems, or mismatch of 
perceptions and decisions about the system to actual problems and offered by the 
system. In this context further research is needed to assess and examine the process of
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selecting a particular system to support organisational problems so to track the origins 
of phenomena observed in post implementation stage and understand the phenomena 
from there.
These findings and implications, however, were not pertinent to be developed into a 
research question until later when they were compared with a review of CSCW 
literature; this review is presented in Chapter Two.
1.3 O rganisation  o f  the  thesis
This chapter (Chapter One) has briefly introduced the research scope and objectives of 
this thesis, and presented a preliminary case study and the observations made in the 
study. The next chapter (Chapter Two) is organised to critically review the current 
CSCW literature and relevant literature in social cognitive research on information 
systems acceptance and adoption. Chapter Three introduces a social cognitive 
approach -  technological frames analysis, explains how the framework will be used in 
the context of this research. Chapter Four, Research Issues, firstly reviews various 
research methods employed in CSCW and examines research topics associated with 
them. This is followed by a section which addresses the research strategy and design of 
the present study. Chapter Five presents the case study conducted in BOC Group whilst 
Chapter Six presents the study of BIS. Chapter Seven brings together the findings from 
both case studies and interprets them in a broader context. Finally, Chapter Eight 
summarises the whole thesis, demonstrates the implications of this research, comments 
on the contributions of this thesis to IS research, and addresses directions for further 
research.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH ISSUES
Since the late 1980s there has been a growing interest in the design, implementation and 
use of technical systems which support people working cooperatively. A research 
domain then emerged and has been known to many as computer-supported cooperative 
work (CSCW). CSCW is said to be a stream of the information systems field but 
because of its specific interests the domain actually develops a research agenda, 
organises conferences (CSCW and ECSCW), and publishes a specialist journal 
International Journal o f Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW). Whether 
CSCW research should be regarded as a pivotal branch of information systems study 
excites debates. Some scholars see that CSCW studies are built on the existing 
development in computing science and information systems and therefore it should be 
seen as a part of information systems study. Yet, some are against such a statement and 
suggest that the research is in itself a new discipline. The present study would argue 
that CSCW is a specific topic which investigates a special domain (computer-supported 
collaborative work) in the information systems discipline. This view allows issues 
relating to CSCW to be studied and with reference to IS research and at the same time 
issues drawn from CSCW studies can be applied to general IS research.
The first section of this chapter (Section 2.1) will be dedicated to a review of the 
development of the CSCW domain and literatures of cooperative work (CW) within the 
CSCW domain. From there, a gap in the current research of CSCW will be discussed: a 
lack of research on the activities undertaken between the stage of searching for possible 
technological solutions and of understanding the limitations of systems in use. The 
relevant literature of this area in IS will be reviewed (Section 2.2). Bringing together
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the observations made in the preliminary case study and the literature review the third 
section (Section 2.3) of this chapter will refine the questions raised in Chapter One and 
tune them into an appropriate research topic for this study.
2.1 G e n e r a l rev iew  o f  CSCW
In this section the development of CSCW research will be reviewed chronologically, 
followed by a comprehensive review of CSCW literature. The literature review is 
further organised into two subsections according to two main streams in the domain: 
workplace study and technology use study.
2.1.1 A brief of review of CSCW development
Broadly speaking, the development in the CSCW domain has followed a similar pattern 
to that that IS has been through -  for instance, emerging, formalising, and maturing 
phases. Each of these phases involves specific interests in academia and technology 
development in the industry. This section provides a brief review of the research 
development in the field.
Emerging (1984 -1 9 8 5 )
Although the very first concept of CSCW was mentioned by Engelbart in the early 
1960s, the first CSCW workshop was not held only until 1984 and since then the 
domain begun to take off. The 1984 workshop was organised by Iren Grief of MIT and 
Paul Cashman of Digital Equipment Coporation and held at MIT. The delegates at this 
workshop came from different backgrounds but shared a common interest -  which was 
to use computer technology to support people to work together (Grief, 1988).
At that time, CSCW was defined as a body of research which examines ways of 
designing systems -  people and computer systems -  that would have significant 
implications for the way people work. This stream of research was argued as differing 
from traditional computer science as it drew on contributions from various disciplines 
such as computer science, artificial intelligence, psychology, sociology, organisational 
theory, and anthropology, all of which supported an aim to develop computer systems 
on the basis of people and their working relationships (Grief, 1988).
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A subsequent response to the discussion of a potential research domain -  CSCW -  was 
the development of a new class of commercial software, namely groupware, which 
was noted as being designed to take group work on board in an integral way. Grief 
(1988) described some software in these terms:
“[...] they put coordination technology into the hands of the group members, giving them 
access to the positive aspects of coordination -  not just preventing collisions, but enabling 
collaboration” (p.9).
Groupware does not, argued Grief, stand-alone but serves as a standard platform that 
allows users to exchange information uniformly; and to have similar levels of consistent 
support for the collaborative work needs of all users.
Formalising (1986 -1 9 9 1 )
The stage of formalising the acknowledgement of CSCW in both computer and IS 
communities began with the first CSCW conference which took place in Austin, Texas 
in 1986. Like IS at its early stage, CSCW went through the stage of identity seeking 
which is reflected in debates over definitions of the term CSCW and research directions. 
Various definitions were offered but there was (and still is) no single definition agreed 
within the community. These definitions ranged from very broad and loose to very 
narrow and specific (Bannon, et al., 1988; Greenberg, 1991; Hughes, et al., 1991; 
Lyytinen and Ngweyama, 1992; Robinson, 1991; Schmidt, 1991; Schmidt and Bannon, 
1992). As an example, Olson (Olson, 1987) defines CSCW as
“a label for an emerging body of research on the relationship between computer systems 
and social systems. Part of the research has to do with building tools to help people work 
together. Part of it has to do with assessing the ways in which people use computer-based 
tools to work together and understanding how the tools and work relationship affect each 
other” (p.77).
Greenberg (1991:1) speaks from a computer science point of view: “CSCW should be 
the scientific discipline that motivates and validates groupware design”, whereas 
Bannon and Schmidt (1991) argue that CSCW should be
“an endeavour to understand the nature of characteristics of cooperative work with the 
objective of designing adequate computer-based technologies. The conceptual models of 
group processes” (p.5).
The fundamental problem was that people could not decide how the word “cooperative” 
should be dealt with. Some argued that the word is redundant while some argued that 
the word should be replaced with other C words in order to reflect the concepts of
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CSCW fully. For example, Bodker et al. (1988) claims that all work is essentially 
cooperative and that there is no need to seek additional clarification by adding the term 
“cooperative” to that of “work”.
Those who saw the necessity to keep the word -  cooperative -  argue that the term not 
only should be kept but also should be addressed and carefully analysed. This group of 
researchers discussed that a considerable number of Office Information Systems (OIS) 
which failed to live up to people’s expectations was due to the fact that they failed to 
address and incorporate into the system designs ideas of cooperation and 
communication in intellectual work (Galegher and Kraut, 1990b).
Some agreed that the second C (operative) word in CSCW should remain on condition 
that it is replaced with other words, for “coordinated”, “collaborative”, “collective”, or 
even with group/teamwork (Howard, 1987). Cooperative work, explained by Schmidt 
(1991) is
“constituted by work processes that are related as to content, that is, processes pertaining 
to the production of a particular product. Cooperative work, then, is a far more specific 
concept than social interaction in the system of work in general. The concept pertains to 
the sphere of production. It does not apply to every interaction pertaining to the running 
of, say, a company” (p. 10).
Building on the above definition, collective work is explained as a type of cooperative 
work where ensembles share responsibility to accomplish a task. Further, collaborative 
work is a “particular ‘collaborative’ or complying spirit among the cooperators, as 
evident, for example, in the expression ‘collaborating’ with an enemy” (Bannon and 
Schmidt, 1997: 7). In light of the above, coordination in a work process can be defined 
as a process of coordinating participants’ activities to attain given goals. Cooperative 
work is an umbrella term to cover different concepts of working together.
Whether or not the name matters at all, and why we spend much time on debating the 
definitions of CSCW, are questions that one may ask. Those who argue that names 
matter believe that only when CSCW is properly defined will the research direction and 
focus become apparent. Ironically, the debates over various C words did not synthesise 
the disparate views of CSCW but led to further confusions and diversities of research 
focuses. Even more, it seemed that all the efforts put into the debates over the 
definitions had been wasted because technology development (groupware development) 
and other research studies rarely referenced those definitions. In fact, Hughes et al.
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(1991) believe that it is wrong that people spend time on defining the terms which are 
irrelevant. They argue that what is important is not which C word should be focused 
on but to recognise that all work is socially constructed:
“all work is socially organised; that most significant tasks are complexly social; and that 
it is largely for this reason that they have sometimes been poorly served by computer 
systems” (p.34).
Another feature of this period of time is that various theoretical frames were proposed to 
study cooperative work. A lot of work came from computer-mediated communication 
literature (Dietz and Widdershoven, 1991; King, 1991; Lea and Spears, 1991), group 
decision support systems studies (Gallupe and McKeen, 1990; Poole and DeSanctis, 
1990; Tan, et al., 1991; Watson and Bostrom, 1991), and studies of group dynamics 
(Bikson and Eveland., 1990; Galegher and Kraut, 1990a; Gutek, 1990; Kraemer and 
Pinsonneault, 1990; McGrath, 1991).
Technology development in this period focused on computer -  mediated 
communication tools and emphasised the issues about synchronously or asynchronously 
communications and cooperations. For example, the discussions on remote meeting 
(Bikson and Eveland, 1990; Cook, et al., 1991; Egido, 1990), e-mail system (Eveland 
and Bikson, 1988; Mackay, 1988; Sproull and Kiesler, 1986), and asynchronous 
conferencing systems (Borenstein and Thyberg, 1988; Galegher and Kraut, 1990a) were 
the themes at that time. Most of applications/systems discussed in the research in this 
period were not commercially available.
Maturing (1992 -1 9 9 8 )
At this stage, debate over definitions and directions of CSCW evaporated, for papers 
written to discuss the matter (definitions and directions) in this period were either 
summaries or reiterations of the earlier studies and did not intend to provoke further 
debate. It is also noted that the number of heterogeneous research proposals decreased, 
and research topics became focused and coherent. Interestingly, the number of 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks offered to study dynamics of group/team work, 
and coordination process decreased too. Instead, empirical work such as ethnographical 
studies to study workplace and work, case studies to study interactions between 
technology and organisations, action research to develop and design groupware; and
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hands-on groupware designs such as virtual spaces, conferencing systems, collaborative 
authoring systems came to dominate the field.
The terms CSCW and groupware had been used by many indiscriminately as if they 
were the same thing, and a consequence of this was that the early research of CSCW 
was limited to small group work. But examining the definitions given, CSCW was 
never defined exclusively to study “group/team work”. There are possible reasons for 
the confusion: firstly, the name group-ware misleads people to think that CSCW and its 
related technologies are for group/team work; secondly, people had been mistakenly 
thinking that cooperative work exists only among a small group of people who share 
and work together towards the same ends. In this phase people began to explore areas 
beyond small group work and look into “cooperative” work in general within an 
organisation.
There were an increasing number of studies in this period which moved out of the 
laboratory into the real world to study CSCW technology in its hosting organisations; 
but only then was it realised that the benefits promised by the technology were not 
there. Disappointment with the technology was explained as the result of the failure to 
incorporate ideas of social constructions of work into the design (Galegher and Kraut, 
1990a; Hughes, et al., 1991; Olson, 1987). The theme, social organisation of work, was 
therefore developed to replace the formal models of cooperative work used previously 
(Harper, 1998; Hughes, et al., 1996; Rouncefield, et al., 1995). The aim of this line of 
study is to provide insights into work in reality, through observations made in 
workplaces so as to inform system/software design.
Another research development in CSCW is the increasing number of case studies 
undertaken to investigate the relations between technology and hosting organisations by 
exploring questions such as why or why not the technologies fail to live up to their 
expectations; and what changes have been made around the technologies. This 
development is related to the availability of the technologies in the commercial sectors. 
The aim of this body of research (Bikson, 1996; Ciborra and Patriotta, 1996; Failla, 
1996; Gallivan, et al., 1993; Orlikowski, 1995; Wynn, 1996) is to inform system design 
(but not software design) and to inform system management (including implementation 
strategies).
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The above development in research was evidently reflected in the changes in the 
principles of CSCW system designs. An example can be given by comparing the 
papers included in the book Design Issues in CSCW edited by Rosenberg and Hutchison 
(1994) published in 1994 and the book The design o f Computer Support Cooperative 
Work and Groupware Systems edited by Shapiro et al. (1996) published in 1996. The 
papers included in Rosenberg and Hutchison’s book seemed to concentrate on rational 
conceptual models of group process, coordination activities, software engineering and 
multimedia conferencing designs only. In contrast, the papers included in the volume 
by Shapiro et al. gave equivalent consideration to both practical systems/software 
design and real world work. The shift from engineering modes of design to more 
socially oriented modes of design is also reflected in the increasing number of published 
studies adopting participatory design (PD) method. For example, the CSCW’96 and 
ECSCW’97 conference proceedings, included articles on PD, and a special issue of the 
Journal o f Collaborative Computing was dedicated to the topic in 1998.
Later in the same period it was observed that technology breakthroughs in both the 
hardware and software industries had advanced systems development and designs in 
CSCW too. For example, more advanced than it was in the early 1990s the multimedia 
technology was now being used to help to create Collaborative Virtual Environment 
(CVE) which aimed to permit individuals to interact with others in a computational 
environment (Benford, et al., 1996; Benford, et al., 1997). Breakthroughs in The 
Internet related technologies have also benefited design in CSCW and prompted some 
radical changes which have led the domain to another stage of development (Bentley, et 
al., 1997; Dix, 1997; Ginsburg and Duliba, 1997).
Internet Era (After 1998)
The development of the Internet has been an agent in driving the CSCW research and 
design to another stage. Within the commercial sectors the term groupware was 
gradually replaced with ‘Intranet” and then with “Extranet”. This development is 
shown by the increasing number of papers published in the conferences and journals to 
discuss the possibilities, problems and perspectives for CSCW on the World Wide Web. 
Commercial products such as Lotus Notes also introduce the Internet alike interface, 
Domino, to reflect the trend.
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In IS research the related concepts and technology of CSCW seem not to be discussed 
as intensively as they used to be in the early days. At one extreme this is viewed by 
some as the sign of the decline of the research like other fashionable ideas but the 
reviews of the development patterns suggests that the field has simply moved on. 
CSCW related topics were widely discussed when the field began to emerge because the 
idea of using the computer to support cooperative work was unfamiliar and new to 
people. Prior to that information systems research talked about information retrieval 
(database), improving effectiveness and efficiencies (office automation), increasing 
individual productivity and so on but it seldom addressed the issues about using the 
computer to support cooperative work or any similar work. Now, after a decade the 
concepts that CSCW studies attempt to draw people’s attentions to have been widely 
accepted in the IS community, and have been considered by systems/software designs. 
The domain now tries to widen its research focus to cover diverse research topics with 
respect to work in workplace and applications of collaborative technology, as is evident 
in the flyer of call for papers for CSCW2000:
“[...] we also encourage submissions that explore the applications of collaborative 
technology to areas such as the domestic environment, health and education. Specific 
topics of interest might include augmented environments for collaborative activity, 
studies of specific work settings, the use of the Internet in the home, technologies for 
organisational knowledge sharing, the impact of The Internet technologies on 
organisational life, or collaborative practices in education.”
2.1.2 A review of Cooperative Work
Broadly speaking, CSCW literatures can be reviewed in two main streams; one focuses 
the surrounding issues of computer applications to support cooperative work, and the 
other focuses on the surrounding issues of cooperative work in the workplace; that is, 
one centres on “CS”, the other on “CW”. This study is categorised in the latter stream 
because of its investigation in how CSCW technology is perceived and has 
determinations of adoption are made in organisations (workplace). Studies of CW can 
be further grouped and examined in two categories, for example workplace study and 
assessment of technology use. The former considers the issues of how work is 
organised in the workplace (in the real world settings), and the latter considers 
phenomena observed in interactions between individuals/organisations and the 
technology. The rest of this section details the review of literature in these two areas.
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2.1.2.1 Workplace study: searching for possible technological solutions
Workplace study is often initiated to study how work is organised in the real world 
settings with an aim to inform system/software design. This body of research argues 
that the nature of work and of the workplace have long been neglected or taken for 
granted by both practitioners and researchers. Workplace studies strongly object to the 
idea that work and workplace can be understood by using formal models, and that 
systems/software are designed on the basis of such understandings. The main reason 
for the objection is that work and the workplace is context specific and can only be 
understood through studying the actuality in context (Ackroyd, et al., 1991; Anderson 
and Button, 1993; Bentley, et al., 1992; Hughes, et al., 1994; Hughes, et al., 1991; 
Randall, et al., 1995). Hence, to design a system to support specific work, it is 
necessary to uncover what that work is really about and how it is organised; if the 
system is to support a specific workplace, then consideration should be given to how 
work is carried out within that workplace. Disappointments that organisations have 
with technology are seen as the result of the failure to incorporate the real-world settings 
in the designs, especially in terms of how organisation arranges this work.
Organisations of work.
Work has been, in organisational studies, IS and CSCW research, examined and 
understood through formal organisational models (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; 
McGrath and Hollingshead, 1994; Sproull and Kiesler, 1991). Most of these formal 
models treat organisations as machines so that work, tasks and people can be articulated 
and modelled since they are routine, efficient, reliable, and predictable (Morgan, 1986). 
Work is therefore a collection of many discrete-entities (Kling, 1987). Each discrete- 
entity has its own tasks to perform, means to use, and ends to meet. Therefore computer 
applications are perceived as a coordination mechanism to link those discrete-entities 
together, as a way of routinising and automating procedures (Walsham, 1991). This 
view of work implies that computer applications can be used to connect discrete-entities 
and even to automate flows between the entities (Malone, et al., 1987; Malone and 
Crowston, 1994). Work here is understood as status quo and can be modelled and 
generalised.
Some scholars reject such a simple view of work and argue that work is a social activity 
which is largely unstructured, covert, political and symbolic (Hirschheim, 1985). In this
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sense, characteristic of work is influenced by its surrounding environment (Ackroyd, et 
al., 1991; Hirschheim, 1985; Kling, 1980). The contextual factors that have impacts on 
work including socio-organisational structures (Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Lyytinen 
and Ngweyama, 1992; Mumford, 1987; Mumford and Weir, 1979), power relations 
(Knights and Murray, 1994; Knights and Murray, 1997; Markus, 1983), and external 
business environments (Bjom-Andersen and Turner, 1997; Galliers and Baets, 1998).
Similarly, a body of research in CSCW regards that work is socially rather than 
formally constructed; and that people perform their jobs in situ (Button and Harper, 
1993; Sachs, 1995; Suchman, 1995). This view rejects the idea that work and tasks can 
be articulated in advance or be studied indiscriminately in different institutions and 
participants. Sachs (1995) writes:
“Studies of actual work practices have yielded evidence that the efficiency of work is in 
feet determined not so much by the logic and sequencing of task flow as by the 
capabilities of people for troubleshooting vexing problems in complicated situations, 
which inevitably arise in all workplaces” (p.38).
Going further, researchers argue that immediate surroundings and local contingencies 
have more direct influence on work than some broader contextual factors (Hutchins, 
1991; Rogers, 1994). For example, in a constantly interrupted office a secretary has to 
perform several jobs simultaneously (i.e. filing, answering telephone, booking rooms, 
etc.) and sometimes needs to cover for the colleagues when they are off sick or on their 
break (Rouncefield, et al., 1995). The study of work is then carried out to underline the 
fact that work is socially organised and situated within the context of a particular 
workplace, and to examine the interplay of work and technology.
Wynn and Suchman (1996) illustrate how procedures of work are much more 
heterogeneous and complex than they first appear, and that to accomplish the process 
effectively there is a need for regular, constant, informal interactions between 
employees. Harper (1998) suggests that this ‘sociality’ of work underscores work 
practice; and that it is this ‘sociality’ which needs to be supported by technology. 
Hughes et al. (1992) illustrates the sociality of work by demonstrating how work is 
socially organised and how tasks and cooperation carried out for accomplishment of 
work are constantly negotiated between participants and changed all the time.
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Various studies of the organisation of work demonstrate that work is context and time 
specific as most activities undertaken to accomplish the work are situated actions. This 
contrasts to the formal organisational or engineering models that believe human actions 
can be formulated and predicted and even summarised in limited number of categories 
(Suchman, 1987). For example, Bentley et al. (1992: 126) conclude on the basis of 
their analysis of work in an air traffic control room (ATC) that although the air traffic 
controllers in the ATC had individual tasks to perform they “move into a ‘working 
division of labour’” in which the individual work is organised dynamically according to 
need and does not necessarily follow a prescribed form. A similar statement is also 
made by Heath et al. (1993) in their study of works performed by dealers in a City 
dealing room. Heath et al. notice that the dealers’ work relied on other people’s activity 
as well as ongoing business in the dealing room; and because the work could not be 
predicted and planned in advance the dealers were required to have ability to respond to 
situations quickly and promptly.
The most effective mechanism which connects or coordinates discrete-work, in an 
event-driven working environment, is individuals’ awareness of ongoing business in the 
workplace (Patterson, et al., 1999). Heath and Luff (1991) in their study of the London 
Underground Control Room remark that awareness of surroundings and ongoing 
business is the most effective mechanism to coordinate various tasks. Watts et al. 
(1996) drew the same conclusion from their study of voice loops used in the Space 
Shuttle Mission Control Room at NASA as they noted that in order to initiate their own 
activities which coordinated with others’, individuals had constantly to be aware of 
ongoing events and activities which were relevant to their divisions of labour. It is 
“awareness” that affords opportunities of cooperation rather than technology (Heath, et 
al., 1993).
Implications of studying organisations of work are twofold: for research and for systems 
design. As for research, the findings of the studies draw attention to organisation of 
work which has been, for some reasons, neglected or taken for granted despite the fact 
that computer applications are expected to support it. As for systems design, the 
studies demonstrate that designs of systems should be able to support the actual 
underlying process of the work rather than the supposed process of the work. And most 
importantly the technology should be designed to support the work rather than to
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undermine it (Harper, 1998). In order to achieve this, understanding work in its settings 
is suggested as the only way.
2.1.2.2 A ssessm ent of technology use: interactions between technology  
and organisations
The other main stream of CW studies technology use in the workplace. This body of 
research stresses and assesses surrounding issues of post implementation of CSCW 
related technology such as evaluating and reflecting factors contributing to acceptance 
or disappointment with the technology (Bowers, 1995; Bullen and Bennett, 1991; 
Ciborra, 1996a; Grinter, 1997; Grudin, 1988; Grudin, 1994; Markus and Connolly, 
1990; Star and Ruhleder, 1994), and investigating organisational changes around 
technology within the workplace (Bikson and Eveland, 1996; Ciborra and Suetens, 
1996; Failla, 1996; Karsten and Jones, 1998; Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski, 1996b; 
Wynn, 1996). The research undertaken in this area, by and large, is carried out in 
workplaces where CSCW related technology is adopted, and the findings drawn from 
the data aims to inform implementation management.
In general, the assessment of technology use is motivated to know why CSCW related 
technologies fail to live up to people’s expectations as “a significant investment has 
been made in their development, and their successes have consistently fallen far short of 
expectations” (Grudin, 1988). Here, “expectations” refer to general promises given by 
CSCW related technology to adopting organisations, and to expectations of 
organisational changes around the technology.
A set of general expectations tightly coupled with CSCW related technologies is that the 
technologies can improve communication, enable group/teamwork, enhance 
information sharing, and remove obstacles of time and place (Section 1.1). It is then 
assumed that organisations’ decision about adoption is to pursue this set of interests, 
and consequently the assessment of technology use is to evaluate the use of technology 
against the promises. When the result of the assessment does not match the initial 
promises given by the technology, then the adoption will be labelled as failure. This 
approach is termed as matching technique.
The mismatch between the promises and the actual outcomes of adoption, however, is 
noted not because of the technology failure per se but because of disparity of benefits
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(Grudin, 1988; Grudin, 1991; Grudin, 1994), because of a lack of critical mass (Markus, 
1990; Markus and Connolly, 1990), and because of unfamiliar working practice (i.e. 
working together) (Ciborra and Patriotta, 1996; Karsten, 1995; Markus and Benjamin, 
1997). The emphases are placed upon compatibility of the technology and its 
environment. Compatibility refers to how well needs for the technology and the new 
working concepts introduced by the technology fit into the current infrastructure (e.g. 
organisational settings, computer networks). IS practitioners are strongly recommended 
to choose an appropriate technology which fits into the existing infrastructure; to make 
necessary changes in order to install the chosen technology; or to compromise 
properties of both the technology and organisation.
Another kind of assessment carried out in post-implementation environments is to 
examine whether changes which are supposed to take place have occurred. 
Traditionally, this kind of assessment is about comparing alterations observed after the 
technology has been put in use with some pre-defined intended changes. If the 
intended consequences are not observed after the technology is put in place, then the 
mission of the technology or project would be declared as a failure. The studies are 
usually carried out during and shortly after technology implementation in organisations 
and their findings represent outcomes at one particular point of time. Recently, 
researchers have began to recognise that change is an ongoing process that does not 
have an end (Orlikowski, 1996a), and argue that the previous approach to assess most 
can mislead organisations to draw a partial conclusion. Viewing change as an ongoing 
process enriches the initial understanding that change can only be of one kind, that 
intended, and provides opportunity to examine changes under different headings, 
including unanticipated (Bikson, 1996; Heath and Luff, 1996), strategic/tactical (Sellen 
and Harper, 1996), opportunistic (Orlikowski, 1996b), emergent (Orlikowski and 
Hofman, 1997; Weick, 1993), and drifting (Ciborra, 1996).
Recognition of different types of changes and their dynamic nature provides an 
alternative viewpoint from which to draw conclusion of the outcome of technology 
adoption. Ciborra (1996a: 8) argues that When changes do not occur as they are 
anticipated or occur when they are unanticipated they should not always be regarded or 
interpreted negatively; for example, drifting can occur for both successful or failing 
applications. An implication of this assessment exercise is to draw people’s attention to
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what makes different types of change occur and how IS practitioners should harness the 
processes of change.
This section (2.1) has firstly described the development of CSCW research in four 
phases: emerging, formalising, maturing, and post modem. Each of these phases has 
special research interests linking to technology development in both software and 
hardware industry. From there, the section has reviewed research literature within the 
cooperative work (CW) domain under two headings: workplace study, and assessment 
of technology use. The research on workplace study usually ends with “thick” (i.e. 
detailed) descriptions of organisations of work under study, and with a list of 
recommendations or guidelines for systems design. The research on assessment of 
technology use ends with a list of factors which contribute to whatever was observed in 
the post-implementation environment, and with a list of recommendations for IS 
managers.
These two mainstreams in CSCW research present different phases of a system 
development lifecycle: problem definition and post-implementation. The literature 
review of CSCW presented in this section reveals that we know much about the issues 
concerned in these two phases but very little about the processes and activities in 
between despite they are equally important and interesting. The experience obtained in 
JF Taiwan shows that many important decisions about system adoption are indeed made 
in this period such as which problem definition is agreed to be translated into system 
requirement; which system is chosen to support the problem; how the system should be 
rolled out, and so on. These decisions although are made in the early stage of an IS 
project their long-standing effects on the subsequent consequences and events should, 
nevertheless, overlooked. In this sense, the reasons for a particular problem definition 
is translated and for a particular system is chosen need to be examined. Next section 
(2.2) will look at how these two issues are dealt with in IS research.
2.2 O rigins  o f techno lo g ical  so lutio ns
Technology adoption is often interpreted as a result of a careful assessment of all 
possible alternative solutions for problems recognised by an organisation. That is to 
say, the technology adoption is a rational solution for an organisation’s problems. Some 
IS as well as CSCW commentators, however, question this approach of looking at
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technology adoption and claim that individuals’ subjective views of problems and of 
technology sometimes predominate the situation and determine the decisions about the 
solutions chosen. In this sense, the technology adoption does not necessarily reflect 
objective reality but subjective interpretation of the reality. This section begins with the 
discussion of the literature which views technology adoption is a rational solution
(2.2.1), it is followed by the discussion of the literature that argues otherwise (2.2.2). 
The last part of this section (2.2.3) synthesises the literature reviews and the findings of 
the JF case study.
2.2.1 Technology adoption is a rational solution
It is suggested by some IS commentators that IS project are initiated or originate from 
the need for technological solutions to support business operation (automating process), 
to improve business practice (tactical), or to gain/maintain competitiveness (strategic) 
(Earl and Feeny, 1996; Fiedler, et al., 1995; Ives and Learmonth, 1984; Porter and 
Millar, 1985; Ward, et al., 1990). For example, Ward et al. (1990) identify four types 
of strategic needs:
■ Linking the organisation via technology-based systems to its 
customers/consumers and/or suppliers;
■ Improved integration of internal value-adding processes;
■ Enabling the organisation “to develop, produce, market and deliver 
new or enhanced products or services based on information”;
■ Top management support, especially external databases (pp. 22-4)
Similarly, CSCW researchers assume that the motivation of CSCW technology adoption 
is to satisfy organisations’ needs for collaborative work (Section 1.1 and 2.1.2.2). The 
assumptions underlying the argument of “needs” are that problems can be analysed and 
broken down into their component parts from which rational solutions are derived; and 
technology is chosen to be the solution.
The evidence shows that in reality when companies adopt a technology they neither 
have any formal strategy in mind nor execute the strategy in expected ways (Knights, et 
al., 1997: 17). The processual approach argues that a rational model of strategic 
planning which assumes that strategies can be articulated and planned in advance in fact 
is not pragmatic in practice. Instead, it claims that “decision-makers proceed
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cautiously, testing the waters, building on their competence, adapting to their 
interpretations of the environment, while maintaining internal cohesion so far as 
possible” (Knights, et al., 1997). Despite the processual approach claims that it 
provides an alternative view of assessing organisations’ strategic needs for 
technological solutions, its underlying assumption remains the same as that of the 
rational models: decision-makers make “rational” choices and decisions through 
constant assessment of environments. In other words, the assumption indeed is not, at 
bottom, different from the conventional rational approach.
A group of IS management writers argue that technology adoption is not always driven 
by the strategic or technological needs but by political needs. This approach sees that 
organisational politics is not deviant, occasional, informal, and irrational activity that 
prevents organisations from the achievement of their goals and strategies. Rather, it 
asserts that organisational politics predominate the process of the development and 
deployment of information technology (Knights and Murray, 1994: 28). Knights and 
Murray (1994: 30) argue that the central motor of organisational politics is the struggle 
that individuals compete to secure and pursue their career in organisations. Thus 
politics is not occasional and irrational conduct but is rationally derived from 
individuals’ objective operating conditions. To examine the process of technology 
deployment as political exercise can provide different views of the activities which 
other approaches conclude as irrational. But to rationalise individuals’ political 
activities and to claim that all conducts are politically driven only helps the analysis to 
certain extent. The approach assumes that individuals are aware of their surrounding 
socio-political and -economic environments all the time and constantly justify 
themselves, engineering and engaging in organisational politics consciously. 
Organisational politics is rational product and deployment of technology is the 
consequence of this product.
Although the above schools of thought demonstrate different views of the origins of the 
needs for technology adoption, a common underlying assumption found between them 
is that decision-makers are rational and that the decision they make are objective. The 
observations obtained in the preliminary case study (Section 1.2) suggest that 
individuals are not always rational and conscious of their choices and decisions. At 
times, it may be true that individuals’ decisions are influenced by their surrounding
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environment and may be motivated by the economic and political lure; however, they 
are predominately made on the basis of individuals’ personal insight and knowledge of 
problems, experiences, and expectations. In fact, decisions may also be made based on 
personal emotions (e.g. personal like or dislike). For example, it was frustration with 
the current systems that led employees in JF Taiwan to express their enthusiasm for 
Lotus Notes during interview despite the fact that they knew nothing about the system. 
This emotional frustration, together with politics between divisions/departments had 
direct impact on the employees’ expectations of Notes; for instance, the requirements 
for the new system collected from users showed that the expectations were 
unrealistically high and that as a result people reflected their feelings about the current 
systems and conflicts between individuals onto the new system.
A lesson learnt here is that individuals’ attitudes towards the technology are highly 
dependent on personal cognitive elements rather than on the result of cost-benefits 
analysis or of similar rational assessment. Put differently, origins of the need for 
technology may come from some cognitive reasons that decision-makers have. 
Cognitive elements have been played down in the main stream studies but are now 
gaining recognition within research on users’ attitudes to the technology (Adams, et al., 
1992; Davis, 1989; Harper and Randall, 1992; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Schneider 
and Angelmar, 1993). The following section will review the relevant literature of the 
impact of cognition on system designs and technology use within IS research. The 
review will then be compared to the observations made in the JF case study and from 
there move to articulate the role of individuals’ cognition in the initiation of IS 
solutions.
2.2.2 Technology adoption is subjective process
2.2.2.1 Subjectivity in IS research
The contribution of cognition to IS is often associated with human computer interaction 
(HCI) and interface designs and is thought only to be important in these areas. The 
main stream IS literature seldom discusses the relation between individuals’ cognition 
and IS development or considers the issue with the seriousness it merits. Bostrom and 
Heinen (1977) claim that system designs are often the reflections of systems designers’ 
frame of references which consist of a set of assumptions, perceptions, beliefs, and
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expectations of the world and of technology. Bostrom and Heinen note that the frames 
of reference held by individuals have a strong influence on how designers perceive the 
problems and translate them into the design. IS failure, in their explanation is, in fact, 
the gap between the needs of users and the design of the technology.
Hirschheim (1989) termed sets of different thinking of the world and of technology as 
paradigm thinking. Hirschheim borrows four paradigms developed by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) to illustrate how different assumptions of the world and technology that 
individuals have could impact on their system designs or on their style of managing 
information systems. Hirschheim therefore urges IS researchers and practitioners to be 
consciously aware of the set of beliefs and expectations that they adopt when designing 
or managing the system.
Walsham (1991) expresses a similar concern. He argues that how individuals think 
about and see organisations have impact on how they design and manage the system 
“either via the prescriptions which arise from information systems theory or as part of 
the way that analysts or systems developers view the organisational world in which they 
work” (p.83). For example, if an organisation is viewed as a machine which operates in 
a routinised, efficient, reliable and predictable way, then the information system would 
be expected to be designed in such a way to secure the routine and maintain stability; 
whereas as if organisation is viewed as a political system which consists of loose 
networks of people with divergent interests, the information system is likely to be used 
as means to achieve an equilibrium of divergent interest and power.
User acceptance has been a long-standing issue in IS research, as it determines the 
fortune of the system in an organisation. Past research has explored organisational and 
technological factors which influence user attitudes towards the technology, but factors 
such as individuals’ motivation and cognitive properties have not been discussed 
widely. Davis (1989) argues that user acceptance of information technology is largely 
affected by users’ subjective views of usefulness of the technology to their work, and by 
ease of use. The former is termed “perceived usefulness” and is explained as ‘"the 
degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would enhance his or 
her job performance” (p.320). The perceived ease of use is defined to be “the degree to 
which person believes that using a particular system would be free of effort” (p.320). 
Davis’ finding suggests that both perceived usefulness and ease of use are significantly
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correlated with self-reported indicants of system use. This echoes Robey’s (1979) 
thesis that “A system that does not help people perform their jobs is not likely to be 
received favourably in spite of careful implementation efforts” (p.523). Davis (1989) 
notes in his study that “perceived usefulness and ease of use are people’s subjective 
appraisal of performance and efforts, respectively, and do not necessarily reflect 
objective reality” (p.335). He therefore argues:
"... beliefs are seen as meaningful variables in their own right, which function as 
behavioural determinants, and are not regarded as surrogate measures of objective 
phenomena. ... Thus, even if an application would objectively improve performance, if 
users don’t perceive it as useful, they’re unlikely to use it” (p.335).
Davis’ work offers alternative measurements to examine and predict user acceptance of 
the new technology which have been proved by other researchers to be useful (Adams, 
et al., 1992); however, the work ignores the complexity underlying the measurements. 
For example, Davis assumes that the beliefs are intrinsic and independent from the 
environment, and then draws a general conclusion that people act according to their 
beliefs about performance (p.335). So the possibility that the beliefs change according 
to the environment or to the accumulated time of using the technology is altogether 
ignored in his study. Another weakness of Davis’ study is that only one set of cognitive 
property is recognised and regarded important to users’ acceptance of technology, belief 
in usefulness and ease of use, in practice other cognitive properties such as experiences, 
expectation, and knowledge (i.e. paradigm thinking) are equally influential to users’ 
attitudes towards the technology.
Ginzberg (1981) proposes that users’ early expectations of a technology could offer 
early diagnosis of MIS failure. In the study of a Trust Department of a large US bank 
Ginzberg noticed that a degree of realism of users’ pre-implementation expectations 
was positively correlated with a range of project success measures. In other words, 
when users hold realistic expectations of particular system they are more likely to be 
satisfied with the result then those who do not. Realism refers to how close users’ 
expectations are to designers’ versions of (1) the reasons for developing the system (its 
goals and objectives); (2) the importance of the problem being addressed; (3) the way 
the system will be used; (4) the impact the system is likely to have on the organisation; 
and (5) the criteria which should be used to evaluate the system. As pointed out earlier, 
systems designers’ expectations of the technology are also subjective appraisals of their
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own assumptions and beliefs of the world and technology, which, in turn, makes is 
difficult to tell whose expectations are realistic and whose are not.
Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987) in discussion of IS failure derive a term “expectation 
failure” to give consideration to the influence of expectations on IS projects. 
Expectations here consist of stakeholders’ interests, beliefs, and desires concerning how 
IS serves their interests. Lyytinen and Hirschheim argue that some failures by nature 
are not actual failure but are regarded to be occasions when individuals’ expectations 
are not met. Hence, they propose that expectation failure is intrinsically bound to 
individuals’ perceptions since it is not the failure of the technology but the dis- 
confirmation of expectations. As they comment, “failure is the embodiment of a 
perceived situation” (p.64).
In a study of the introduction of the microcomputer in three companies Caroll and Perin 
(1988) conclude that managers’ expectations of microcomputers directly affect the 
direction of implementation. Managers’ expectations of the technology could be seen 
as the sources that determine perceived alternative solutions, choices of specific system, 
perceived change strategies, and chosen strategy. Caroll and Perm derive three types of 
expectations (automating, informating, and networking) which they suggest to be 
explanations for why the scope and scale of organisational consequences differ; and 
why conventional understandings of centralised and decentralised management and cost 
control have different consequences. For example, the manager in one of the 
companies saw the microcomputer as a calculator and the employees were allowed to 
use it when they needed to prepare financial reports only. Thus, other benefits that 
microcomputers could have brought into the company were not realised. Carroll and 
Perm therefore conclude that “the kinds of expectations with which an organisation 
approaches new information technology does much to define the consequences that will 
be observed” (p.348).
Although the above notions offer alternative approaches to investigate systems design, 
user acceptance of technology, and IS failure, the lack of systematic investigations 
undermines the significance of the findings. Despite the fact that the above studies have 
given some thought to individuals’ subjective perceptions and expectations of the 
technology, they are still categorised within the traditional “objective” school of thought
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because little consideration has been given to the social and political dimensions (Lee, 
1999).
Compeau et al. (1999) propose social cognitive theory (SCT) as a method to study self- 
efficacy which they believe determines user attitudes to technology. By self-efficacy 
Compeau et al. mean t£beliefs about one’s ability to perform a specific behaviour -  
recognising that our expectations of positive outcomes of a behaviour will be 
meaningless if we doubt our capability to successfully execute the behaviour in the first 
place” (p. 146). SCT, argued by Compeau et al., explicitly acknowledges the existence 
of a continuous reciprocal interaction between the environment in which individuals 
operate, and their cognitive perceptions and behaviours. Compeau et al. specify some 
of the issues that imagine on the interactions as related to personal social status and to 
personal feelings about the technology and then employ these issues to measure 
outcome expectations, performance outcomes, and personal outcomes. The findings 
confirm their initial hypothesis that there is a causal relation between cognitive 
perceptions and individuals’ attitudes towards the technology, including the effect of 
realistic and unrealistic expectations on users’ satisfactions with the technology noted 
by Ginzberg (1981) previously. The major weakness of the study by Compeau et al. is 
that the authors do not explain how personal social status links to how individuals feel 
about the technology; where the feelings about the technology come from; and whether 
changes in self-efficacy take place and why and how.
Karahanna et al. (1999) challenge the lack of a dynamic model in the above study by 
proposing that users’ perceptions and use of IT are different before and after adoption. 
Karahanna et al. argue that whatever sociological factors all involved in the process, 
they may have divergent impact on individuals’ attitudes towards the technology at the 
various stages of sourcing and implementation. The model that the study adopted has 
two components: attitude (behavioural) and subjective norm. Behavioural belief refers 
to individuals’ salient beliefs about the consequences of adopting the IT and evaluation 
of these consequences. Normative belief refers to that individuals’ salient belief about 
what others expect them to do with respect to adopt the technology and their own 
motivation to comply with those beliefs. The finding of the study suggest that 
normative beliefs predominate individuals’ decisions about whether to accept the 
technology prior to the adoption; and that behavioural beliefs predominate users’
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decisions about continuing to use the technology after the adoption. This finding gives 
point to the possibility that decisions are made under social pressures; and that 
individuals’ subjective perception of experiencing the technology forms a part of it. 
Such considerations are regarded as significant because they addressed social situations 
and personal feelings about the technology and imply that there is an interplay between 
social norms, (potential) users, and technology. And most importantly, the process is 
second dynamic and individual reactions one perceived as changing throughout time.
2.2.2.2 Subjectivity in CSCW research
Comparing with IS research, there is a lack of systematic investigation of subjective 
determinants of decision about technology adoption in CSCW. Bullen and Bennett 
(1991) specified four general categories of organisational factors that contribute to 
CSCW technology adoption process; “expectations” was one of them. Expectations 
here refer to the purposes that lead organisations to introduce groupware into 
companies. According to Bullen and Bennett, if the purposes of adopting groupware 
are well defined, then the likelihood of having a successful system deployment is 
greater because ‘"the way in which new groupware tools are introduced to the work 
group will influence the ways in which they are used” (p.227). In a study of the 
adoption of Notes in a consulting company, Orlikowski (1992) argues strongly that 
cognitive properties have ability to both enable and constrain use of technology. In 
other words, individuals’ perceptions and expectations of technology directly influence 
the way that it is introduced and used3.
In a late study, Grinter (1996) argues that individuals’ or organisations’ perceptions and 
expectations of groupware can be an obstacle to prevent groupware from being utilised 
and optimised as it should be. Some individuals and organisations tend to use 
technology according to their expectations and interpretations rather than according to 
actual or defined functionality of the technology. A similar point was made by 
Hutchins (1991), despite his being more concerned about how artefacts could support 
problem solvers to interpret problems in particular way. Hutchins studied artefacts used 
for ship navigation and revealed that artefacts do not, as many might assume, amplify
3
Further discussions of this case study will be provided in the next chapter.
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individuals’ cognitive abilities but present a different cognitive problem which requires 
a different set of cognitive abilities or a different organisation of the same set of abilities 
to achieve useful resolutions. Hutchins argues that solving a problem simply means 
representing it so as to make the solution transparent and that the way that a problem is 
represented changes in compliance with the problem solvers’ views. He came to the 
conclusion that the ship navigators did not switch to those intelligent computer artefacts 
but continued using traditional instruments because the latter possessed the ability to 
make problems transparent to the individuals who have encounters with them. Problem 
transparency makes problems easier to be understood and allows navigators to find the 
solutions readily, this reduces the ambiguity embodied in interpretation.
Rogers (1994) and Plowman et al. (1995) also raise concerns about discrepancies 
between expectations of groupware and groupware in practice. Rogers and Plowman et 
al. notice that so-called groupware failure may be the result of a mismatch between 
promises made by vendors/practitioners and managers’ and users’ expectations. As 
Plowman et al. put:
“implementation of CSCW systems in work settings note how they have fallen short of 
expectations, being used sutHoptimally, not at all, or in different ways than intended. It 
appears that there is a mismatch between “the promises of software companies promoting 
their groupware products, management’s expectations of how these can be realised in 
their particular organisations, and the changes in work practices that have to be adopted 
by employees to enable the groupware to work in the ways intended and project” (p.317).
2.2.3 Choices and decisions about technology
The review of literature discussed above reveals a common phenomenon that 
individuals’ decision about adopting, continuing to use, or using a particular technology 
is not necessarily made on the basis of the concern about maximising institutional 
benefits but on the basis of subjective perceptions and expectations of the technology. 
This challenges the conventional assumption that technological solutions originate from 
the strategic and technological needs, as well as the assumption that choice and decision 
are bounded by rationality.
March (1997) summarises and identifies three conspicuous interrelated assumptions of 
choice taking in organisations; they comprise pre-existence of purpose, necessity of 
consistency, primacy of rationality. The assumption of pre-existence o f purpose refers 
to a strong tendency to believe that choices and decisions are based on a set of pre-
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defined objectives. The assumption of necessity o f consistency centre on concerns that 
actions taken by different parts of an organisation should be consistent with each other; 
that is, that individual and organisational activities should be seen as connected with 
each other in terms of their consequences, that there should be some consistent set of 
purpose. The primacy o f rationality assumption is to decide “what is correct behaviour 
by relating consequences systematically to objectives” (p.341). March argues that 
studies which over-emphasise the concept of rationality usually implicitly reject the two 
further procedures for choice and decision making: one is the process of intuition, by 
means of which people may do things without fully understanding why; the other is the 
processes of tradition and faith, through which people do things because that is the way 
they have been done in the past and hence, should be in the future.
March’s argument coincides with the findings of the JF case study. First, Lotus Notes 
was considered to be JF’s next IS project not because of some pre-existent purposes but 
because of frustrations with the current technological and political situations. In fact, 
the purposes were learnt and emerged during the process of problem definition and 
objective searching. Second, the idea of necessity of consistency was also challenged 
by the finding that there was no consistent interest, interpretation, expectations, and 
objective of problem situations and of the technology across the departments. This 
inconsistency of interest, interpretation, and expectations of the problems and 
technology was caused by individuals’ social and hierarchical status within the 
company and by particular patterns of work.
Both the review of literature and the findings of the case study demonstrate the interplay 
between individuals’ subjective perceptions and expectations of the technology, social 
and organisational properties, and the technology itself. Choices and decisions about 
adopting a particular technology do not necessarily reflect rationality of maximising that 
one can get from the technology benefits but reflect individuals’ experience. Because 
choices and decisions may reflect subjective preferences, the literature suggests that 
disappointment with the outcomes of implementation can be interpreted as a mismatch 
between an individual’s circumstance, the “real” problems, and the properties of the 
technology. The question then emerges: “Can the outcome of system adoption be 
determined in the early stage of the project if decisions about technology adoption are 
based on the ambiguous objectives?” Ginzberg (1981) raises the same issue and argues:
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“If the key decisions which determine the ultimate success or failure of an MIS are made 
near the start of the project (i.e., at Definition), we should be able to assess the chances 
for successful implementation at this early stage” (p.461).
The question forms an central part of the research agenda of the present thesis. The 
following section will discuss this research question and the agenda for the study.
2.3 R esearch  Q uestion
Discussion in preceding sections (2.1 and 2.2) has highlighted two, if not substantial but 
fundamental, areas in both IS and CSCW research. The literature review in section 2.1 
draws attention to the lack of consideration given to the origins of technological 
solutions in CSCW research. This lack of research can be explained as a consequence 
of the motivation for organisations to adopt CSCW related technology too often being 
seen as the same as that that the technology aims to achieve. This has a further impact 
(Section 2.2) in that topics such as why and how technological solutions emerge and on 
what basis they emerge are seldom touched upon. Studies which take the origins and 
motivations of technological solutions for granted present what might be termed a 
“tidy” picture; that is that decisions about adopting a particular technology emerge and 
are decided without any difficulty or conflict. In addition, such studies lead many of us 
to think that the solutions chosen must be the best ones that organisations can have. On 
these accounts, investigation or assessment of technology adoption tends to match the 
perceived solution and actual outcome of the adoptions, and draws a conclusion about 
the relation between technology and its hosting organisation. The findings of the 
preliminary case study discussed in Chapter One, however, does not support such a 
picture and argues that the process in which decisions about technology solutions 
emerge is in fact “messy”. Also, the preliminary study shows that decision-makers do 
not necessarily have the best knowledge of the problems and technology in order to 
make the tcbest” decisions. The decisions may reflect only the decision-makers’ 
personal views of their personal situations and agenda; in such circumstances, ideas 
about the best or rational decisions about the technology are indeed, a myth.
Developing ideas from the findings of the preliminary case study together with 
emerging questions from the literature review, this thesis proposes to investigate the 
origins of technological solutions for organisations’ problems. Such a proposal rests on 
a belief that the answers to why and how solutions originate hold the key to a better
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understanding of what is observed in post-implementation environments. In other 
words, the history of the project is substantial importance for what is currently 
happening. Ciborra (1996a) notes the significance of history with respect to a better 
understanding of what is currently happening:
“I strongly recommend the reader refer to each case history for a fuller picture and the 
details” (p.4).
Latour (1987) also expresses a similar concern and states
"[...] As a consequence, listeners make sentences less of a fact if they take them back 
where they came from, to the mouths and hands of whoever made them, or more of a fact 
if they use it to reach another, more uncertain goal. The difference is as great as going 
up or down a river. [...] We understand now why looking at earlier stages in the 
construction of facts and machines is more rewarding than remaining with the final 
stages" (p.24).
The importance of addressing the origins of a technological solution can be illustrated 
by providing extreme examples which demonstrate that the outcome of a project can be 
determined as early as the first stage of its development (Drummond, 1996; Keil, 1995). 
The disastrous Taurus project at London Stock Exchange (LSE) is an example which 
illustrates that decisions taken at an early stage of a project are indeed influential and 
have continuous impact on subsequent events (Drummond, 1996). Drummond claims 
that the outcome of the Taurus project as presented to the public could have been 
different if the decisions relating to the project were not made persistently in directions 
that individuals involved within it knew would not work.
This thesis takes a social cognitive approach to examine the origins of technological 
solution in organisations and emphasises the role of individuals’ cognitive properties in 
the process of determing and choosing the solutions. The present thesis takes a number 
of theoretical stands:
(1) Individuals’ attitudes towards a particular technology do not necessarily reflect 
what the technology offers but reflect individuals’ interpretation of problems, 
experience and expectation of technology, and personal agenda.
(2) Individuals take actions towards technology on the basis of the meanings which 
the technology has for them within the context. Therefore the same technology 
may be assigned with different meanings depending on individuals.
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(3) Individuals’ attitudes towards the technology change over time in accordance 
with their surrounding situation and knowledge of the technology.
(4) The decisions and choices made in the early phase of an IS project have an 
impact on the subsequent development of the project.
The research question is formulated to investigate how the perceptions and expectations 
o f individuals influence the decisions taken with regard to the initiation and acquisition 
o f a specific information system.
The findings of this study are expected to provide some insights into the process of how 
organisations come to determine a particular technological solution, if not on the basis 
of rationality and of choice. Predicted contributions to research literature are twofolds: 
firstly, a contribution to the knowledge which is less well presented in the current IS 
and CSCW literature. Secondly, a contribution to the knowledge of social cognitive 
approach in IS research.
2.4 S ummary
The development of CSCW research domains and the main streams of investigation 
concerning the areas of “CW” have been reviewed in this chapter. Through the 
literature review a less well represented research area was highlighted, that is, about the 
origins of groupware solutions in host organisations. Together with the findings from 
the JF Taiwan case study, this thesis found that decisions and choices about particular 
technology are influenced by individuals’ subjective understandings and expectations of 
the technology rather than organisations’ rational objectives. The present thesis, 
therefore, proposes to provide insights of why and how an IS project is initiated by 
studying the origins of an IS solution from the perspective of social cognition.
The next chapter will discuss the research framework deployed to assist the 
investigation.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Based on the review of the CSCW literature the previous chapter revealed research 
negligence towards origin of groupware adoption in current research. It was interpreted 
as a consequence that the motivations of initiating groupware adoptions have been 
either taken for granted or been assumed to be indifferent across organisations. 
However, the findings of the preliminary case study presented in Chapter One (Section 
1.2) demonstrated that decisions about groupware adoptions do not always reflect the 
objective reality but individuals’ subjective interpretation of the reality. In this sense, 
any decisions made about groupware adoption at the early stage could potentially affect 
the direction of further development of the technology. Because of the lack of 
literature of this area in CSCW the mainstream IS literature was reviewed. It is 
surprised that even the mainstream IS research pays little attention to the topic. This 
research therefore proposed to study origin of IS development and its focus will be on 
why the project is initiated and how a particular technological solution is determined to 
support the perceived problems. The findings of the preliminary case study suggested 
that individuals’ cognitive properties and interactions with others significantly influence 
their perceptions of problems, expectations of the technology, and decisions about the 
technology, thus, the questions will be approached from a social cognitive perspective.
In IS literature, it is evident and widely believed that individuals’ decisions about 
adopting information systems are by and large influenced by organisational politics
(2.2.1) and by individuals’ political interests within organisations. This was also 
observed in the preliminary case study when the senior manager was under pressure to 
accept JF Hong Kong’s suggestion to look at the possibility of installing Lotus Notes in
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the Taipei office. The senior manager might not have any idea about the technology, 
indeed showed little interest in it, but for various reasons she had to be seen to be 
interested, in the eyes of others’. The senior manager’s political motivation was 
reflected in her subjective views of technology. It is noted that an individual's political 
motivation is likely to be reflected in his or her subjective view and decision about 
technology adoption. In this context, it seems appropriate to deal with the political and 
power related issues as if they are a central and integral part of individual's subjective 
interpretation of technology rather than a separate problem.
Issues of decision making about innovation adoption have been considered in the 
diffusion of innovation approach (Rogers, 1995). The approach considers individuals’ 
decisions about acceptance or rejection of innovation. Rogers (1995) suggests that the 
process of individuals’ decision making about innovation can be analysed into five 
stages. These are: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. 
Rogers argues that the innovation-decision process begins with a ‘knowledge’ stage 
which commences when an individual is exposed to the innovation’s existence and 
gains some understanding of how it functions. However, the individual’s knowledge of 
the innovation is selective and depends on the individual’s interest, needs, or existing 
attitudes. It is these interests, needs, existing attitudes and their impact on the 
individual’s decisions about having the innovation that the present study is 
investigating. It is worth noting that we are interested in the impact of “having” rather 
than “adopting” the innovation. The difference between these two is that individuals 
who decide to have the innovation are not necessarily the same individuals who will 
adopt and use the technology. In the diffusion of innovation approach the former is 
understood as “change agency” while the latter is understood as “innovation adopters”, 
and the approach is focused mainly on the latter’s decisions about adoption. In this 
sense, we argue that the approach would be more suitable for studies which are 
interested in the process of information system adoption within organisations not for the 
study of this kind which focuses on the process in which change agencies’ formulate 
their perceptions and expectation of information systems and make decisions 
accordingly.
The ideas introduced by the technological frames analysis appear to echo the 
assumptions and arguments made by this research, hence, the analysis was employed to
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study individuals’ cognitive properties and the impacts of these properties on 
individuals’ decisions about the technology. A contextualist approach was employed 
and synthesized with the technological frames analysis to develop a conceptual 
framework to pursue the research interest. This chapter is dedicated to discussing the 
research framework and organized into three sections.
The first section (Section 3.1) introduces technological frames analysis and issues 
relating to the analysis. The second section (Section 3.2) outlines a contextualist 
approach developed by Pettigrew (1987) and its role in this research. The third section 
(Section 3.3) synthesizes the technological frames analysis with the contextualist 
approach and discuss as how the synthesised framework will be applied later in the 
thesis.
3.1 T echnological  frames  analysis
Technological frames analysis was developed by Orlikowski and Gash (Orlikowski and 
Gash, 1992; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) to study underlying assumptions, expectations, 
and knowledge that people have about technology. It is important, according to them, 
to understand such underlying cognitive threads as they have influential effects on 
individuals’ behaviour towards technology. As Orlikowski and Gash (1994) write:
“We argue that an understanding of people’s interpretations of a technology is critical to 
understanding their interaction with it. To interact with technology, people have to make 
sense of it; and in this sense-making process, they develop particular assumptions, 
expectations, and knowledge of the technology, which then serve to shape subsequent 
actions toward it. While these interpretations become take-for-granted and are rarely 
brought to the surface and reflected on, they nevertheless remain significant in 
influencing how actors in organisations think about and act toward technology” (p. 175).
The underlying assumptions and arguments of Orlikowski and Gash’s technological 
frames analysis and of the present study share a common ground as they both emphasis 
the importance and role of knowledge, of interpretations, and of expectations of 
technology in the interactions that occur between individuals and technology. It is for 
this reason that technological frames analysis was deployed: in order to acquire insights 
into the proposed topic.
Discussion in this section will be organised into several sub-sections: Concept of 
Frames (3.1.1), Technological Frames Analysis (3.1.2), Applications of Technological 
Frames (3.1.3), and Critiques of Technological Frames Analysis (3.1.4). Section 3.1.1
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is dedicated to a discussion of some concepts of ‘frames’ in social cognitive research; 
from there the technological frames analysis is introduced (3.1.2). Literature reviewed 
and referenced here follows the literature used by Orlikowski and Gash in order to 
understand the ideas embedded in the technological frames analysis better. Section 3.1.3 
introduces other studies which are applications of the technological frames analysis, and 
is followed by a consideration of some of the limitations of the approach (3.1.4).
3.1.1 The Concept of Frames
Orlikowski and Gash's technological frames analysis has its roots in research which 
studies social cognitive processes within the context of organisations. Most of their 
arguments are drawn from work included in the book Thinking Organisations (Sims and 
Gioia, 1986). This book aims to study the underlying processes that bear on the reasons 
for human actions, rather than the results.
“Much of what has been written about organisations has focused mainly on behaviours 
and outcomes, without an in-depth understanding of the cognitive processes that 
influence those behaviours and outcomes” (p. 3).
Social cognition emphasises the importance of “meaning” for individuals’ actions when 
individuals enact things such as objects, social occurrences, and concepts. The main 
argument of social cognitive research is that "people act on the basis of their 
interpretations of the world, and in doing so enact particular social realities and endow 
them with meaning" (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). These interpretations of the world 
can be described as being based on a set of "cognitive maps", "frames", "interpretive 
schemes", "mental models", "paradigms", "scripts", or "thought worlds". These terms 
all have a common characteristic in that they are each used as a sense-making device in 
order to describe how people attribute meanings to things. Orlikowski and Gash adopt 
the term “frames” and develop it further in the context of organisational study. 
According to them frames are “definitions of organisational reality that serve as a 
vehicle for understanding and action”, and consist of sets of assumptions, beliefs, 
knowledge, expectations, and interpretations. Frames, on one hand, as Orlikowski and 
Gash argue, enable individuals to make sense of events and on the other hand guide 
individuals’ behaviour to act appropriately in their situations.
It is worth noting the differences between mental models and Orlikowski and Gash's 
idea of frame. Mental models are argued to be the foundations of reasoning which
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consist of formal rules of inference, like those of a logical calculus (Johnson-Laird, 
1989). Theories of mental models are various but most of them share a similar feature 
that the boundary of a mental model is drawn around an individual. That is, it is self- 
contained and processing information independently from the external world. In this 
sense a mental model is individualistic. On the contrary, Orlikowski and Gash argue 
that individuals' ability to interpret an even relies not only on the existing body of 
knowledge which they have but also on their relationship with the external world. In 
this sense, frames are shared (Bijker, 1995) or have potential to be shared by 
individuals (Orlikowksi and Gash, 1994). This view is particularly important to the 
present study as it argues that through interactions individuals are likely to alter their 
own frames or others' in order to achieve decisions.
A frame has a number of qualities. First, it is a device for sensemaking. People use it 
to organise and make sense of information and to ascribe meaning to the world around 
them. A frame directs appropriate behaviour or even sequences in specific situations, so 
people can act on the basis of the meaning that things have for them.
A frame operates as a short cut and a filter with which to understand some things and to 
ignore others. If a similar situation has happened in the past, the individual is likely to 
deal with the current situation in accordance with the experience and knowledge gained 
from that past situation and at the same time expect to see a similar result. If there is no 
historical occurrence which the individual can use as a model to handle the current 
situation, the individual will search for knowledge of other events in the same category 
of frames in order to facilitate understanding and action. Frames are particularly useful 
when they structure organisational experience, allow interpretation of ambiguous 
situations, reduce uncertainty in situations of complexity and change, and provide a 
basis for taking action.
As a cognitive structure a frame is unique to an individual. It is assumed that frames are 
formed through social background, learning process, and experience with events hence 
they are only meaningful to the individuals who own them. This explains why different 
individuals interpret the same event differently and act towards the events differently.
Frames are interpretive flexible and context specific. Individuals referencing to the 
same frame to make sense of the same event or thing in different context are expected to
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arrive at different interpretations and conclusions of the event. This explains existence 
of inconsistency of frames which refers to the phenomenon that individuals may 
believe, for example, a new technology will be benefit to people’s general performance 
but they themselves do not use the technology.
Finally, frames operate in the background and do not have physical forms. Since frame 
is a cognitive property and individuals have difficult to describe it in words it can only 
be observed via the meanings given to things by individuals and through observation o f 
their actions.
Typology of frames
At least three broad types of frame are identified within organisations: individual, 
group, and organisational. As its name suggests, individual frames are held and owned 
by individuals and used as vehicles to enable individuals to understand the world around 
them and as guides for appropriate behaviour. With individual frames individuals 
make sense of what is going on around them both in their personal and in their working 
lives.
A group frame is shared by people in the same group who have common interests, 
educational background, or jobs. The social cognitive perspective develops the concept 
of frames as individual cognitive structures but suggests that after a period of time 
individuals within a group or organisation tend to think, at least to some degree, alike. 
That is that individuals tend to share a set of frames with peers within a group or 
organisation. Within social cognitive research a frame which is shared by individuals 
within the same group is termed ‘cognitive consensuality’ (Gioia and Sims, 1986). 
Consensuality does not mean that all members of a group will think and behave 
identically, rather it implies that “whatever the process -  conscious or unconscious, 
deliberate or not, individuals have achieved a certain similarity in the way they process 
and evaluate information” (Gioia and Sims, 1986: 8). Instead of following the argument 
of consensuality in social cognitive research Orlikowski and Gash employ 
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance. Following the notion of family 
resemblance a shared frame refers to how the members of a community share some core 
assumptions, knowledge, and expectations of the same thing. A shared frame serves as
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a device to facilitate group to make sense of events and in turn to take actions to 
respond to the events.
Building upon the same argument of shared frame organisational frames are expected to 
serve as a facilitator to help members of staff to some sort of common understanding of 
the organisation and organisational occurrences such as formal meetings, decision 
situations, performance appraisals, and day-to-day employee interactions (Gioia, 1984).
The relationship between the above three types of frames is not linear. In other words, 
an organisational frame is not a collection of group frames and similarly a group frame 
is certainly not the sum of individual frames. The relationship between individual, 
group, and organisational frames is interdependent and interconnected and one cannot 
operate without others. An individual is expected to reference his/her frames to make 
sense of an event within the constraints of group and organisational frames. Similarly, 
an organisational frame is built-in with individual and group frames, so it is common to 
find that organisational visions reflect a particular individual’s or group of individuals’ 
frames.
Shared frame and subculture
The notion of shared frame especially group frames in particular may be confused with 
the concept o f ‘subculture’ in organisations. Schein (1996) defines culture as:
“[...] a set of basic tacit assumptions about how the world is and ought to be that a group 
of people share and that determines their perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and, to some 
degree, their overt behaviour” (p. 11).
In Schein’s view ‘subculture’ is understood as a set of shared assumptions, knowledge, 
and goals formed around the same function. Schein therefore argues that the problem 
of why cross-functional project teams do not perform well arises from the difficulties of 
integrating different subcultures into one (e.g. the hierarchical view).
Confusion between the concepts of shared frames and subculture arises if the definition 
of organisational subculture by Schein is taken literally. Schein’s definition seems to 
blend various things into the term ‘culture’ and assumes that ‘culture’ holds the key to 
answering questions of cross-functional unity, the unique characteristic of each 
function, management style, and so on.
Morgan (1986) argues, however, that using shared assumptions, knowledge, and shared 
sense-making to describe organisational culture or subculture does not really describe 
the whole characteristics of culture. He proposes rather that in talking about culture 
one should focus one’s attention on a process of reality construction since it allows 
people to “see and understand particular events, actions, objects, utterances, or 
situations in distinctive ways” (Morgan 1986: 128). Morgan (1986) argues that 
constructing social reality is important because the nature of a culture can be found in 
its social norms and customs.
“The characteristics of the culture being observed will gradually become evident as one 
becomes aware of the patterns of interaction between individuals, the language that is 
used, the images and themes explored in conversation, and the various rituals of daily 
routine” (p. 128).
‘Culture’ here is defined with a more ‘contextual’ view. Morgan uses several terms to 
describe culture including patterns of behaviour, social norms, circumstances, and 
context. These terms are used to describe the characteristics of a space / environment in 
which people’s thoughts and behaviours are bounded.
In contrast, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) want to distinguish the differences between 
subculture and types of frames in their model and argue that frames are essentially 
cognitive structures or mental models while culture refers to a “living historical product 
of group problem solving”:
“[...] individuals -  drawing on their shared frames -  engage in symbolic action and 
thereby construct a social reality that reflects their common assumptions, beliefs, and 
understandings, and that includes particular rules, rituals, and customary practices”
(p. 178).
Put simply, the notion of frames is about cognitive structures or knowledge structures 
which facilitate individuals’ understandings of the world; and the notion of culture and 
subcultures is about social systems which govern the thoughts and behaviour of the 
majority of the individuals who are within such systems. Hence, the subculture should 
be seen as a context in which a specific shared frame is formed but it is in itself not a 
frame.
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3.1.2 Technological Frames Analysis
Building upon the ideas of social cognitive research Orlikowski and Gash take the 
concept of frames further and develop a conceptual model -  technological frames 
analysis -  which aims to investigate the use of technologies in organisations. 
Technological frames analysis helps to understand the reasoning behind individuals’ 
behaviour rather than to record events, and this is an area that Orlikowski and Gash 
argue much of the current research has overlooked.
Frames are then an abstraction for the cognitive and knowledge structures which serve 
as vehicles for understanding and action. Technological frames are referred to as “a set 
of assumptions, meanings, knowledge, and expectations that people use to understand 
the nature and role of technology in organisations. This includes not only the nature 
and role of the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and 
consequences of that technology in particular contexts” (Orlikowski and Gash, 1992: 3).
The principal thrust of technological frames analysis is that individuals interact with 
technology in accordance with the meaning that the technology has for them. In other 
words, individuals make sense of technology and then interact with it. In this sense- 
making process individuals develop a set of perceptions, assumptions, definitions, 
interpretations, and expectations of the technology namely technological frames current 
context. Once technological frames are formed, individuals decide their own actions 
towards technology.
The features of technological frames are inherited from the general concept of frames in 
social cognitive studies (Section 3.2.1). Technological frames are unique and belong to 
the individuals who hold them; based on the technological frames individuals develop 
their personal views of a piece of technology. Because technological frames differ from 
one individual to another, interpretations of the same piece of technology therefore 
differ between individuals. As a consequence interactions between individuals and the 
technology are various.
Technological frames serve as a short cut and a filter by which individuals make sense 
of technology based on their experiences with technology earlier. In JF Taiwan, the 
employees’ experiences with other information systems and knowledge of the problems 
serve as a device to help them to form the expectations of the new system despite they
- 5 2 -
knew very little about the technology. For example, the Managing Director had high 
expectation of Lotus Notes because the personal experience of using Lotus cc:Mail was 
successful.
The notion of ‘relevant social groups’ from the literature of the social construction of 
technology (SCOT) was brought into the technological frames analysis to enrich the 
framework. Orlikowski and Gash use the notion to explain how social groups have 
influences on, and at the same time are influenced by, the artefacts in which they come 
in contact. According to Pinch and Bijker (1987) a problem can be defined only when 
relevant social groups are identified. The concept is straightforward because the 
meanings that the social groups give to the artefacts determine the role that the artefacts 
play. Pinch and Bijker write:
“[...] the different interpretations by social groups of the content of artefacts lead by 
means of different chains of problems and solutions to different further developments”
(p.42).
Once relevant social groups are identified other components of technological systems 
can be brought into the picture such as economics, politics, and institutions. Hughes 
(1987) notes that a technological system not only consists of physical objects 
(technology itself) but also organisations, legislative artefacts, and natural resources. A 
technology functions as a component and interacts with other components in a system, 
all of which contribute directly or indirectly through other components to the common 
system goal. If one component is removed or if its characteristics change, other 
components in the system will alter their characteristics accordingly. Because 
components are invented and developed by system builders and their associates, they 
are socially-constructed artefacts, meaning that their material form and function will 
embody the relevant social groups’ objectives, values, interests, and knowledge of that 
technology (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). Since all the components within both 
technological and social systems interact with one another, the characteristics of 
technology are likely to derive from these interactions. For example, a management 
structure depends on the nature of the business and on the character of the functioning 
hardware, especially so in the manufacturing sector. In turn, the management 
component in a technological system is likely to choose a technology that can support 
the structure of management.
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Since it is assumed that individuals within these social groups, to some degree, share the 
same set of technological frames, they are expected to act more or less the same towards 
the technology as a group. Nevertheless, the set of shared technological frames within a 
group may not be shared by other groups as others have different interests to pursue and 
different experiences of the world. This phenomenon is explained as “interpretive 
flexibility” which maintains that technological artefacts are socially constructed and 
interpreted. This concept helps to explain why there is incongruence of technological 
frames between groups as different social groups interacting with the same technology 
have different concerns and even radically different interpretations of that technology.
Orlikowski and Gash define congruence of technological frames existing when groups 
share “similar expectations around the role of technology in business processes, the 
nature of technological use, or the type and frequency of support and maintenance.” 
Incongruence of technological frames refers to the fact that “there are differences in 
important expectations, assumptions, or knowledge about some key aspects of the 
technology” (p. 179).
In the Alpha case study Orlikowski and Gash identified three social groups which they 
argue play key roles throughout a system life: the traditional trinity of management, 
systems designers/IT personnel and users. They found that technological frames around 
the Notes technology held by technologists and users were not much in common. 
Contrasting technologists’ and users’ technological frames in three areas (nature of 
technology, technology strategy, and technology use), Orlikowski and Gash argue that 
differences in expectations and actions between technologists and users which led to 
unwanted outcomes can be said to reveal the differences in the respective technological 
frames of the two groups. In fact, technological frames incongruence between the two 
groups was found in all three areas.
Orlikowski and Gash further argue that frames may be internally inconsistent. By 
inconsistency they mean that frames can “embody ideas that are ambiguous, obsolete, 
incomplete, or incorrect” (p. 181). This inconsistency in technology frames has 
important consequences for the implementation of technology. For example, managers 
may think that an electronic scheduler can speed up the process of arranging meetings 
or appointments because the system provides the facility to let people view others’ 
schedules to check availability, while at the same time they themselves do not want to
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use it (Grudin 1988). One reason for an unwillingness to use the system is that the 
managers have an idea that the system is useful for others but not to themselves, since 
they don’t want others to see their own schedule.
The notion of technological frames is also discussed in Bijker’s (1995) study of 
Bakelite. A number of fundamental assumptions of both technological frames analyses 
are similar. As for both Bijker and Orlikowski and Gash, a technological frame 
provides goals, ideas, and tools needed for actions and it guides thinking and 
interactions performed by the relevant social groups. Moreover, both technological 
frames analyses emphasise the nature of the interpretative flexibility of technology. The 
meaning of a particular technology depends on who is associates with it, as Bijker 
(1995) writes that “working and nonworking of an artefact are socially constructed 
assessments, rather than intrinsic properties of the artefact” (p.75). This leads to the 
element of relevant social group in both analyses. Each relevant social group has its 
own technological frame which allows group members to communicate with the same 
vocabulary and guides their actions towards the technology.
In spite of their similarities, Bijker’s work on technological frames differs from 
Orlikowski and Gash’s in many respects. A fundamental difference is that the former 
has roots in the social construction of technology (SCOT) and focuses on both change 
and constancy in technological development; while the latter has strong roots, as 
claimed, in social cognitive theory and is interested in meanings that individuals assign 
to the technology. On closer scrutiny, it can be argued that social-cognitive 
technological frames, is similar to the semiotic scope of technological frames (Bijker, 
1995). This scope views that the frames “mirror technological development and 
provide the vocabulary for forming artefacts, and constitute another type of world” 
(Bijker, 1995: 195). For example, Orlikowski and Gash has demonstrated that 
technological frames provide individuals with a set of values and assumptions to enable 
them to formulate the meanings of the technology and then they act toward the 
technology according to the meanings. Moreover, the social constructionist viewpoint 
of technological frames analysis argues that a technological frame does not reside in but 
external to individual and is located at the level of social relevant group. However, 
social cognitive technological frames analysis argues that a technological frame belongs
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to individuals and at the same time individuals who may share the same group can share 
a technological frame which is sustained continuously through interactions.
3.1.3 Applications of Technological Frames Analysis
On the basis of a literature search there are four studies in information systems research 
that explicitly use technological frames analysis to study technology use and 
organisational changes in the post implementation period including two studies 
conducted by Orlikowski and Gash (1992, 1994). These studies are Changing Frames: 
Understanding Technological Changes in Organisations, Learning From Notes: 
Organisational Issues in Groupware Implementation (Orlikowski, 1992), Technological 
Frames: Making Sense o f Information Technology in organisations (Orlikowski and 
Gash, 1994), and Implementing Radical Change: Gradual versus Rapid Pace (Gallivan,
1994). How technological frames analysis is applied in each of these studies will now 
be considered.
Changing Frames: Understanding Technological Changes in Organisations
In this study Orlikowski and Gash (1992) use technological frames analysis together 
with the topology of technological changes (which consists of first order change, second 
order change, and third order change) to discuss shifts in technological frames held by 
the three critical social groups -  management, technologists, and users -  in relation to 
technological changes which occur in organisations. Orlikowski and Gash claim that 
“comparison of frames across groups over time reveals the nature of change that 
particular groups have experienced as well as the areas and extent of incongruence 
around new information technology” (p.9).
Orlikowski and Gash identify at least seven sets of dimensions that constitute the core 
dimensions of technological frames. They are shown in Table 3.1. They assume that 
when individuals face a piece of technology their actions towards the technology will be 
led and influenced by some of the dimensions identified.
When first order change takes place, existing frames and processes will be reinforced 
incrementally so current assumptions, meanings, knowledge and process are modified 
(the term ‘process’ is understood as a business process revolving around the 
technology). When second order change happens, existing frames and process shift
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dramatically. Usually, second order change is associated with organisational 
transformation which involves radical changes not only in frames but also in evaluation 
criteria, formal roles, structures, and social norms. Third order change refers to the 
capacity of individuals and organisations to be able regularly to reflect on their existing 
frames, processes, and interactions, and to change them if necessary.
The archetypal outcomes of technological changes include aligned intended change, 
partial intended change, and unintended change. Aligned intended change implies that 
the three social groups share a common understanding, agreement, and commitment to 
the direction of the changes. Partial intended change means that not all three groups 
have changed their technological frames either incrementally or radically. Finally, 
unintended change indicates that one or more members of a group experience changes 
which are not planned or expected.
Orlikowski and Gash’s synthesised framework, which consists of technological frames 
analysis, a typology of changes, and a description of the archetypal outcomes of 
technological changes, is grounded in the argument that it is the underlying 
assumptions, meanings, expectations, and knowledge that people have about technology 
which guides their behaviour towards the technology. Through the lens of this 
framework, conflicts between the plans and the outcomes of technological change can 
be explained. Various scenarios are summarised in Table 3.2.
Dimension Definition Components
Philosophy towards 
technology
Beliefs and assumptions about technology and information technology in general, as held by self and 
perceptions of organisations’ philosophy
Personal philosophy 
Organisational Philosophy
Issues around initiation Knowledge and experiences of the initiation stage of a specific technology, including background, 
participants, feasibility assessment, and perceptions of the technology’s objectives, utility, and importance.
Rationale/History, Costs/Benefits 
Decision process, Managerial 
Support
Issues around 
implementation
Knowledge and experiences of the implementation process of a specific technology, including background, 
participants, stages, design issues, support from users, managers, ethnologists, and others.
Involvement, Barriers/Facilitators 
Cost / Scope / Timeframe 
Training, Managerial Support
Issues around use Knowledge and experiences of the use of a specific technology, including frequency and discretion of use, 
level of customisation, satisfaction, technical support, maintenance requirements, and expectations and 
experiences about the technology’s criticality, ease of use, usefulness, quality, reliability, integrity, and 
availability.
Customisation, Maintenance 
Technology attributes
Criteria of success Beliefs about how the success of a specific technology is being or should be assessed, and which particular 
criteria and measures are or should be used. Assessment of how a specific technology is meeting these 
criteria.
Criteria, Measures, Experiences
Impact Expectations or experiences about the impact of a specific technology on the strategy, structure, culture, and 
way of doing business, as well as how a specific technology should or has/will change jobs, tasks, autonomy, 
control mechanisms, skills/knowledge, responsibility, social relations, status, workload and stress.
Organisation-wide effects 
Task-level effects, 
Individual effects
Relations with other 
players in the computing 
social world
Expectations and experiences about the frequency and extent of interaction with other players about IT, the 
nature of the interaction including the role played in this relationship, and perceptions of attitude towards and 
understanding of technology
Managers (senior, middle) 
Technologists, Users 
Third parties (e.g. Consultants)
Table 3.1: Seven dimensions of technological frames Source: Orlikowski and Gash, 1992
First order Change Second order change Third order change
Characteristics Incremental change intended to refine and extend 
status quo
Technological frames are modified to reflect 
extensions to technology
Motivated by desire to cut costs, increase efficiency, 
or improve productivity.
Radical change intended to transform or replace the 
status quo
Technological frames are changed to reflect the new 
technology
Motivated by crisis or significant innovation 
opportunity
Human, organisational and technological 
systems are intended to be open to the 
possibility of future change 
Acknowledges that frames need frequent 
monitoring and modification when 
assumptions become invalid 
Motivated by desire to be more flexible and 
reflective in fast-changing world
Examples Typically systems built in the 1960s and 1970s 
Accounts receivable system that automates existi9ng 
manual procedures
Typically systems built in the 1980s 
Just-in-time inventory system that replaces manual 
order entry and purchasing procedures by creating 
direct electronic link between retailers and suppliers
Future systems
Tax software that monitors and updates its 
routines when it detects changes in tax law or 
changes in interpretation and application of 
the tax law
Incongruence More subtle than in second or third order change
If occurs, is not likely to be disruptive
May be addressed with increased training or
communication
More obvious than in first or third order change 
If occurs, is likely to be very disruptive 
Increased training or communication may be less 
effective if incongruence is due to political battles; 
requires process workshops and change management 
education.
Either one group forces the other/s to change their 
frames or revert to old ones, or the organisation 
becomes increasingly dysfunctional and unstable over 
time.
More likely due to divergent interpretations of 
change rather than resistance
Requires training in learning systems and 
process workshops, as well as belief in the 
high probability of future change
Measurement Issues Traditional research designs can detect measurable 
improvements in process and outcome with pre and 
post measures
Traditional research designs cannot detect any 
unintended changes
Traditional research designs can detect measurable 
improvements in outcomes, but cannot detect paradigmatic 
change with pre and post measures
Traditional research designs cannot detect any 
unintended changes
Alternative research designs and measures may be 
more useful to capture unintended changes and 
paradigmatic change
Traditional research designs cannot detect 
change in paradigm to continual learning 
Alternative research designs and measures 
may be more useful to capture change in 
paradigm, such as the development of 
learning and reflecting mechanisms.
Table 3.2: Summary of orders of intended technological changes Source: Orlikowski and Gash, 1992
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Learning From Notes: Organisational Issues in Groupware Implementation
Borrowing concepts from technological frames analysis Orlikowski (1992) suggests in this 
study that the lack of communications and of formal training on the new system (Lotus 
Notes) is one of the reasons that the system did not live up to original expectations. The 
argument is that the employees used the system in accordance with their existing 
technological frames. Since there was no new concept relating to groupware technology, 
the employees did not use Lotus Notes as groupware but used it like other systems which 
they knew of and for which they had developed frames. The assumptions behind the 
argument are that how users change their technological frames in response to a new 
technology depends on (1) the kind and amount of information about the technology 
communicated to them, and (2) the training they receive on the technology. The less the 
communication and training on the new system, the more likely the company will create 
incongruences in its technological frames.
Technological Frames: Making Sense oflnformation Technology in organisations
It is in this study that Orlikowski and Gash (1994) fully describe technological frames 
analysis, and use the analysis to analyse the Alpha case study. Based on their empirical 
findings three frame domains were used to understand the interpretations that 
participants made about Notes and its role in the company. Orlikowski and Gash (1992) 
explained that the seven dimensions which they had derived earlier in another paper 
were not employed because technological frames are both time- and context-dependent, 
and should be examined in situ and not defined in advance. This can be illustrated by 
the fact that only two of the seven dimensions were observed in Alpha.
The three frame domains derived from the findings include the ‘nature of technology’, 
‘technology strategy’, and ‘technology in use’. The nature of technology refers to 
people’s understandings and perceptions of the technology; technology strategy refers 
to people’s views of their organisation’s motivations for adopting the technology; and 
technology in use implies people’s understandings of how the technology should be 
used on a day to day basis. The technological frames held by the technologists and 
users were examined.
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The findings of the study show that the users’ visions of the nature of technology, 
technology strategy, and technology in use “scattered” around the technologists. For 
example, the technologists perceived that the Notes would provide a standardised 
communication platform for information sharing, electronic communication, document 
management, and on-line discussion. From this understanding Notes is a potential 
device for enabling group work in the company. In contrast, user groups saw Notes as a 
means to augment personal productivity rather than as a group tool. As a result, the 
capability of the tool to facilitate group work and collaboration was largely ignored. 
The findings also suggest that the incongruence in frames between the technologists and 
users caused, to some degree, an initial barrier of scepticism both within the technology 
group itself and the user group, as well as frustration and the perception that the 
company did not recognise the system’s potential of supporting groupwork.
Implementing Radical Change: Gradual versus Rapid Pace
Gallivan (1994) employs technological frames analysis to study different stakeholders’ 
visions of organisational and technological changes in the Information Systems (IS) 
Department of a regional telecommunications company. These changes coincided with 
other changes which occurred in the company during the period of the study; however, 
Gallivan focuses on organisational and technological changes only in the IS department 
and treats other changes as part of the organisational context within which changes in 
the IS department were taking place. The changes in the IS department arose from the 
adoption of new technologies including client/server technology, object-oriented 
development, and graphical user interface (GUI) development tools. Adopting these 
new technologies meant some necessary hiring, training and other learning processes; in 
other words, reskilling was required. Reskilling is defined as replacing or realigning the 
existing IS staff and resources. The study was conducted to investigate the reskilling 
process and the stakeholders’ understandings and knowledge of reskilling in the 
Information Systems Department. The result of the study suggests that there was an 
existing incongruence4 in the technological frames across groups. For example, the
4
Although Gallivan uses the term ‘inconsistent’ instead of incongruence in the paper, it can be argued 
however that the term ‘inconsistent’ is misused. Gallivan uses the term to describe how ‘reskilling’ 
presented different meanings to the different stakeholders and how these meanings are not only not shared 
across groups but may even be contradictory to one another. This phenomenon is understood as
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group of change management specialists saw reskilling as more than the migration of 
the new technologies within the company. They were concerned about a broader set of 
changes introduced by the new technologies which began with new ways of organising 
and serving users. On the contrary, the IS managers and employees perceived that 
reskilling is merely updating the IS personnel’s technical skills. Finally, “outsiders” to 
the reskilling initiative shared some assumptions with the change management specialist 
group such as the degree of organisational transformation necessary, but they did not 
share a belief about how this transformation might be achieved.
3.1.4 Critiques of technological frames analysis
The above studies demonstrate the virtue of applying technological frames analysis to 
examine interactions between individuals and technology; nevertheless there are a 
number of weakness in the framework. These weakness can be divided into two kinds 
that one is generic and can be found in most cognitive arguments and while the other is 
specific to the technological frames analysis.
3.1.4.1 Generic problems of the technological frames analysis
Despite the fact that Orlikowski and Gash (1994) claim that the framework was 
developed from the ideas of social cognitivism and other social theories (SCOT and 
Wittenstein’s family resemblance) nevertheless the framework faces similar criticisms 
that the traditional cognitivist study faces. Cognition is defined as “information 
processing as symbolic computation -  rule-based manipulation of symbols” (Varela, et 
al., 1993: 42). Traditional information studies of symbolic processing assume that “all 
the action is inside the head, yielding a natural distinction between the stuff out there 
and the processes taking place inside here” (Norman, 1993: 3). In such a view the 
context in which an individual situates is seen to take place in the head and the actions 
taken are determined directly by the outcome of that process. It is therefore thought 
that human behaviour can be described in formalism.
It was found that the technological frames analysis, to extent, shares the above 
assumptions and arguments made by the traditional cogitivist study. The framework
incongruent rather than inconsistent in the context of technological frames analysis.
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believes that human cognition can be articulated and made visible in turn interactions 
between human and technology can be articulated and predicted in advance (Orlikowski 
and Gash, 1994: 199). Moreover, cognitive process has been seen as essentially a linear 
relationship and process. For example, it is often assumed that symbols are regarded as 
media with which people communicate; schemas which store individuals’ experiences, 
knowledge, philosophy and other psychological elements in different categories are 
used to make sense of situations that individuals face; and scripts guide individuals’ 
behaviour according to the ‘suggestions’ prompted by the schemas. The technological 
frames analysis seems to suggest that interactions with outside (i.e. outside the cognitive 
process) are not considered (self-contained); and frames are structural and procedural, 
meaning that they are made up of elements and that each of the elements are prosecuted 
at an appropriate time.
Such ideas must question whether technological frames have actual form and whether 
they can be observed and captured by human beings. But despite the definition of 
technological frames and the several dimensions of technological frames given by 
Orlikowski and Gash, which may lead us to think otherwise, the answers might be 
negative. It is wrong to imagine that technological frames have physical form and can 
be formalised to predict individuals’ actions. Nevertheless, the framework is useful as it 
provides a conceptual model to examine motivation behind individuals’ actions towards 
the technologies. Because it is a conceptual model, it should not be imagined that it can 
be used to formulate connections between actions and cognition.
A school of thought criticises the traditional cognitivism because of its context 
independent view and argues that human behaviour is largely determined by the 
structure of the world. It argues that human behaviour is constrained and guided by the 
world in which human beings are situated. This school of thought -  situated action -  
emphasises the importance of historical influences, social interaction, culture, and the 
environment, and minimises the importance of internal cognition -  whereas traditional 
cognitivism tends to downplay the importance of these external environment but 
focuses on internal cognition (Norman, 1993).
Orlikowski and Gash were aware of the above problems of the traditional cognitivism; 
to overcome the issue of context-independent in particular they incorporated a number 
of ideas from other modes of social theories such as SCOT and structuration. Although
-63 -
social context is considered in technological frames analysis, social interactions which 
are believed to have influence on technological frames are not discussed at length. 
Technological frames analysis argues that individuals’ actions towards a specific 
technology are dependent on what they see and how they interpret the technology, and 
how they interpret the technology depends on their technological frames. In other 
words, individuals’ actions towards the technology are determined by their mental 
process.
The present study asserts that this view neglects the notion of social interactions. In 
order to develop this critique further and make it specific to the technological frames 
analysis the study will deploy ideas from Herbert Blumer’s (1969) arguments 
surrounding symbolic interactionism.
3.1.4.2 Specific problems of the technological frames analysis
Symbolic interactionism is grounded in three fundamental premises. They are: that 
actions are based on meanings, that meanings are products of social interaction, and that 
meanings are processed by individuals and in so doing action can be taken. The first 
premise is that “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the 
things have for them” (Blumer, 1969: 2). This premise is in fact the same assumption 
underlying the argument of technological frames analysis, and has been discussed 
earlier.
The second premise is that “the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, 
the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows” (Blumer, 1969: 2). There are 
traditionally two ways to account for the origin of meanings. One is that the meaning is 
intrinsic to the thing that has it; that is, the meaning of the thing is in the thing, and it is 
‘there’. The other view is that meaning arises from psychological elements such as 
sensations, feelings, ideas, memories, motives, and attitudes. Symbolic interactionism, 
however, rejects both the above explanations of the origin of meanings; it argues instead 
that meanings are social products and that they arise from social interactions between 
individuals and their fellows. It is this notion of social interactions that technological 
frames analysis neither takes account of nor provides any detailed explanation for.
Social cognitive theorists assume that “meaning created is seen as influencing action 
taken, similarly action taken is seen as influencing meaning created. Both processes are
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viewed as inextricably reciprocal” (Gioia, 1986: 51). Based on this assumption, 
Orlikowski and Gash assert that by using technological frames analysis people would be 
able to explain and “anticipate” outcomes. Such a causal relationship between meaning 
and action shows that technological frames analysis oversimplifies the process of the 
formation of meanings to their being relevant predicates of human conduct. Even more, 
their assertion overlooks the importance of social interactions in the process of forming 
meanings on the one hand, and overemphasises the importance of cognitive structure to 
human behaviour on the other.
This is not saying that individuals’ existing technological frames do not have impact or 
influence on how individuals see and interpret a specific technology; rather it tries to 
extend technological frames and argues that meaning is not simply retrieved from these 
frames. Meaning indeed emerges from social interactions. Although social cognitive 
scholars recognise the role of social interaction for understanding individual conduct, 
they view social interaction as a neutral medium for operating outside factors (Blumer, 
1969). Put simply, social interaction is a process in which individuals express their 
psychological elements such as motives, feelings, attitudes, perceptions, or personality. 
In symbolic interactionism social interaction is regarded as a process in which 
participants take account of each other’s ongoing acts, interpret those acts and so adjust 
their own understandings and intentions, which, in turn, determine their own acts. In 
other words, meaning is not just a psychological but also a social product.
Building on the above argument, individuals’ actions towards the technology can be 
analysed in four steps. It is worth noting that these four steps take place simultaneously 
rather than linearly. Figure 3.1 depicts how an individual decides his or her actions 
towards the technology. It is assumed when individuals come across a new technology 
that they will reference their technological frames (vertical arrow 1) and try to make 
sense of it (arrow 2) to themselves. According to the technological frames analysis, the 
next step should be that individuals decide their actions towards the technology (arrow 
4). Building upon the idea of self- and social -  interaction in symbolic interactionism 
(Section 3.1.4), we argue that the next step should be that individuals try to make sense 
of others’ behaviour towards the technology in relation to their own positions (arrow 3). 
Then individuals will come about meanings of the technologies and act according to 
these meanings.
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Figure 3.1: Sensemaking process
Technological
Frames
Self­
interaction
Social-
interaction
1
Technology
This can be illustrated with an example. A Network was installed in the Central 
Government Office (CGO) with the aim o f improving document productivity (Bowers,
1995). The Network allows not just for documents to be available on-line, to be shared 
by others, but also allows the documents to be visible, inspectable, and manageable. 
This function gave senior managers in the CGO an opportunity to ensure their aim o f  
becoming a “quality organisation” by allowing them to trace the history o f the 
documents (e.g. who does what part) so to support quality reviewing and inspection.
“ ... by having a ‘peek in” at the status of work, Jon could ensure that work was being 
done according to approved “quality methods” and was on schedule and so forth” 
(Bowers, 1995: 199).
Employees, however, were not willing to put their contributions on-line if their 
preliminary draff would be inspectable by both the branch head and line managers. To 
those employees the Network was understood as a means for managers to carry out 
surveillance rather than as a means to help them increase their document productivity. 
As a result, some members decided to make their work ‘invisible’ to their managers. 
This illustrates that people’s understanding o f a specific technology not only derives 
from their technological frames but is also built from their interpretations o f what other 
people’s intentions are towards the technology; in the light o f this knowledge, they 
determine their own acts. In this case the action taken by the employee is to continue 
“real work” o f document production off-line.
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Contents of frames are not only changed via social interactions but also via self­
interaction. As the third premise of symbolic interactionism argues, 4<these meanings 
are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in 
dealing with the things he encounters.” Once the meaning is formed individuals will 
first indicate to themselves the meaning of the things that they encounter. The process 
of indicating the things to themselves and the meaning of the things is known as self­
interaction. By virtue of interacting with oneself, interpretation becomes a matter of 
handling meanings. The individual “selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and transforms 
the meanings in the light of the situation in which he is placed and the direction of his 
action” (Blumer, 1969: 5).
The concept of “self5 is essential to symbolic interactionism. Borrowing Meads’ idea 
Blumer argues that the human beings is an organism having a self, such that individuals 
may perceive themselves, have conceptions of themselves, communicate with 
themselves, and act toward themselves. Since the human being has a self as well as the 
ability to interact with this self, Blumer therefore argues that “with the mechanism of 
self-interaction the human being ceases to be a responding organism whose behaviour is 
a product of what plays upon him from the outside, the inside, or both” (p.63). He 
continues that the human being “instead, acts toward his world, interpreting what 
confronts him and organising his action on the basis of the interpretation.”
The notions of both social and self-interactions within symbolic interactionism highlight 
dynamics of technological frames which contrast to Orlikowski and Gash’s, more or 
less, static view of technological frames. Orlikowski and Gash see technological frames 
as a set of existing cognitive properties and individuals develop their understandings 
and interpretations of technologies on the basis of such a set. Because technological 
frames are treated as given in their analysis Orlikowski and Gash’s discussion focuses 
mainly on the properties and dimensions of frames, and the process of formation, 
reformation, and change is overlooked. This static view of technological frames allows 
Orlikowski and Gash (1994:174) to claim that technological frames analysis can “offer 
an interesting and useful analytic perspective for explaining and anticipating actions 
and meanings.” But the concepts of social and self-interaction tell us that it is naive to 
claim that actions towards technology can be anticipated through examination of 
technological frames since social and self interactions can change the contents of frames
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and then change individuals’ actions towards technology. Since social and self­
interaction are in themselves unpredictable, it is impossible to predict how the contents 
of technological frames will be changed.
Orlikowski and Gash further argue that technological frames analysis can be used to 
examine the changes associated with implementation of a new system over time, 
especially organisational changes. It seems here that the dynamics of technological 
frames is finally noted but the argument is still inclined to understand technological 
frames as static. In contrast, this study believes that the dynamics of technological 
frames should be considered in two modes: changes in the contents of technological 
frames together with an analysis of how these changes are made (i.e. a process-oriented 
view). Orlikowski and Gash emphasise properties of technological frames which shift 
from one state to another but the persistence of technological frames and the social 
interactions which influence technological frames are underplayed in their argument.
Although Orlikowski and Gash do not develop discussion on how social and self 
interactions influence the content of technological frames, Orlikowski notes elsewhere 
(Orlikowski, 1992) that communication is critical when existing technological frames 
need to be changed or a new set of technological frames needs to be formed.
Building on social and self-interactions symbolic interactionism also argues that 
individual conduct is not determined by cognitive structures alone. That is, that 
individuals do not just react to what their technological frames ‘tell’ them to do; rather, 
that they take actions towards their technological frames including revising, examining, 
modifying, and replacing them through interactions with others and with self.
To sum up, the main concerns regarding technological frames analysis are perceived as 
the absence of the notion of social interactions in spite of its importance in the process 
in which meanings are formed. Moreover, technological frames analysis oversimplifies 
the process of meaning-action and considers it to be a positive causal relationship. 
Furthermore, technological frames analysis inherits the weakness of social cognitivism 
which views frames as static and as having properties and structures.
To resolve the problems just mentioned this study will expand the technological frames 
model and also use a contextual approach to capture both the dynamic nature of
technological frames and social interactions. It is to the details of this latter approach to 
which attention is now given.
3.2 C o ntextual approach
Technological frames are dynamic and shift over time to be able to capture a process of 
changes in frames Orlikowski and Gash employ structuration theory developed by 
Giddens (1984). Structuration theory aims to end a polarised dilemma between 
voluntaristic and deterministic approaches in social science as it argues that the basic 
domain of study of the social sciences is “neither the experience of individual actor, nor 
the existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across space and 
time” (Giddens, 1987: 2).
One of the main theses of structuration theory is the duality of structure. The duality of 
structure is concerned with the idea that agents and structures are not two independently 
given sets of phenomena, but that they are highly interdependent. That is to say, the 
structural properties of a social system are both the condition for and the consequence of 
human interaction, and that it is through interaction that social structures are produced 
and reproduced. Based on the notion of the duality of structure Orlikowski and Gash 
argue that in organisational structuring processes individuals draw on shared 
technological frames (e.g. either group or organisational) to accomplish their action, and 
therefore reinforce or change the social and technological structures of an organisation 
(and their frames). Moreover, individuals design or use information in accordance with 
shared technological frames, and hence reinforce or modify not only the organisation’s 
structural properties but also their own (and shared) technological frames.
Although Orlikowski and Gash (1992) claim that structuration theory is employed to 
understand shifts in individuals’ and organisations’ technological frames, it seems that 
the theory is merely used to describe phenomena relating to how structural properties of 
organisations and their technological frames are reinforced or changed over time. 
Issues such as how a sequence of change starts and what elements mark the opening of a 
sequence of change are barely touched upon. Moreover Orlikowski and Gash argue 
that the theory can be used in an attempt to capture both the historical and contextual 
nature of frames, but the question of how this might be achieved is not explained or 
demonstrated. Thus, we are left with questions as to what the significant contributions
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of structuration theory are in relation to the study of understanding changing 
technological frames and how theory can capture the historical and contextual nature of 
technological frames.
This thesis is interested in (i) the relationship between individuals’ technological 
frames, their surroundings (context), and the process of the changes in technological 
frames and (ii) the effects of these three elements on individuals’ choices and decisions 
about technology. In this sense, the clear emphasis of the contextualist approach on 
multi-level contexts, on process and on the links between process and contexts seems to 
match the research interest. In considering the changes which occur in individuals’ 
technological frames structuration theory appears to be more appropriate than the 
contextualist approach on the grounds that the former focuses on agents and agents’ 
interpretations and interactions with technology and with others. It has been argued that 
structuration theory has the ability to offer a detailed and subtle view of the constitution 
of social life (Walsham, 1993), however in the present study it is argued that its analytic 
dimensions of the duality of structure and its associated modalities are too detailed and 
complex in some instances. For example, the theory was used to interpret the data 
collected in the preliminary case study and it was found that the analytical dimensions 
of duality of structure and its associated modalities blurred the research focus. 
Walsham (1993) raises a similar concern and suggests that such a detailed and complex 
analysis could have a negative impact on the process of analysis. He argues that “the 
choice between a simpler or more complex model to explain a particular empirical 
example is a matter for the researcher’s judgement, depending on the view taken 
concerning the additional depth of insight to be gained by using the more complex 
theory” (Walsham, 1993, p.70).
Re-examining the research interest of the present study, it is apparent that an analytical 
tool is needed to capture the state of changing technological frames and the multi-level 
contextual factors associated with those changes. It is worth noting that the issue of the 
relationship between changes in technological frames and the duality of organisational 
structure is not the main concern of this research. In light of the above considerations, 
the contextualist approach therefore appears to be a more appropriate model for this 
study than structuration theory.
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3.2.1 Outline of the contextual approach
The contextual approach was developed by Pettigrew (1987) from the experience 
gained in a research project to investigate strategic decision making and change in 
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (ICI). Pettigrew argued that in order to understand 
organisational changes a theoretically sound and practically useful analysis needs to be 
employed. The analysis has to take account of the “continuous interplay between ideas 
about the context of change, the process of change, and the content of change” 
(Pettigrew, 1987:64).
The contextual approach is grounded in the notion of contextualism in Pepper’s (1942) 
“World Hypotheses”. Within the contextualist approach one can identify a number of 
different kinds of proposition; Pepper calls them ‘world hypotheses’ and distinguishes 
four kinds: formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organism. Each of them presents a 
distinct view of seeing the world around us. For example, formism takes account of 
classifications; the appropriate truth theory is correspondence, and the underlying 
metaphor is similarity. Mechanism is concerned with the law-like relationships 
between classes and phenomena, and its underlying metaphor is cause and effect. 
Contextualism deals with “the event in its setting; the truth theory has to be qualitative 
confirmation since the context will change and knowledge will need to change also, and 
its underlying metaphor is the historic event” (Pettigrew, 1985: 59). Organism is 
concerned with enduring patterns of events, irrespective of time and place, and the 
underlying metaphor is harmonious unity.
With the benefit of Pepper’s idea Pettigrew exposes some of the strengths and weakness 
of literature on organisational change, and concludes that the dominant studies in this 
area are ahistorical, aprocessual, and acontextual so that there are theoretical limitations 
to those studies. To overcome the pitfalls of these literatures on organisational change 
Pettigrew proposes a contextual approach which, he argues, instead of dividing the 
world into limited sets of dependent and independent variables isolated from their 
context, helps people to understand emergent, situational, and holistic features of a 
process of organisational change in its natural settings.
The contextual approach has three basic components: context, process, and content of 
change. These three components interplay with one another.
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Process Processual analysis emphasises that an organisation or any social system 
is an ongoing system with a past, a present, and a future. Two frames of reference are 
introduced in the procedural analysis: process and time. Process is seen as “a 
continuous, interdependent, sequence of actions and events which is being used to 
explain the origins, continuance, and outcome of some phenomena” (Pettigrew, 
1985:67). Time indicates what changes are seen, their relation, and how those changes 
can be sequenced and explained. It is the notion of time which provides meanings for 
and conditions the process (or even the context).
Pettigrew also points out the importance of the concept of ‘time’ in the study of 
organisational changes and criticises how dominant literatures have overlooked its 
significance:
“... change in this mode of analysis is regarded either as a single event, or a set of 
discrete episodes somehow or other separate from the immediate and more distant 
antecedents which give those events form, meaning, and substance. [...] they limit 
themselves to ‘snap shot’ time series data, fail to provide data on the mechanisms and 
processes through which changes are created.” (Pettigrew, 1985:62)
It is not possible to separate the present from its past and similarly the future cannot be 
foreseen without examining and responding to the past and present. Time should not 
be conceived as narrowly as clock or calendar time, but as the mode that indicates the 
duration and location of a particular social interaction or occurrence.
Context Context is usually referred to as an environment where a process takes 
place. The environment not only implies the physical environment but also social, 
economic, and political environments. To study changes in organisations two sets of 
context are said to have an influence on the content and pace of change, namely inner 
and outer context. Inner context is said to be the intra-organisational environment, and 
outer context is the socio-economic and political environment in which an organisation 
is situated.
Intra-organisational environments include structures, cultures, managerial style, and in 
terms of the study of information systems also includes the IS development and 
operation environments. The characteristics of the inner context are usually changed by 
two modes: social interactions taking place within it and outer contextual factors. Using 
the ICI case study as an example Pettigrew (Pettigrew, 1985) illustrates how 
individuals’ positions in a company differentiate their interpretations of the same thing
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from others and concludes: “managerial action is fundamentally located in differential 
perception and understanding of intra-organisational and socio-economic context” 
(p.70).
An IS development environment consists of the development methods and techniques, 
the organisation and management of IS development, maintenance, and other existing 
information systems that may interface with or be impacted on by the system under 
development. The major components of the IS operations environment include 
software, hardware, organisation and management of IS operations, and the operations 
personnel. The operations personnel include computer operations staff, technical 
support staff, and the end users.
Outer contextual factors can be market conditions (i.e. in recession or booming), 
structure of the industry (i.e. competition within the industry), domestic politics and 
regulations, and so on. Because of globalisation, the domestic economy and the market 
is likely to be influenced by the global economic and political climate; the rise of 
multinationals in the past two decades also introduces another variable to the local 
economy and market. Because of the connections between local and global markets, 
companies nowadays need to consider not only local competitors and market conditions 
but also global ones. That is, the boundary of outer context has been push back further 
from a iocaP to a more ‘global’ environment.
When studying an information systems related topic, one needs to take into account the 
development and condition of the IT industry (including hardware and software) along 
with working practice introduced by IT as an outer contextual factor (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997). The availability of hardware or software has direct effects on 
companies’ internal decisions and on choices of which technology to employ.
Content Content refers to the object or problems in question. The content of 
change is about what changes there are, and the implications for the organisation in 
general. Content of change reflects the significance of intervening between a process 
and the surrounding context both inner and outer. That is, a process is both constrained 
by structures and shapes structures, either in the direction of preserving them or altering 
them; the content of changes will show those constraints and alterations either in the 
structures or in the process itself.
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The above are three basic elements of the contextual approach which suggests that the 
key to studying a process of change or forming expectations, lies in positing and 
establishing relationships between context, process, and the content of change. Two 
levels of analysis are involved in contextual analysis. The vertical level of analysis 
concerns “the interdependencies between higher or lower levels of analysis upon 
phenomena to be explained at some further level” (p.66). Higher or lower levels of 
analysis means the analysis of higher or lower level contextual factors and process. 
Each level is recognised to have its own properties, processes, and relationships. Also, 
the phenomena at one level cannot be reducible to or inferred from those at another 
level, hence a key to the analysis is to identify the interactions between levels through 
time. Figure 3.2 illustrates the possible higher level and lower level factors in the 
context of this research.
Figure 3.2: Higher and lower level factors and their interactions
Outer context
Inner context
Technological \
The horizontal level of analysis (e.g. time) refers to the “sequential interconnectedness 
between phenomena in historical, present, and future time” (Pettigrew, 1985: 66). The 
process of change is said to be revealed through the horizontal level analysis since it 
exhibits the different states of the phenomena and their interconnections over ‘time’.
Pettigrew argues that a wholly contextualist approach should have the following 
qualities. First, a clearly delineated set of levels of analysis, each level having its own 
properties, processes, and relationships. Moreover, the process under investigation 
needs a clear description which gives the details of the sequence of actions and events 
within a specific time frame. Furthermore, a model of human behaviour is required. 
Hence individuals’ capacities and desires to shape the social system to meet their own
- 7 4 -
needs, and the power relationships in the emergence and ongoing development o f  
processes can be examined. Finally, the most crucial part o f the analysis for a 
contextual approach is the linkage between contextual variables and categories in the 
vertical analysis and the process under examination in the horizontal analysis.
Both individual and organisational expectations pertaining to the perceptions o f  the 
situations and capabilities o f a new technology change over time. Specifically, 
expectations are likely to be amended to fit an actual situation and achievements (Tyre 
and Orlikowski, 1991). The contextualist approach’s ability to link content, context, 
and process together to track changes in the subject within its situation provides a 
conceptual framework to analyse changes in technological frames that the technological 
frames analysis is unable to do. The next section (3.3) will discuss how contextual 
approach together with technological frames analysis to form a synthesised conceptual 
framework to assist in investigating the research topic.
3.3  S y n t h e s is e d  c o n c e p t u a l  f r a m e w o r k
The synthesised conceptual framework consists of two theoretical frameworks: 
technological frames analysis and contextualist approach; and these frameworks have 
been discussed separately and extensively in the preceding sections (3.1 and 3.2). Table
3.3 summarises the components o f the synthesised conceptual framework.
Table 3.3: Technological frames and choices and decisions made about technology: Synthesised
analytical framework
Key components of the 
framework
Associated conceptual elements
Technological Frames Individuals’ interpretations and expectations of current problems and
(content) the technology .
Outer context National and global social, economic, and political environments. 
Inventions in the software industry.
Inner context Structure, task actors, and technology.
Process Changes in technological frames
The first component o f the framework is technological frames which is the subject 
under the examination in this study. Technological frames are context and time specific
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(Section 3.1) hence there is no pre-identified/ defined set of technological frames in this 
synthesised framework. In fact, it is expected that specific technological frames derive 
from empirical work to represent specific case and situation.
The second component is context within which individuals recall certain dimension of 
frames to help them make sense of technology. Context is categorised into two broad 
types: outer and inner. The synthesised framework does not intend to articulate a set of 
contextual factors (both inner and outer) in advance and argues that the contextual 
factors should be like technological frames deriving from the field. It is important to 
note that the relationship between outer and inner contexts is not hierarchical but 
interconnected. The outer context may create a context in which an inner context 
operates and organisational activities undertaken with the constraints imposed by these 
two environments, but it is not in anyway superior to the other. In an oligopoly industry 
in which only few major companies dominate the industry, it is likely that those 
companies’ business strategies and activities become part of the industrial structure or 
standards in the industry. For example, the series of software products developed by 
Microsoft have become the standard operating system or applications in user PCs.
The third component of the framework is process in which changes in technological 
frames are undertaken. The process links individuals’ technological frames and 
contexts within which technological frames operate and individuals act towards 
technology accordingly together to reveal the dynamics of technological frames.
These components will be analysed at two levels. At the vertical level, consideration is 
given to the contents of frames, and to inner and outer contextual factors. The analysis 
seeks to show that the meanings and interpretations (contents) ascribed to the same 
situation or technology are likely to be altered by interactions between various 
contextual factors. General concepts of outer and inner contextual factors have been 
described in the previous sections. It is not possible to derive a sets of contextual 
factors here, a priori, since they are in themselves context- and time-specific and can be 
observed in situ only.
At the horizontal level time is used as an indicator to point out different stages/phases of 
actions and even contents of technological frames, and as a mechanism to show that 
technological frames are interconnected sequentially in historical, present, and future
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time. Since technological frames are dynamic in nature the meaning of a specific 
technology based on them accordingly changes over time. So, choices and decisions 
made about the technology based on that meaning can be examined in the light of the 
fact that they have a past, a present, and a supposed future (e.g. expectations). One can 
therefore argue that decisions and choices made in the past have a certain impact on 
present decisions and choices, and that the relevance for the latter will be carried 
forward into the future. The ‘impact’ can be observed from the interpretations of, 
expectations of, and experiences (technological frames) with the technology or from the 
outcomes of the decisions. Within this broader context and perspective some adoption 
outcomes that are originally explained as emergent phenomena or accidents may not be 
so, and indeed may have strong roots in the past.
3.4 S ummary
The technological frames analysis was developed on the basis of the assumption that the 
expectations, and interpretations of, and assumptions held by individuals about a 
specific technology have influences on individuals’ attitudes and actions towards 
technology. A set of expectations about, interpretations of, and assumptions about 
technology is a technological frame, and serves as a vehicle enabling people to ascribe 
meanings to the technology and take actions. Once the meanings are assigned to the 
technology individuals will take actions towards the technology. Technological frames 
analysis, then, is a conceptual model that helps us to analyse the meanings attached to 
individuals’ behaviour towards the technology.
As has been argued here, technological frames analysis alone cannot be adopted for this 
research because it does not provide a dynamic view of how technological frames shift, 
and are altered, or replaced over time. This research, therefore, employs the contextual 
approach to situate changes in the state of technological frames; it is an approach which 
incorporates the components of context, process, and content of change.
Section 3.3 has drawn together the analytical strengths of the above two approaches to 
form a synthesised framework which serves two purposes in this study. It serves as a 
mode of analysis informing the process of change in technological frames which, in 
turn, is followed by changes in choices and decisions about technology. In terms of 
practical research the framework is used for gathering data, and sorting that data into
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broad categories for analysis. The case studies in chapter five and six will demonstrate 
the ways in which the synthesised framework is applied.
The contributions of this chapter are several. First, it has elaborated arguments within 
technological frames analysis at length so as to make clear the origins of assumptions 
and arguments made by Orlikowski and Gash. Second, it has demonstrated the 
usefulness of technological frames analysis and how it may be applied in conjunction 
with other social theories to examine changes taking place around technologies with or 
without intentions. The third contribution of this chapter in IS research is that it has 
explored and provided a critique of technological frames analysis at length, which 
Orlikowski and Gash omitted in their papers. The critiques of technological frames 
analysis have been largely based on concepts in symbolic interactionism and argued 
that, despite Orlikowski and Gash taking care of criticism of the traditional 
cognititivism (context independent), they pay little attention to the roles of social and 
self-interactions to individuals’ frames. Fourth, the adoption of technological frames 
analysis has brought social cognitivism further into IS study. Furthermore, the chapter 
demonstrated how a contextualist approach which is often used to study organisational 
development or changes, can be used as a mechanism to connect an object’s past, 
current, and future in order to view it in a continuous manner. Finally, the synthesised 
analytical framework introduced in this chapter has dual roles at different stages of this 
research: data design and collection, and data analysis.
The next chapter is devoted to research design, and discusses how this research was 
carried out with what method and what techniques.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter introduces a discussion of the empirical research strategy employed in this 
thesis. The chapter begins with a review of research method adopted by articles 
published in the CSCW and ECSCW conference proceedings between 1988 and 1997, 
and is followed by a discussion of the research design of this work. The section 
explains why an interpretive case study method is employed; what data techniques are 
employed; and why a hermeneutics mode of analysis is seen as an appropriate approach 
to analyse the data. The chapter ends with a summary.
4.1 R eview  o f  Research  D esign  in C SC W
Many assessments of published information systems have been undertaken to review 
and examine a community’s constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques. Results of 
these assessments show that the largest number of research topics and research designs 
are scientific focused. Galliers and Land (1987) note that research in the information 
systems field has treated IS as a science, with as much as 50 percent of effort being 
placed on laboratory-based experimentation or on field surveys. Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991) present a similar result from their examination of published information 
systems literature between 1983 and 1988 in four major information systems outlets 
(i.e. survey 49.1% and laboratory experiment 27.1%). An intention of those papers is 
to remind researchers in the field to be aware of the philosophical assumptions of their 
studies, as well as to encourage researchers to look at topics and modes of research 
beyond a scientific focus.
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Assessment and discussion of research methods of this kind are few in CSCW. Olson 
and Olson (Olson and Olson, 1997) provide a description of some of the methods and 
issues involved in CSCW research in which method such as survey, interview, diaries, 
ethnography, analytic field study, case study, experiment, Quasi-experiment, 
Longitudinal studies, historical studies, and simulation and formal modeling are 
mentioned. The description of the research methods however is based on the general 
principles of the methods rather an attempt than to show how the methods are applied to 
study particular topics in CSCW. Although Plowman et al. (1995) analyse strengths 
and weakness of research methods such as ethnographic study and case study in 
workplace study in CSCW, the analysis is limited to specific topics and methods only.
The intention of this section is to examine a range of commonly used research methods 
and to discuss how those methods are employed for particular topics in CSCW studies.
4.1.1 Selection of papers
This study chooses to examine the ten years of published CSCW literature between 
1988 and 1997 in two major CSCW conference proceedings: Proceedings o f CSCW and 
Proceedings o f ECSCW. The first European CSCW (ECSCW) was held in Gatwick
London 1989, and like its American counterpart ECSCW is organised every other year.
Over this period a number of journals organised special issues to reflect emerging 
interest of CSCW such as Office: Technology and People (1987), International Journal 
o f Man Machine Studies (1991). These special issues however are not included in this 
review for two reasons. First is their partial status and the potential influence of editors. 
Second, such special issues are essentially collections of conference papers, for 
example, a special issue published by Office: Technology and People was a collection 
of the papers in CSCW’86 conference proceeding.
More generally, journal articles are not included in this review owing to a concern with 
continuity. Two specialist CSCW journals: Organisational Computing and 
International Journal o f Computer Supported Cooperative Work, began in the early 
1990s. Prior to the establishment of specialist journal articles on CSCW related topics 
were published in occasional issues of mainstream journals in computing, information 
systems, or organisation and management disciplines. As a result, the consistent trend 
of research interests and research design is difficult to retain. However, the continuity
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of conference proceedings between 1988 and 1997 allows examination o f trends in their 
popularity.
Table 4.1 displays the conference proceedings included in this review. A total o f  304 
articles published in 10 conference proceedings between 1988 and 1997 were examined. 
These 304 articles were reviewed to eliminate those that focus on computer modelling, 
theorem discussion, and so on and 130 papers which contain some empirical work were 
left for further review.
Table 4.1: Proceedings in review
Year CSCW Empirical work ECSCW Empirical work
1988 305 14 (50%) Nil
1989 Nil 23 8 (33%)
1990 30 9 (32%) Nil
1991 Nil 21 11 (50%)
1992 48 19 (46%) Nil
1993 Nil 23 10 (40%)
1994 39 17 (44%) Nil
1995 Nil 21 8 (40%)
1996 45 16 (33%) Nil
1997 Nil 24 18 (60%)
Total 192 112
The potential limitations o f this method are twofold. First, the papers included in the 
proceedings are subject to conference themes and editorial boards’ preferences. The 
editorial board o f the conferences may need to choose appropriate papers according to 
the conference themes which means that papers employing certain types o f research 
methods would be inevitably excluded from the proceedings. Thus, the papers counted 
here may not have reflected the actual but partial trend o f methodology employment in 
the field. It is worth noting that the judgement o f  the research methods that the papers 
employed relied on the authors’ claims rather than on the researcher’s subjective 
assessment.
5 The number of articles included in the proceeding.
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4.1.2 Analysis
The review identifies five frequently adopted research methods in CSCW such as 
laboratory experiment, field experiment, field study, case study, and ethnographic study 
(Olson and Olson, 1997). Table 4.2 shows the distribution o f each method in the field 
in general. Except for field experiment research method all other methods were used 
consistently in CSCW studies.
Table 4.2: Papers classified by research methods
Research Method N u m b e r  o f  p a p e r s
Experiment 29
Field experiment 9
Field study 30
Case study 38
Ethnographic study 24
When these figures were analysed further by looking at the frequency o f adoption in 
each year, a slightly different story is told. Table 4.3 displays the breakdown o f these 
figures. The breakdown shows that field experiment methods was favoured in the early 
days but the number o f paper that adopting this method decreased. In contrast, 
experiment, field study, and ethnographic study methods are consistently used by the 
researchers in the field. Like its counterpart, the information systems field, case study 
method gradually catches up in the CSCW field; for example, in 1988 there was only 
one paper that adopted the method but there were nine papers in 1996 and six papers in 
1997 claimed that they adopted case study method in their research.
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Table 4.3: Articles classified by years
CSCW Experiment Field
Experiment
Field Study Case Study Ethnographic
Studv
Total
1988 2 3 4 1 4 14
1990 5 Nil 2 1 1 9
1992 3 1 4 7 4 19
1994 4 3 2 4 4 17
1996 Nil 1 2 9 4 16
Experiment Field EthnographicECSCW Experiment Field Study Case Study Study Total
1989 6 Nil Nil 1 1 8
1991 2 Nil 6 2 1 11
1993 1 Nil 4 4 1 10
1995 4 Nil Nil 3 1 8
1997 2 1 6 6 3 18
Looking beyond these figures this review shows two things: a linkage between research 
methods and objectives, a trend o f research development in CSCW studies.
Based on further analysis o f  the proceeding review, the linkage between different 
research methods and research objectives is made, as follows:
(i) Research to improve the effectiveness o f groupware in practice (utilising either 
the laboratory experiment, field experiment or field study approaches).
(ii) Research to study groupware failures or implementation efforts (utilising case 
study methods).
(iii) Research to study the impact o f information technology and information systems 
on organisations (again utilising case study methods).
(iv) Research to study the work such as group work and workflow in practice with 
and without groupware (ethnography method).
The linkage made here does not take into account the influences from various 
institutional contexts within which researchers are trained and work, and researchers’ 
personal preference for particular methods.
The linkage between research methods and objectives o f the research shows a changing 
trend o f research interests in the field. For example, the review shows that in the early
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days of the field methods that could be deployed to investigate effectiveness of 
technology were popular as the field was emerging and new to establish its worth. Case 
study method, however, is increasingly employed by researchers as research interests in 
the field shifts from technology development to technology within adopting 
organisations.
4.1.3 Research methods in CSCW
Laboratory experiment, field  experiment, and field  study. As in other disciplines, 
experiments in CSCW research are carried out in a controlled environment so objects 
can be observed and tested where disturbance to the objects can be minimised. 
Similarly, field experiments involve manipulation and measurement of clearly defined 
variables, but in natural settings. In field studies researchers measure independent 
variables and dependent variables in their actual context; however, no control or 
manipulation is involved. Regardless of whether a study is carried out within or outside 
laboratories, the three methods assume that technology is independent from its context 
and has impact on users (Eveland and Bikson, 1988; Galegher and Kraut, 1990a; 
Hindus, et al., 1996). Research adopting these three approaches usually aims to identify 
and measure relationships between technology and users for in so doing the impact of 
technology can be seen and explained.
For example, in their paper “Work group structures and computer support: a field  
experiment” Eveland and Bikson (1988) present the results of a study to illustrate the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of electronic communication compared with 
more standard media. An objective of the study was to generate general findings that 
could be applied elsewhere; in order to do so they chose to use a field experiment 
method. Eveland and Bikson write
“the field experiment would allow us randomly to assign group members to computer- 
based vs. traditional support in the completion of identical work goals as well as to design 
and control the introduction of new information and communication technology” (p325).
Case Study. Case study methods investigate contemporary phenomena within
natural settings and with minimum interference to the objects and environment as 
possible (Yin, 1994). Studies that employ case study research method in CSCW usually 
engage with topics like examination or evaluation of groupware adoption, impact of 
groupware on individuals, groups, or organisations (Bikson, 1996; Bowers, 1995;
- 8 4 -
Rogers, 1994; Anderson, 1993; Orlikowski, 1992); a few are interested in development 
of prototyping (Bellotti and Bly, 1996; Isaacs, etal., 1996; Schwab, etal., 1992).
Orlikowski (1992) conducted an in-depth study of the adoption of Lotus Notes at a 
consulting company with an aim to explore groupware use in practice. As Orlikowski 
argues, the method allows exploration of the topic further so a thorough understanding 
of technology in its natural settings and interaction between technology and its 
immediate social world could be generated. Orlikowski stress the intention of adopting 
the case study method by saying:
“In this paper I describe the findings of an exploratory field study which examined the 
implementation of groupware product Notes® (from Lotus Development Corporation) 
into one office of a large organisation. My interest in studying the implementation and 
use of this product was to investigate whether and how the use of collaborative tool 
changes the nature of work and the pattern of social interactions in the office, and with 
what intended and unintended consequences” (p.362).
The case study approach can also be employed to obtain better understandings of a 
workplace prior to groupware adoption so suggestions of new systems can be made 
(Auramaki, et al., 1996; Berlin and Jeffries, 1992; Gronbek, etal., 1992; Rogers, 1992), 
and in some cases prototypes are developed based on analysis of studies (Bellotti and 
Bly, 1996; Isaacs, et al., 1996; Schwab, et al., 1992). For example, the aim of Egger 
and Wagner’s (1992) study was to develop a new prototype of coordination 
mechanisms to solve current time management issues in a clinic. A case study was 
chosen as the research method, the research team argue, because the method would 
allow them to examine the clinic’s social practices of managing in great depth. By 
doing so, a prototype could then be developed based on the result of the study.
Apart from conducting exploratory case studies to uncover issues, the explanatory case 
study method is adopted in the field to provide some explanations for particular 
phenomena such as success or failure of groupware in practice (Grudin, 1988; Grudin 
and Palen, 1995; Whittaker, 1996). In a 1988 conference paper, Grudin presents the 
findings of case studies of why a meeting scheduling application did not live up to the 
original expectations. Grudin and Palen (1995) use the same method to demonstrate 
that meeting scheduling applications could be successful if the interface of a system is 
well developed. Similarly, Grinter (1996) uses a multiple case study method to suggest 
some critical elements to successful workflow system adoptions.
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Ethnographic study. The ethnographic method originated with anthropologists, and 
was used to study cultures in different human societies. More recently the method has 
been used to study everyday work in the workplace. The mode of ethnographic study 
has a long history in CSCW, four papers out of fourteen in the CSCW’88 conference 
proceeding adopted this method. The ratio of adoption of ethnographic study as a 
research method in CSCW seems to keep steady throughout the period. Researchers at 
CSCW Research Centres in Lancaster University UK and at Rank Xerox Research 
Centre in Cambridge UK argue that the method has an ability to produce detailed 
descriptions of ‘workday’ activities of social actors within the ‘real world’. An ability 
of this kind, it is argued, is critical to groupware design since designing a large-scale 
interactive system needs an adequate analysis of sociality of work. Heath et al. (1993) 
write:
“Despite impressive technological developments in CSCW, it is widely recognized that 
there are relatively few examples of successful applications in real world settings. [... ] it 
is suggested that the lack of success of CSCW systems derives not so much from their 
technological limitations, but more from their insensitivity to the organisation of work 
and communication in real work environments” (p. 155).
As mentioned previously, studies which are interested in examining workday work in 
the workplace in order to inform system design usually employ ethnographic study as 
the appropriate research method. The method requires researchers to stay in the 
workplace in question in order to observe, to participate, and to talk to people. In so 
doing, it is claimed that in-depth understanding of the workplace can be obtained. 
Researchers are then able a to provide thick descriptions of phenomena and highlight 
problem domains which might be supported by groupware (Bentley, 1992; Twidale, 
1994; Heath, 1991; Harper, 1997; Heath, 1993).
In a study of Air Traffic Control Room (ATC) Hughes and others say that an intention 
of their study was to “to explore some ways of linking ethnographic studies of work in 
context with the design of CSCW systems” (Hughes, et al., 1992: 121). An 
Ethnographic study method was chosen to examine how work is socially organised 
rather than to prove that work is socially organised.
Ethnographic method has also been applied in the area of exploring groupware use in 
post-implementation environments, but this is not a common research practice in 
CSCW study. In research with CGO (Bowers, 1994), Bowers demonstrates that the
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method can be used to study implementation processes. Spending nearly five years at 
the site, Bowers was involved in undertaking a study of installation and early and 
mature use of a network. The study states that it intends to add to the literature of 
CSCW applications use, and avail itself of and point to connections between the 
sociology of science and technology. Bowers carefully presents data in a thick 
descriptive format and stresses issues of how the network and usage of application 
became of concern and required management interaction, of how the behaviour of 
organisations and users of the network changed after the introduction of technology, and 
of how organisational context influenced the effectiveness of Network.
4.2 R esearch  D esign
The review of the frequently used research methodologies in CSCW studies identified 
and summarised the linkage between different research methods and research 
objectives. The first part of this section examines the underlying philosophical 
assumptions of the research arguments made in Chapter Two by using Burrell and 
Morgan’ model. Then the frequently adopted research design in CSCW will be 
compared and matched with this study’s interest and lead to selection of an appropriate 
research method for this study. The second part of this section, research design, 
addresses practical issues of the research method chosen -  for example, site selection, 
data collection, and data analysis.
4.2.1 Research strategy
It is understood that each research method has its underlying philosophical assumptions 
which enable it to view and explain things from certain angles. In order to identify an 
applicable research method for this study it became important to examine the underlying 
philosophical assumptions of the research question (Chapter Two) and to compare and 
match them to those of the research methods. Following Burrell and Morgan’s (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979: 3) model the examination will emphasise four dimensions: ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology.
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Figure 4.1: A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science
The subjectivist The objectivist
approach to social science approach to social science
ontology
epistemology
human nature
methodology Nomothetic
Realism
Positivism
Idographic
Nominalism
Voluntarism Determinism
Anti-positivism
The subjective-objective dimension
Ontologically speaking, arguments o f this work are inclined towards nominalist 
arguments that ‘reality’ exists through an individual’s consciousness and there is no 
world which exists independently o f an individual’s appreciation o f it. 
Epistemologically, this research inclines towards compatible arguments o f anti­
positivism, the main argument o f anti-positivism being that “the social world is 
essentially relativistic and can only be understood from the point o f view o f the 
individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied” (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979: 5). Anti-positivism rejects the idea that there is a general and 
universal law waiting to be discovered. It also rejects the notion that social activities 
can be understood ffom outside, whilst arguing that the only way in which to understand 
human activities is to see things from where the participants stand. In line with these 
arguments this research argues that individuals act towards things on the basis o f the 
meanings those things have for them. Meanings o f things to individuals cannot be 
understood and interpreted ffom ‘outside’ but only ffom ‘inside’ (e.g. ffom individuals’ 
points o f  view).
Arguments contained in this work are neither as extreme as voluntarist, which views 
human beings behaving ffeely without considering their external environment, nor as 
extreme as determinist, which sees human beings only responding to their external 
environment mechanically. The work can be said to be in the middle o f such a 
spectrum.
- 8 8 -
The methodological stance of this research emerges when underlying ontological, and 
epistemological assumptions, as well as the model of human nature in this research are 
put together. The research, it is argued, tends towards an ideographic approach that 
emphasises analysis of subjective accounts and the importance of ‘getting inside’ and 
seeing situation ‘through the eyes of actors’. In methodological terms, an ideographic 
approach argues that “one can only understand the social world by obtaining first hand 
knowledge of the subject under investigation.” That is, one has to get as close as 
possible to the situation in which the actors are situated and in which social activities 
take place.
Burrell and Morgan systematically summarise the above four dimensions of 
philosophical assumptions and on this basis identify four paradigms in social science 
study: radical structuralism, functionalist sociology, interpretive sociology, radical 
humanism. In relation to this model, this research is regarded as falling into an 
interpretive paradigm.
An interpretive approach makes three basic claims. Ontologically, it claims that 
‘reality’ is intrinsically meaningful and that its meanings are constituted by the 
meanings that social actors within it give to it. Epistemologically, it argues that the 
social world can be understood only through discovering the meanings that constitute it, 
and by a process that involves understanding situations from the actors point of view. 
Methodologically, it rejects the idea of causal explanations, inductive generalisation and 
prediction in the social science. To an interpretivist researcher, interpreting and 
understanding a situation is the process by which to generate knowledge of the social 
phenomena.
Research methods in the interpretive paradigm emphasise the importance of being 
inside situations and understanding them from inside. Based on this idea, interpretivists 
argue that scientific methods, such as laboratory or field experiments, cannot provide 
sound understandings of human activities in the social world. Alternatively, 
interpretivists practice interpretive methods with which they engage in a series of 
dialogues and through interaction with actors. Understandings of situations can then be 
generated from the dialogues and interactions.
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Predominated by positivist field research traditionally, in recent years IS researchers are 
aware that the conclusions drawn from the positivist research may not be able to address 
particular underlying phenomena such as organisational, social and political dimensions 
of information systems. Interpretive field research however emphasises in-depth 
understanding of phenomena through accessing the meanings that participants assign to 
them. Unlike positivist, interpretivist does not seek for generalisation from the setting 
to a population but intends to understand the deeper structure of a phenomenon 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Galliers (1991) argues that ‘"the strength of such 
methods is their ability to represent reality following an in-depth self validating process 
in which presuppositions are continually questioned and our understanding of the 
phenomena under study is refined” (p. 158). Similarly, Walsham (1993) claims that the 
interpretive method of research helps IS researchers to produce “an understanding of the 
context of the information system, and the process whereby the information system 
influences and is influenced by the context” (pp.4-5).
Interpretive field study includes interpretive in-depth case studies and ethnographies 
(Klein and Myers, 1996: 11) and they have been frequently used in CSCW study. Klein 
and Myers claims that there is no hard distinction between these two methods, the 
principle difference between the two is length of time spent on site but the underlying 
ontological and epistemological assumptions are the same. A similar assertion is also 
made by Yin (1989): “Ethnographies usually require long periods of time in the field 
and emphasis detailed, observational evidence... In contrast, case studies are a form of 
enquiry that does not depend solely on ethnographic or participant observation data” 
(pp.21-22). Klein and Myers identify seven underlying principles of interpretive 
research, as follows:
1. The principle of contextualisation
2. The principle of interdependence between the researchers and the subjects
3. The principle of abstraction and generalisation
4. The principle of dialogical reasoning
5. The principle of multiple interpretations
6. The principle of suspicion
7. The fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle
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Klein and Myers argue that a good interpretative study should have the above qualities. 
Despite the underlying philosophical principles of ethnographies and of interpretive 
case studies are the same and both methods can be employed to study the same topics, 
there seems to be an unspoken rule that the both methods are deployed to pursue rather 
different research topics in CSCW.
As for ethnographic studies, it is claimed they allow people to uncover taken-for- 
granted phenomena in the workplace, so those who argue that system failure is a result 
of a lack of understanding of work in practice employ the method to obtain needed 
insights (Anderson, 1996; Bannon, 1996; Bentley, et a l, 1992; Button and Dourish, 
1996; Hughes, et a l 1996; Randall, et a l, 1995; Shapiro, 1996). Thus Hughes et a l 
(1994) argue
“The intention of ethnography is to see activities as social actions embedded within a 
socially organised domain and accomplished in and through the day-to-day activities of 
participants. It is this which provides access to the everyday ways in which participants 
understand and conduct their working lives” (p.430).
As for interpretive case studies, its detailed analysis of observed phenomena is 
presented to expose potential unexpected relationships that had not been noticed before, 
or to find counter examples to claims made by theories (Olson and Olson, 1997). 
Therefore researchers who are interested in exploring or explaining particular 
phenomena, especially technology in post-implementation environments, frequently 
employ such case study.
As for this work, which is interested in studying shifting patterns of perceptions and 
expectations during the pre-implementation stage, both ethnographic study and case 
study methods could be adopted to explore the issue and most importantly to examine 
matters from participants’ points of view. However, after taking some general and 
practical issues into account the interpretive case study method has been chosen and not 
the ethnographic study method.
The choice of the interpretive case study method is made on the basis of three criteria: 
timescale of research, accessibility to sites, and suitability of method. Timescale of 
conducting an ethnographic study was judged as not feasible for this research as it may 
take excessive time to complete fieldwork compared to an interpretive case study. Two 
things were considered on account of access to sites. First is the confidentiality issue of
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exploring choice and decision making of groupware in organisations which would be a 
major obstacle of getting access to sites. Second, although this work stresses activities 
taking place prior to technology implementation, it argues that conducting a study in an 
organisation which has groupware and which has been using it for a while provides a 
broader view of roles of particular choices and decisions in a project rather than at a 
specific point of time. Issues of timescale and access to sites highlight the unsuitability 
of ethnographic approach for this research.
The alternative, interpretive research case study method was then chosen. The case 
study method is deployed for the following research purposes.
1. The research argument needs to be studied in a natural setting and focus needs to be 
on contemporary events including the events happening and decisions made during 
the period of the study.
2. The research argument would lose its significance if the study is carried out in a 
controlled environment.
3. The research needs ‘rich’ descriptions in order to support interpretations from 
various perspectives.
4. The research aims to draw multiple implications as to the relationship between the 
technological frames and decisions on groupware. An interpretive case study can be 
expected to advance knowledge of this kind.
The first three purposes stated above are broad but the last purpose is specific to this 
study. Except for the specific research purposes practical aspects were also taken into 
account. First, length of research time spent on empirical work becomes manageable 
and flexible with the method. Second, it is possible to examine choices and decisions 
made of groupware from a historical point of view which provides a holistic view to see 
their positions in a project. Third, the writer has experience of conducting case study 
work but lacks proper training and skills to conduct an ethnographic study; therefore, 
case study method was chosen on balance of advantages because of existing knowledge 
of the method.
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It must, however, be acknowledged that the interpretive case study method has its 
drawbacks. These drawbacks centre on the generalisability and reliability of analysis ( 
Galliers, 1987; Orlikowksi and Broudi, 1991). Concern of generalisability of analysis 
arises from comparison of analysis with scientific research methods. As Walsham 
(1993) says ‘"the criticisms of the in-depth case study method for empirical research 
tend to focus on the non-representativenss and lack of statistical generalisability arising 
from the work” (p. 14). Yin (1994) also notes that people are concerned that case study 
work provides little basis for scientific generalisation. Questions such as “How can you 
generalise from a single case?” is a frequently heard limitation.
Mitchell (1983) argues that concern of generalisability is based on a common 
assumption that the only valid basis of inference is that which has been developed in 
relation to statistical analysis. This common assumption has been associated with 
scientific research for more than a century, and as information systems study has often 
and usually been seen as ‘scientific research’, generating statistical analysis to 
generalise phenomena has been preferred by many in the past.
Only in recent years have significant numbers of scholars in the field begun to question 
whether the requirement of generalisability is necessary or not. An observation made in 
the review of literature in both information systems and CSCW studies is that most 
researchers who employ the interpretive case study method seem not to have any 
intention of generating universal laws from their studies. Instead, they report what they 
observe in studies and suggest possible explanations for particular problems with the 
aim of highlighting some interesting issues and in so doing to attract practitioners’ and 
other scholars’ attentions and urge them to be aware of them.
Even if we accept the validity in general of the approach there is the issue of reliability 
and quality of interpretations made by researchers. This is another area that receives 
criticism. Interpretations of case studies largely rely on researchers’ conceptual 
apparatus and the researchers’ positions within the research, hence an argument about 
reliability of analysis arises. In terms of research endeavour, case studies method has 
often been criticised as lacking rigour, and case study investigators are characterised as 
sloppy, letting biased views influence the direction of their findings and conclusions 
(Yin, 1994).
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It can be argued, however, that reliability of or basis of analysis should not be regarded 
as a particular or unique issue associated with interpretive case study method. Most 
methods have their built-in biases or opportunities for bias. For example, results of 
laboratory experiment method are affected by variables chosen to be controlled during 
experiments; results of survey method are determined by design of questionnaire, 
choice of sample from population, and sample size.
This research is aware of the major weakness of case study research; however for the 
purpose of this research the decision of employing the method is not changed 
(Podsakoff and Dalton, 1990; Smith, 1990). The decision of employing the case study 
research method was made after examining the research assumptions and arguments and 
comparing them with other similar research. This led to a decision that the case study 
method would be the most appropriate method in the context of this research, despite 
some disadvantages of using it. These drawbacks however are minimised if research 
design takes extra care of areas such as data collection and analysis. The following 
section will discuss what various data collection techniques should be deployed and 
how data should be analysed in order to reduce methodological concerns.
4.2.2 Research Design
The previous section has explained why the interpretive case study method is chosen for 
this work, and discussed two main criticisms of the method. This section addresses 
considerations of data collection and analysis so to reduce concerns associated with the 
research method. Before discussion of data collection and analysis consideration is 
given to site selection for the case study.
4.2.2.1 Site selection
The research began with some general criteria for site selection. A basic criterion was 
that sites should have implemented groupware and been using it for a considerable 
length of time, and that outcomes of choices and decisions made related to groupware 
had been experienced. As mentioned previously, issues around groupware post­
implementation phenomena is not the main focus of this study, but organisations’ 
experiences with groupware would be a source of ‘expectations’ of groupware and 
enable choices and decisions made to be viewed from a historical stance.
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The second criterion of site selection was that organisations studied were preferred to be 
multinational. An assumption made about groupware is that this technology appeals to 
large distributed organisation multinationals, as it facilitates people to work together 
regardless of different times and places. By this account, conducting case studies in 
multinational firms may either confirm the assumption or reveal another characteristic 
of the nature of multinationals which drive companies to adopt a particular technology. 
Not only is the nature of an organisation assumed to influence decisions about 
groupware, but also is the business environment in which the company is situated. This 
work chooses to have case studies in different industries with an aim to appreciate 
whether and in what ways contextual factors play a part in formation of organisations’ 
expectations of and choices and decisions about groupware.
Based on the above criteria investigation began by looking to newspapers, magazines, 
and the Internet to collect information on companies that were using groupware. A 
particular article was noticed attention which was a summary of discussion at a 
workshop on Lotus Notes. The delegates of that workshop were mainly IT managers of 
Taiwan-based firms or multinationals in Taiwan. After approaching companies whose 
names appeared in the article, one company suggested that contact should be made with 
business partner, as decisions of adoption of Lotus Notes were largely determined by 
their its business partner. The company was then known as British Oxygen Company 
(BOC Group) and became the subject of the first main case study. The second main 
case study was carried out in Bank for International Settlement (BIS) located in Basle, 
Switzerland. Contact here was established through informal contacts. The Bank 
adopted Novell’s GroupWise in 1997, but had experiences with other technologies.
4.2.2.2 Data Collection
The data collected from BOC and BIS are from interviews, articles in newspapers and 
magazines, company’s annual reports, management letters, meeting minutes, internal 
management letters, memoranda, e-mail messages about the projects between the 
personnel, informal conversations with employees during lunch breaks, and e-mail 
questionnaires.
The primary data source was unstructured interviews. The selection of participants is 
made according to the research aim. Thus, the interview participants are limited to
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those who had participated in the initial process of making choices and decisions about 
the technology.
The interview questions are designed and guided by the elements of the framework 
described in Chapter Three. The questions prepared for the selected interviewees were 
initially organised under a number of headings. Each heading looks at different aspects 
including the history of the project, decision-makers’ initial and developed perceptions 
and expectations of the problems and technology, decision makers’ choices and 
decisions about the technology, and the consequences of their choices and actions. The 
interview questions however were modified for one of two reasons. One depended on 
the interviewees’ job title and position within the organisational hierarchy; and the other 
was initiated through the dialogues between the researcher and interviewees.
At the beginning of the interviews the researcher asked the interviewees for their 
permission to tape record the interviews and assured them that the tapes would not be 
available for other people to access. The tapes were fully transcribed to allow the 
researcher to engage in dialogue with the full interview data on a continuous basis, and 
this would be difficult with partially transcribed data. The transcribed interview data 
serves two purposes. First, it informed the history of the projects and of the 
organisations studied, and provided an opportunity to understand events from the 
participants’ point of view. Second, it was used as a source of reference to support the 
observations and arguments made in the thesis. Along with the interview data further 
sources of data were also collected and through an awareness of the possibility of 
participants’ biased views or false memories about events.
In addition to formal interviews, informal conversations with employees during breaks 
deepened our understandings both projects and company background, and exposed 
more personal feelings about projects. Such data is difficult to acquire through formal 
interview. Notes were taken after such conversations.
Secondary data is another significant data source, as well as that from formal interviews 
and informal conversations. Secondary data can be used in conjunction with other 
sources to complement primary research material. Kiecolt and Nathan (1985) suggest 
that secondary data, can be employed in combination with primary data particularly in- 
depth interviews, to establish sound research. Secondary data in this research is
employed for triangulation and tracking trends and came from annual reports , 
newspapers and magazine articles, and ABI/Inform’s database.
Annual report study Chairman’s, Chief executive’s, and Managing Director’s letters 
to shareholders, in only a few pages, give highlights of the year and summarise actions 
and decisions made to confront events in particular years, and strategies for coming 
year. Taking the case study of British Oxygen Company (BOC) as an example, BOC’s 
marketing sector was reorganised to meet demands from its customers, and had, to a 
certain degree, implications on its business strategy and organisational settings. The 
annual report then became a useful source to track and examine changes made in the 
company with respect to the marketing division reorganisation. Analysis of annual 
reports between 1992 and 1997 showed that marketing reform had been constantly 
mentioned in the Chief Executive’s, Chairman’s and Managing Director’s statement 
since 1994, and that business strategies also changed after the reform. Annual reports 
were also used to identify possible environmental elements that might have influenced 
organisations’ business activities such as in the depression global economy, political 
environments, and so on.
Newspapers and magazine articles, ABI/Inform's database search Learning from 
interviews, some intensively discussed management ideas and technologies appear to 
play an important part in organisations’ expectation, choices, and decisions of 
groupware. To support this claim newspapers and magazine articles were examined and 
ABI/Inform’s database was searched. The search was based on a number of keywords 
including groupware, Lotus Notes, Microsoft Exchange, etc.
4.2.2.3 Data Analysis
Mode of analysis
Hermeneutics is chosen as the mode of analysis used here. Hermeneutics can be viewed 
as both an underlying philosophical assumption and/or a specific mode of analysis. As 
a philosophical assumption, hermeneutics is concerned with “interpreting and 
understanding the products of human mind which characterise the social and cultural 
world” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 235-235).
Being used as a mode of analysis, it focuses on establishing underlying meanings of a 
text. In order to understand a text, one is expected to be open to the text and engage in a
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series of dialogues with it, and to move forward and backward to ask questions, 
examine questions as well as answers, and to revise one’s understanding and 
interpretations of the text. This process of interpreting a text is named as the 
‘hermeneutic circle’. Because the circle is continuous, one should not expect that there 
is a fixed and single interpretation of the text. Also, due to prejudice (preconceptions) 
on which one’s interpretation is made, interpretation is changing throughout a period of 
time according to the state of certain prejudices. The awareness of prejudices is realised 
through entering into dialogues with the world in which one’s horizon of understanding 
is opened to that of another person (Introna, 1997).
The hermeneutics mode of analysis was originally used for text analysis, but it has been 
adopted to understand human activity other than text based documentation. Lee (1994) 
says:
“[...] many hermeneutic scholars have extended their conception of text to include not 
just the documentary artefacts that human subjects create, but also their individual 
actions, group behaviours, and even social institutions, all of which, as text analogues, 
have meanings that can be read and interpreted” (p. 148).
Researchers in the IS field employ this approach to make sense of wholes and 
relationship between objects other than text such as technology, individuals, and 
organisations (Boland Jr., 1985; Boland, 1991; Lee, 1994; Myers, 1994). For example, 
Boland (1991) argues that the design and study of information systems should be 
understood as a hermeneutic process:
“In designing an information system, the designer reads the organisation and its intended 
users as a text in order to make an interpretation that will provide the basis for system 
design” (p. 196).
In line with hermeneutic scholars, this investigation views the relationships between 
perceptions, decisions, individuals, organisations, and technology as texts that are open 
to interpretation. This means that the researcher not only looked at them, but also 
entered into dialogue with them, to search for understanding and interpretation. Despite 
certain prepositions prior to interpretation process, it was through a series of dialogues 
that understandings and interpretations of situations under investigating came to a richer 
and fuller shape.
Data analysis
Following ideas of the hermeneutics mode of analysis, data collected from the field was 
first read to gain background knowledge of organisations and of projects that were
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generated; and then interpretations were formed through continually reading and re­
examining the materials. Continuous engagement in dialogue with the materials was 
pursued in order to re-examine and revise emergent arguments and assumptions. When 
‘interaction’ between the materials and the researcher stopped owing to a lack of 
information, further work was pursued by returning back to the interviewees for more 
information either by arranging another interview or by e-mails. Documentation was 
carefully reviewed and analysed to complement interview materials. When 
inconsistency emerged between information contained in documents and statements 
made by the interviewees on the same topic, explanations were sought first from other 
available sources first, if this proved inconclusive, further interpretation and explanation 
was sought from the interviewees.
4 .3  S u m m a r y
In this chapter a review o f research methods adopted in CSCW studies is presented, 
followed by discussion o f research design for this research. Reviews o f research 
methods and objectives have been done in the information systems field, but there are 
few such studies o f the same topic focus in particular on CSCW. Therefore, one o f the 
main contributions o f this chapter is considered to be its detailed and close review o f  
various research methods which link research objectives and methods together in 
CSCW studies. The second part o f the chapter examines the philosophical assumptions 
of this work, and argues that the work falls into an interpretive paradigm. Two research 
methods within an interpretive paradigm were considered as potential methods for this 
work: ethnographic study and interpretive case study. Taking timescale, accessibility, 
and knowledge and skills into account, conducting an ethnographic study was not seen 
to be feasible for this work. An approach grounded in an interpretive case study was 
then chosen as the research method for this work. Table 4.4 summarises research 
design o f this research.
Table 4.4: Summary of the research design
Research Design Detailed Description
Type of research question Questions regarding to individuals’ and organisations'
perceptions and understanding of the problems and technology 
and based on them the decisions are made.
Assumptions Ontology: actors give meanings to the world and act
accordingly.
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Research Design
Conceptual Framework
Paradigm 
Strategy 
Data collection
Data Analysis
Detailed Description
Epistemology: the meaning of the technology is interpreted and 
given tty the actors so they are different from one company to 
another. In order to understand the decisions based on those 
meanings, they need to be studied within the context.
Human Nature: the actors make decisions within the context; 
however the consequences of the decisions may modify or even 
generate a new context for the next decisions to be made.
A synthesised framework consists of two parts: technological 
frames and contextualist approach.
Interpretive paradigm.
Descriptive / Interpretive case study.
Unstructured interviews, documentation, informal conversations, 
and secondary data.
Hermeneutics mode of analysis.
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CHAPTER 5 
BRITISH OXYGEN COMPANY
This chapter presents a case study that concerns the choices and decisions about a 
groupware project at British Oxygen Company (BOC). The groupware project was 
launched in 1995 to support BOC’s internal market function reform, but for various 
reasons the system failed to achieve its prescribed objectives. A considerable number of 
explanations from different perspectives could be offered, but this research is interested 
principally in individuals’ and the organization’s technological frames which brought 
the project into being and ultimately had impact on the choices and decisions made.
BOC was chosen for this research for a number of reasons. First and most important is 
that the company uses groupware technology. Second, it is a global company and much 
of its expertise is dispersed around the world. Most case studies done by other 
researchers have been carried out in large and multinational companies, and groupware 
was often seen as a communication and collaboration tool to assist global teamwork in 
those organisations. Hence, in order to connect with the assumptions and arguments 
made by others it seemed important to minimise the differences between organisations 
for this research and others. Furthermore, BOC Group is an experienced information 
systems / technologies user, ranked as the 70th among top 100 IT spenders in the UK in 
1997 (Computing, 1997).
Multiple techniques of data collection were used. Six semi-structured and tailored 
interviews of an hour or hour and a half in length were conducted. All interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed. Four interviews were with the participants from the BOC 
Group’s Information Management Department (Group IM), one with a manager from a 
business division, and one with an IM manager at BOC’s business partner in Taiwan
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(Table 5.1). Some follow up questions related to the opinions or data given by the 
participants were subsequently asked o f the participants via e-mails. Documents were 
also examined, including company’s internal documents, meeting minutes, and annual 
reports from 1992 to 1997.
Table 5.1: Primary interviews
Date Time Title
July 1997 PA hours New Development 
Manager
July 1997 1 hour Project Manager
July 1997 1 hour Project Manager: 
infrastructure
October 1997 1 hour Project Manager
October 1997 Via e-mail Business Manager
August 1997 1 hour IM Manager (Taiwan)
Table 5.2: Titles of principal documents studied
Date Document
9 February 1994 Management Letter
May 1996 Information Management: The Way Forward (Presentation
by the Director of Information Management)
December 19996 Knowledge Management Programme. Internal Web
Project. IM Infrastructure Standards
May 1997 BOC Technology (i.e. company's internal magazine)
June 1997 BOC World (i.e. company’s internal magazine)
1 July 1997 Minutes of Internal Web/Knowledge Management
workshop
1992-1997 Company Annual Reports
1996 “Getting Notes right: A guide to the effective use o f  Lotus
Notes within The BOC Group ”
Among the various documents, the company’s annual reports are the most important to 
this case study. They are important because, first, they provide the information on the 
condition o f the business environment and organisational context before and during the 
project. Second, the statements made by the company’s chairmen, chief executives, and 
managing directors provide a trace o f a series o f changes in BOC’s business principles 
and strategies. Finally, they are the sources used for triangulating the interviewees’ 
statements. Since there was only limited access to interview those who participated in 
the Lotus Notes Project (e.g. some people had left the company, some were beyond the
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reach because of their business duties, and others are based in the USA), we therefore 
used the secondary sources including BOC Group related news in Financial Times 
between 1994 and 1997 (Appendices 2), and on-line CD-ROM to build up the 
background knowledge of the Group.
The description and analysis of the case is based upon the synthesised framework 
developed in Chapter Three and summarised in Table 3.3. The next section outlines the 
case history as a general introduction, and this is followed by the section of analysis. 
The analysis section consists of three parts that present three phases of the project. In 
each time frame the data is presented and analysed within the synthesised framework. 
The final section of the chapter discuss some findings from section two, followed by a 
short summary of the chapter.
5.1 B ritish  O xygen  Company (BOC G roup)
5.1.2 About the organisation
The BOC Group, a UK based industrial manufacturer, has grown and developed over 
the past 100 years. It was known as Brin’s Oxygen Company Ltd in the late 19th 
century, and produced oxygen and developed technology to separate atmospheric gases 
for industrial use. The company changed the name to The British Oxygen Company 
Ltd in 1906, and it has been operating its business under this name since then. BOC 
Group expanded its business operation to the United Sates of America in 1910, and after 
that it has consistently sought for new business opportunities abroad. Today, the Group 
has business in over 60 markets in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia / Pacific, and 
employs 40000 people around the globe. Profits for the year to 30 September 1997 
were £287.6 million, growth of about 3%6.
The Group has business in four different areas: Gases, Health Care, Vacuum 
Technology, and Distribution Services. Among these four business, Gases is the 
Group’s core business in terms of sales, profit, number of employees and capital 
investments, accounting for 70% of the £4 billion turnover, and 76% of operating profit.
6 1997 BOC Group Annual Report
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It provides a range of products including atmospheric gases (e.g. oxygen), non- 
atmospheric gases, and a wide range of speciality gases, medical gases, gas mixtures, 
and gaseous chemicals to its customers who are in electronics, food, glass, chemicals, 
petroleum, metals fabrication, and medical industries. Gases’ business operation spreads 
over five geographical regions: Europe, the Americas, North Pacific, south Pacific and 
Southern Asia, and Southern Africa. Each has its own Regional Director and 
management team.
Ohmeda was the Group’s Health Care business, and is made up of four divisions, 
pharmaceuticals, medical systems, medical devices, and speciality products. It has its 
roots in providing high quality anaesthesia products and services used in operating 
rooms, emergency departments, and in post-anaesthesia, intensive, neonatal and cardiac 
care units around the world. Together with its sister company, BOC Gases, Ohmeda 
offers a combination of capabilities to meet the customers’ special needs, such as the 
gas in facilities designed to meet the US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Good 
Manufacturing Practices regulations for pharmaceuticals.
The Vacuum Technology business was an acquisition in the 1960s. Its main activities 
are the design and manufacture of vacuum equipment for semiconductor, scientific and 
industrial applications. Many of its vacuum pump customers around the world are also 
customers for BOC Gases.
The Distribution Services business grew from the Gases business, which had given the 
Group Expertise in food chilling and handling and in complex distribution systems. It 
was created in the 1950s as an exclusive service to the food business of Marks & 
Spencer in the UK; since then the business has grown moderately.
Health Care, Vacuum Technology, and Distribution Services are managed by their own 
managing directors (MD) who have responsibility to report to the CEO, but Gases is 
different since it is under the direct control of the CEO. Figure 5.1 shows a simple 
version of BOC Group management structure.
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Figure 5.1: Group Management Structure (1996)
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5.1.1 B ackground o f the Project
Traditionally, Gases concentrated on developing strong business relationships within 
the regions and countries it served, and its business strength and competitive advantage 
in the market was believed by many to come from there. Strongly focusing on local and 
regional management, Gases’ overseas offices and joint venture companies had 
discretion over business operation and decision making most o f the time. Along with 
this emphasis on local and regional markets, Gases practised a simple supply driven 
marketing strategy by organising its market functions around the mode o f supply such 
as ‘compressed’, ‘liquid’, or ‘tonnage.’ Moreover, Gases thought much about how to 
produce cheap industrial and speciality gases and less o f what customers’ real needs 
were.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s BOC Gases faced increasing pressure from customers 
especially those in the electronic industry. The message sent from the customers was 
clear and demanding: Gases had to act under a single name -  BOC Gases -  instead of 
acting as several regional and local gas companies in the name o f BOC. These 
customers were world class semiconductor manufacturers and, while their 
manufacturing facilities were geographically dispersed, they expected a standard and 
consistent services from their suppliers regardless o f where they require the services. 
However, their experiences o f dealing with BOC Gases were that they had to deal with 
several regional or local companies instead o f with only one BOC. The very same
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customers also asked Gases to supply much higher purity of gases than industry 
standard7, as well as rapid turnaround.
The demands from its customers forced Gases to re-examine the existing business 
approach and to seek a new way of doing business8. In order to meet the customer 
requests Gases needed to be synchronised, regardless of where the customers are or 
where the work is carried out. In other words, all overseas offices and joint venture 
companies would have to cooperate with each other, so that standard and consistent 
services could be delivered to the customers. A global market sector -  the Electronic 
Market Sector -  was therefore set up in the late 1980s, aiming to serve the customers in 
the electronic industry throughout the world. Gases selected several companies in the 
electronic industry to be their “global” customers, and employees working with those 
chosen companies were expected to share and exchange information and knowledge of 
those customers with their colleagues at different locations; that is, the employees had 
to work as a global team with a global business framework.
Since the establishment of Global Electronic Market Sector, BOC has won several 
important contracts in the industry. An article published in BOC World, an internal 
company magazine, claims:
“The global electronics teams has won every major project on which it has bid over the 
past six months, achieving a hit rate of two major contracts a month. The value from 
these projects over their contract life is around $200m” {BOC World, August 1995, No4:
23).
The success in the Global Electronic Market Sector showed the Group that the 
reorganisation of market function to work around the globe could successfully pursue 
the company’s interest and the customers’ demands, and at the same time cause the 
“minimum disturbance” to the existing organisational settings. Minimum disturbance 
meant that the Gases wished to re-organise the current way of doing business but at the 
same time it had no wish to re-structure the current organisational settings.
7
As it was stated in the company’s 1992 annual report: “Manufacture of the latest generation of 
semiconductor devices requires process gases to be not only produced, but also delivered to the point of 
use, to outstanding levels of purity.”
g
This was mentioned many times in the interviews and annual reports.
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The first thing that Gases noticed was that in order to deliver the growth and value for 
its customers, to just be cost competitive alone was not enough.
“[...] innovate faster than its competitors, bring new ides to its customers in all countries 
as quickly as possible, and ensure that its operational effectiveness is unsurpassed” 
(Management Letter, February 1994, Issue 215).
In other words, everything Gases did needed to be targeted to achieve higher customer 
satisfaction. This Vision for BOC Gases, drafted in the summer 1993, made it clear to 
the whole BOC Group that:
“BOC Gases will be recognised as the most customer-focused industrial gases company 
worldwide. We will achieve this Vision through innovation and service created by 
working together around the globe” (Management Letter, 9 February 1994, Issue 215).
To be customer focused and globally, effective, the newly appointed Chief Executive -  
Gases, and Group Operating Officer, Mr. Chow, and his management team proposed a 
reform of Gases’ market function (1994). Their idea was to reorganise the market 
function around the customers and not by product. As a result six global market sectors 
were set up: Chemicals, Glass, Fabrication, Food, Electronics, Iron & Steel. Most 
customers were assigned to particular market sectors depending on their business. Each 
market sector was expected to work as a global team disregarding regions and countries. 
In doing so, consistent and standard services and interfaces within Gases and between 
Gases and the customers could be created.
Two support divisions were set up in the same year (1994) to look after the market 
function reform scheme: Marketing, and Process Development. The Group Manager -  
Marketing had to work with the market directors to develop the necessary marketing 
processes and skills in Gases. The Group Manager of Process Development was 
responsible to ensure that all market sectors were co-ordinated effectively, and that 
processes which span market sectors were supported appropriately. The employees 
who worked in the global market sectors were expected to work together at a global 
level, and the experts’ knowledge, information, and experiences of dealing with 
particular customers, industries, or technical problems were also expected to be shared 
and exchanged.
In the following year (1995) the Group Manager of Marketing and his team began to 
look for a common platform in order to facilitate cooperation and exchange, and they 
came to the conclusion that Lotus Notes would be useful. They believed that Lotus
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Notes could create consistent interfaces between BOC Gases’ local and regional offices 
and support ‘virtual global teams’. As a result, the Lotus Notes Project was set up to 
look after the technological support for market function reform.
The project
Lotus Notes project was initiated and launched by the market sector reform team to 
support the re-organisation of the marketing sector in Gases. At the beginning, Gases 
had Lotus Notes servers in the United State of America, Australia, Europe, and South 
Africa. The server at the centre in Guildford UK was responsible for managing the 
traffic between the servers in the other regions. About thirty ‘region’ databases were set 
up for Gases’ global customers in Notes. These databases were quite basic, similar to 
discussion groups, so employees could discuss customer issues and share information 
within regions. There were also team reference databases for each global market sector 
which contained the support materials for the global teams, including customer contact 
details, and business reports. Information such as outlines of strategies for customers, 
and plans of developing the account, were stored in the Strategy and Plan databases. 
Individuals could retrieve information from the databases but at the same time they 
were expected to put information of what they do with particular customers, how they 
deal with problems, and the development of their projects with the customers, into those 
databases. At this stage, Notes did not function properly for various technical reasons 
and was not used in the way that the team expected it to be used. This will be discussed 
later in the chapter.
In 1995, Group Information Management Department (IM) took over the Lotus Notes 
project9. The Group IM is BOC Group’s Information Management Department located 
at the headquarters in UK, and working with all of the BOC business including Gases, 
Health Care, Vacuum Technology, Distribution Services regardless of the regions and 
countries. Its central role was to set the standard and policies, and to provide global 
services and infrastructures such as e-mails, workgroup, documentation management,
9
The reasons why the project was passed on to Group IM to manage it are not known. It could be the 
organisation of the market reform was discontinuous after Mr. Chow’s departure (Section 5.3).
- 108-
internal web, etc. to IM departments within all of BOC’s overseas operation offices and 
business partners.
In early 1996, the Group EM initiated the “Notes 96 Project” to review the service and to 
ensure that the BOC built a firm platform for the next stage of development in terms of 
business and information technology. At a workshop for Notes 96 most IM personnel 
agreed that it had learnt a lot about Notes and was confident of making the system work 
properly the second time. A forty page long guidebook ‘Getting Notes Right’ was 
published to guide Notes users to use the system effectively so they would find the 
system could help them to do their jobs.
Also, in the early 1996 the Group IM organised a workshop on Knowledge 
Management within BOC. At the end of this workshop a general feeling emerged that 
BOC should look out for opportunities to adopt the Internal Web in order to gain market 
competitiveness. In July 1996, a number of suppliers attended another Knowledge 
Management workshop, including Lotus, David Skyme, Verity, Documentum, 
Microsoft, Andersen Consulting, Unipower, and Ernst & Young. In the workshop the 
suppliers and management consultants showed Group EM the development of 
knowledge management in other organisations, and explained its importance to an 
organization.
In a further workshop held in December 1996 some technological issues of knowledge 
management were discussed as well as the primary aim of the ‘knowledge management 
programme.’ As they put it: “Knowledge Management is about levering experience 
and expertise, so that knowledge gained in the one area can be used in other areas. ”
Following these events in 1996, Group IM integrated the Internal WWW and 
Knowledge Management Programme into a single workshop, which took place at UK 
headquarters in mid 1997. This workshop attracted not only personnel from IMs but 
also people from the business divisions. In fact, several senior managers, one level 
below the Board of Directors’ were among the delegates. A committee was set up as a 
result of the workshop and its duty was to report the progress of Knowledge 
Management Programme to the Board. By then the initial Notes project had faded away 
in the company.
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5.2 A nalysis
The description given above suggests that the case can be analysed by viewing the 
project in three phases: new concept of working together, exploring the technology, 
extending and applying the skills. These three phases are not determined according to 
calendar year or clock time nor are they according to any schedule set up by the project 
team originally. Rather, they are divided according to significant changes in 
individuals’ and group’s attitudes towards the system. Each phase had a specific 
context in which individuals or groups formed their own interpretations and 
expectations of problems and technology. Drawing on the data various interest groups 
were identified as the project progressed forward. These groups played roles in the 
project, and some were more influential than others in the different stages.
The analysis is organised around the three phases of the project, and each phase will be 
discussed under the headings of context, content, and process.
5.2.1 Phase / ;  New concept of working together (late 1992- 1994)
This period lasted from the early 1990s to 1994. In this period two major events took 
place in relation to the project: one was the reform of the marketing sector, and the other 
was the launch of the Lotus Notes project.
Context
According to the synthesised framework the context concerns two kinds: outer- and 
inner-context. The data suggests that the proposal on reform of marketing sector was 
largely influenced by external environments such as global economic environment and 
demands from customers. The Lotus Notes project was launched to support the reform 
and decisions made about the system were influenced by external factors such as the 
development of the software industry and by internal factors such as organisational 
settings and the IS environment.
Outer context
Global economic environment
In the late 1980s three large economies in the world namely US, Germany, and Japan 
did not do well in their external trade balance hence there was a fear that global
-1 1 0 -
recession was on the way. For example, the US had the problem of the double deficit 
and a ballooning debt which left a narrow path between recession and inflationary 
growth; Japan experienced its domestic financial crisis and political problems; 
reunification costs in Germany placed severe constraints upon policy makers. In the 
meantime the political and economic reconstruction in the European Communist bloc 
increased uncertainty in both the world economy and politics (BOC Annual Report, 
1992).
During this period BOC Gases experienced slow growth and even setbacks in sales and, 
concurrently, saw threats from their competitors’ success. In 1992 the Group claimed 
that its turnover was less than 1 percent above that in 1991; excluding exchange rate 
movements there was an underlying growth of 2 percent compared to 5 percent in 1991, 
as reported in its 1992 business review (1992 Annual Report: 42).
Customer Demands
BOC’s multinational customers demanded that BOC operate as a multinational as they 
preferred to deal with one multinational BOC rather than a number of different regional 
and local BOCs. This demand originally came from large multinational semi-conductor 
manufacturers who had plants all over the world, and put pressure on BOC to review its 
internal business operation between local and regional offices and also its external 
business contacts with customers. Such demands from the customers were important to 
BOC at that time because the global recession was on its way and there was a setback in 
the company’s sales figures. To meet these existing customers’ demands became ever 
so important at that time. Another reason that BOC responded to the demands from 
customers in the electronic industry was due to the fact that the semi-conductor industry 
was booming at a fast speed globally in the early 1990s. To meet the demands from the 
customers from this sector meant a chance to maintain steady sales figures for BOC.
The development of the software industry
The development of groupware in the software industry at this time is another 
contextual factor for which evidence was found. Articles published in newspapers such 
as Financial Times and Times between 1981 and 1995 were examined to find out the 
period when groupware and relating concepts emerged in the software industry and 
commercial areas. ABI on-line CD-Rom was also searched to confirm the findings of 
the newspaper survey. On-line databases were searched and the results of the search
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were used to support the argument. Generally speaking, the results reflected the trend 
which has been observed in recent years but it is worth noting that omissions could have 
potentially occurred due to different indexing systems. To establish the trend o f  
growing attention to groupware keywords such as “groupware”, “Lotus Notes”, 
“Microsoft Exchange”, “GroupWise”, and “CSCW” were used to search the databases. 
However the relevant articles may be indexed under other keywords and therefore 
would not be retrieved by the search.
The results are presented in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2. The results show that prior to 
1986 no article about groupware was published in the newspapers or magazines, but 
that from 1986 onwards there was a significant increase in the number o f articles 
published in this area.
Table 5.3: The rise of groupware
1981-1985 1986-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995
G'ouoware 0 101 406 1076
Lotus Notes 0 13 120 468
MS Exchange 0 0 0 48
Figure 5.2: The rise of groupw are
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The increasing number o f articles about groupware relates to two things. First is that 
the first official CSCW conference was held in 1986 just when the topic began to take 
off in the academic and software industry; and second, it is clear that articles increased 
dramatically at the time when Lotus Notes was first made available in the market 
(1987).
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Lotus Notes was regarded by many as the first substantial groupware product in the 
market, and since then its name has become synonymous with groupware, particularly 
in corporate environments. For example, there were 51 articles published between 1992 
and 1993 which concerned groupware and Lotus Notes at the same time; and in the 
period of 1994 and 1995 there were 216 articles discussing groupware and Lotus Notes 
compared with only 21 articles relating Microsoft Exchange with groupware. Because 
Notes was the first groupware on the market it gained the pre-eminent market share. 
Microsoft’s Exchange and Novell’s GroupWise entered the market later and could not 
shake the position held by Lotus Notes (interview with LM project manager).
Inner context
Organisational setting
Until the early 1990s BOC Gases had historically focused on its geographic strength, on 
building relationships in the countries that it served, and on local and regional 
management. Therefore, on most occasions its overseas operation offices and joint- 
venture companies around the world had discretion over business decisions; in 
consequence the market functions in BOC were decentralised. The result was that 
cross-region and country coordination or integration was weak. In fact, working 
together across regions and nations rarely happened within the company.
Also at this time, the marketing strategy was supply driven so the market function in 
BOC Gases was organised by the mode of supply such as ‘cylinder’, ‘bulk’, or 
‘pipeline’.
IS environment
IS environment refers to issues about software, hardware, organisation and management 
of IS operations, operations personnel within organisation, development methods, 
techniques, and so on.
Prior to the adoption of Notes, BOC had been using mainframes and stand alone PCs, 
and there was no global computer network to link offices around the world together. 
The lack of global computer networks within the company meant that all Notes servers 
were connected by modems, and data transmission was via ordinary telephone lines. A 
technical problem associated with such connection was the speed of transmission and 
replication which was slow when the traffic of transmission increased. This was
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regarded as a setback as the slow data transmission and replication put people off from 
using the system. Project manager in Group IM said:
“It was not rare that it took several hours to complete replications. In some cases the 
people could not even connect to the servers, and this really put people off” (The Project 
Manager).
Content
During this period of the time three sets of frames are derived: interpretation of 
problems, expectations of the technology, and understandings of the technology. 
Interpretation of problems in this phase associated with the way of doing business. 
Expectations of the technology refer to the expectations about the impact of the 
technology on the way of doing business and on working practice. Understandings of 
the technology refers to knowledge, experiences, and skills of the technology. The first 
set was held by the management group, while the second set was held by the marketing 
reform team, and the last set was held by the technologists.
The Management Group
Interpretations of problems
Historically, BOC’s perception of doing business focused on products and of being a 
leading company within the industry that was cost effective and able to provide 
relatively cheaper products to its customers. Owing to global economic recession, the 
boom in the semi-conductor sector, the pressures from its multinational customers, and 
the setback in its sales figures, the management group’s perceptions of how to maintain 
BOC’s market share changed. As the group reviewed the company’s business operation 
it realised that other things were equally or more important than just being cost and 
price competitive, such as having good relationships with its customers. The result of 
this changing perception was that the group decided to become more customer-focused.
By being customer-focused the management group meant that the company had to be 
familiar with its customers’ business, the industries where the customers were located, 
and how the customers used BOC’s products. Based on this understanding, together 
with the increasing pressures from its customers in the semi-conductor sector, by about 
1991 the Global Electronic Market Sector was established with the express purpose to
serve those customers. In the following years this strategy won some large contracts 
for Gases.
The successful experience with the Global Electronic Market Sector highlighted and 
brought to the surface a problem which had not been noted before; the lack of 
knowledge of its customers and of the industries to which BOC sold most of its 
products. The realisation made some in the company uncomfortable. As the new 
development manager said in the interview:
“[...] for example, most customers for the Oiban products were in the steel industry, but 
Gases knew very little about the steel industry, the customers and how the Orban products 
were used.”
Another problem which the management group perceived during this period was that 
BOC had not been seen as a multinational company but as an international group of 
BOCs. Such a perception came from the increasing demands from its customers to 
require BOC to be a multinational company to provide consistent and standard services 
access the globe. Through the eyes of its customers the management discovered that the 
Group did not have a single, consistent, and global business process and strategy and 
saw that to create a global business process was urgent (interview with the new 
development manager and project manager).
Within the current context, and building on the perceptions of current problems, the 
Managing Director (MD) of Gases drafted a Vision for the business in which he 
articulated two main directions that Gases should follow: customer focused and being 
a global company.
The Vision was supported by the Board level and was publicly endorsed as the Chief 
Executive made a statement in the 1994 Annual Report:
“[...] we once thought in terms of ‘cylinder’, ‘bulk’ or ‘pipeline’ business, we are now 
organised into teams serving, for example, the electronics, chemicals, food, glass, metals, 
fabrication and other markets. [...] In the early 1980s -  like many other UK business -  it 
(BOC Group) lacked understanding of its core markets; it suffered from high costs; above 
all, it needed to transform itself and its culture from being a UK company with an export 
business to being a truly international player.”
A similar statement was also made by the Managing Director of Gases in the same 
Annual Report:
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“It is our vision to be recognised as the most customer-focused industrial gases company 
in the world and we are building an organisation that is both locally competitive and 
globally effective. We are focusing ever more closely on the needs of our customers and 
responding swiftly and creatively to them” (Annual Report 1994).
An outcome of the perceptions of the problems and solutions for them was to reform the 
marketing sector in Gases. The marketing sector was now organised around the 
industries to which most of its products were sold and employees were asked to work 
together regardless of their locations when they served the same customers.
The Marketing Sector Reform Team
Expectations of the technology
Expectations of the technology such as expectations of impact of the technology on 
business operations and working practice were the primary reasons that the Lotus Notes 
project was initiated. It was noted that the expectations of the technology which 
became a force behind Notes project initiation and roll-out within BOC were held by 
the marketing sector reform team, especially by the manager of the team.
Mr. Sanderson, the manager of the team, had always worked in the business division 
and was regarded as a ‘business man’ in BOC, but he was described by the interviewees 
as the one who initiated the Lotus Notes Project. Sanderson explained that it was not by 
chance that he decided to adopt an office information system to assist the reform, rather, 
he had always believed in the role of IT/IS in today’s organisations.
“1 have always considered information system and its associated tools an integral and 
essential part of modem management. [...] the awareness of Lotus Notes came from my 
interest in all things about information systems” (Interview with Mr. Sanderson)
The perceptions of the current problems derived by the management team provided an 
opportunity for Sanderson to “test” his assumptions of information systems by rolling 
out Lotus Notes project in BOC.
Sanderson’s knowledge and understandings of Lotus Notes came from reading 
computer magazines and newspapers. When Mr. Sanderson and his team looked into 
possible information technology to support the marketing sector reform, they noted 
groupware as a potential solution for their problems, since in most magazines and 
newspaper articles Notes was synonymous with groupware and they “naturally” saw 
both are the same thing.
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Mr. Sanderson read about groupware/Lotus Notes and learned that it provided a 
platform to enable teamwork. He matched the definition of Notes given by the software 
industry10 and the media11 with the aim of market reform (i.e. working together as a 
global team) in mind, and was convinced that the system would support the marketing 
sector reform by creating consistent interfaces, enabling all BOCs to work together, and 
by being customer-focused. Sanderson said in the interview that he and team did not 
spend much time on evaluating other groupware but chose Notes straightaway. 
Although the decision about Lotus Notes seemed not to be properly the project manager 
commented that the choice made was “the best at that time and even today12.”
The Technologists
Understanding of the technology
Perceptions of problems were derived by the management, but expectations of the 
technology were formed by the marketing sector reform team. The former resulted in 
the decision about marketing sector reform and the latter, which was based on the 
former, lead to the initiation and roll-out of the Lotus Notes project. The decision of 
introducing Notes into the company raised doubts within the Group IM due to the fact 
that there was no knowledge base and no skills available in the Group IM to roll out 
Notes.
Current understanding of computer technology in BOC was associated with the 
mainframes and therefore PCs and networking were new things to many IM personnel. 
According to the interviewees, the lack of knowledge of Notes and of experience of 
dealing with network PCs caused a resistance to change within the Group IM especially 
from those who did not regard networked PCs as a real computing system.
A further impact of the lack of knowledge and skills of Notes led the technologists to 
make a decision about implementing the systems with a trial and error method which 
had implications in three areas: technical solutions, applications, and management. As
10 Vendors’ advertisements.
11 Articles published by newspapers.
12 “The best” in their own words.
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mentioned earlier there was no global network within BOC at that time so setting up the 
linkages between Notes servers in different countries relied on modems and telephone 
lines. A consequence of this technical solution was that users were upset with the slow 
speed of data replications and transmissions.
The decision to implement Lotus Notes in BOC was taken by the marketing reform 
team (applications), but how actually the system could be used to support the reform 
was not defined. The first application that the technologists thought of and developed 
was on-line discussion groups which aimed to let users across national and regional 
boundaries talk and share information with others on-line. The aim was seen to inform 
the objective of the marketing sector reform. A number of discussion groups were set 
up within Notes for each market sector, and users were able to meet now colleagues on 
the other side the world, whom they might have never met before, and discuss business 
virtually.
However, because of the lack of knowledge of possible implications that groupware 
could have for working practice, and the absence of experience of managing similar 
information systems, the technologists left these discussion groups to users to self 
regulate; that is, no policy to control and manage the discussion groups was put in place. 
Moreover, because Notes was also new to the technologists and the decision to deploy 
the technology was top-down there was no implementation strategy, and no user 
training. For example, when interviewees were asked if they could talk about their 
implementation/roll-out strategies at that time, they all (i.e. the new development 
manager, project manager, and project infrastructure manager) replied that there was no 
such thing. In this sense, users were left alone to explore the system by themselves.
“No, not for Lotus Notes, there is no implementation plans. Because what happened was 
that this person who started it said: OK, we want global team marketing and we want 
these people around the world involved, so we want their regions to put in Lotus Notes.
That is how Lotus Notes server popped up. That was not really planned It just 
happened” (The new development project manager)
Since there was no training on Lotus Notes available to users, many saw that Notes was 
no different from an e-mail system and they used both systems in more or less same 
way. For example, people used e-mail to carry out a small group discussion while they 
should have used discussion groups in Notes to do so. Consequently, the traffic in the 
e-mail system increased while discussion groups were left idle. In addition, an
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unintended result of using an e-mail system to have small group discussion was that 
invisible boundaries between groups and the rest of the company were created as only 
participants involved in the group were acknowledged in the content of discussions.
This led to further consequences. First, due to the lack of formal regulations for 
discussion groups, discussion groups became a place where people met and chat 
sometimes. For example, the discussion groups began with focused topics relating to 
business operations but were then driven away from the agenda to social chats and 
sometimes the discussions never came back to discuss the initial topics. This irritated 
some users as they felt that some discussions started off with interesting topics but 
became inconclusive at the end.
“Although discussions conducted within discussion groups took off slowly because of 
barriers between employees at the beginning, once the barriers start breaking down 
people then started getting ‘friendly’. What happened was that the discussion groups all 
started from very business focused topics, but after two or three times met on-line people 
started talking about something else and discussions went off to completely different 
tangent. No body really took back that debate and concluded it and produces document 
on it. So people got very very frustrated especially they found there were some very very 
good debates going on but nothing would never happen.” (project manager)
Second, many discussion groups were set up but were not updated and used on a 
frequent basis which only put people off from using the application even more. As 
project infrastructure manager pointed out in the interview:
“People were enthusiastic about the application at the beginning especially those new to 
the company. But they soon found out that there was nothing happening in these 
discussion groups (e.g. no one used it or information was not updated) and they soon 
abandoned the idea of using them for their work.”
Not only did users feel frustrated with the discussion groups but so did the management 
group. The management group saw that the discussion groups had become social chat 
rooms and was not impressed by it. And, most important of all, the management group 
conceived that Notes was not professional enough for business. Lotus Notes image was 
damaged among the management group and one consequence was that the Managing 
Director of Health Care, having seen the example in Gases, refused to install Notes in 
his division.
Process
Initiation of the Lotus Notes came from the business needs; however, when considering 
the changes that needed to be made in the company, an information system was not on
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the management group’s mind. The decision about introducing the system came from 
personal expectations o f the impact o f information technology held by Mr. Sanderson. 
How Notes could help the company to pursue its new business and marketing interests 
was left to the technologists to decide. It is seen that the perceptions and interpretations 
of the problems were top-down: the management group to marketing sector reform 
group to technologists and then to user groups. Each group, due to their situations and 
immediate contexts held specific perceptions o f problems which may or may not 
directly link to the initial ones derived by the management group. Figure 5.3 illustrates 
the relationship between issues that each group concerned.
Figure 5.3: Frames involved in Phase One
Management Group
Marketing Sector Reform TeamP h a s e  Z e r o
Technologists Group
P h a s e  O n e
Business needs
Understandings of the 
technology
Expectations of 
information systems
•Initiation of the marketing
sector reform
•Initiation of Lotus Notes
The three sets o f frames were held by three different groups and there is little evidence 
to show interactions taking place when one set o f ideas was passed down to another to 
initiate actions around it. Having said that, it is clear that group and individual 
expectations and understandings o f the technology changed every time the new ideas 
were passed down from the top.
5.2.2 Phase II: Exploring the technology (mid 1995 -  first half of 1996)
A significant feature o f this phase is that both technologists and users were more 
experienced with Notes and that their conceptions o f  problems associated with the 
system had moved beyond some basic technical problems and begun to concern
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organisational issues associated with the introductions of the system. Group IM took 
over the project in the early 1996 and thus marked a critical event which transferred the 
project to another phase.
Context
In this phase perception of current problems became focused on the system and its 
surrounding issues. The external business environment was seen as relatively 
insignificant compared with those internal. The discussion of contextual factors will 
concentrate on internal problems including the political climate and IS environment.
Political climate
At this phase, BOC Gases went through a major change in the senior management team. 
Mr Chow, who initiated the market sector reform in Gases, departed from BOC for 
GKN which is one of Britain’s largest and most profitable engineering groups.
In 1996 Mr. Chow was approached by Heidrick & Struggles International, the London- 
based executive recruitment agency, and was offered a job of chief executive in GKN. 
In the same year, Mr. Chow left BOC Gases for the job. A number of industry 
observers claimed that Mr. Chow’s departure had been expected ever since BOC 
promoted Mr. Rozenkranz from the Vacuum Technology Division to be the Group’s 
Chief Executive (April 20 1996, FT). The industry analysts commented that his leaving 
for GKN was: “BOC’s loss and GKN’s gain.” (Apirl 19 1996, FT)
An impact of Mr Chow’s departure regarding Notes project was that the market sector 
reform scheme was left half finished and would probably never be finished as the new 
appointed chief executive had different ideas of how to run business (interview with 
New Development Manager).
An impact later reflected in the project was the absence of a global business process in 
BOC. Mr Chow was described as having ample knowledge of Gases business as he 
joined the company in 1976 and had a global view of running business. He had held 
several senior positions in Hong Kong, Australia, Japan and the UK (Annual Report 
1993). In contrast, the new Chief Executive, Mr. Rosenranz, had relatively little 
knowledge of Gases business and weak international experience as he was promoted
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from the Vacuum Technology Division and had less experiences with global business 
(interview with New Development Manager).
The management style of the new Chief Executive, Mr. Rosenkranz, was described as 
consultative and changes made within the company tended to be evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary. In an interview with Financial Times Mr. Rosenkranz said: ‘"there is 
no 100-day plan, because I don’t work like that” (January, FT  96). He articulated two 
business principles and stressed that business strategies and employees would be 
expected to follow these:
1. Business strategies and policies are best developed centrally and collectively by 
those who run the operations, with highly devolved management accountability 
to achieve effective ‘local’ implementation.
2. Quick and effective decision-making is best accomplished with the shortest 
possible lines of communication within a high calibre management team whose 
members understand the details of the business they are running and who can 
operate effectively across national and cultural boundaries (Annual Report 1996: 
4).
Changes were made according to these principles in the Group. For example, the 
company established a management team namely Executive Management Board, which 
comprised fifteen business managers from around the world, to run and co-ordinate 
business globally. Also, in order to shorten the communication route and to closely 
monitor the gases business Mr. Rosekranz decided to run the Gases Division directly. 
Whereas other divisions in the Group were managed by Division Managing Directors 
who report to the Chief Executive (Figure 5.1).
IS Environment
At the end of the last phase a global PC network was in place in BOC hence some 
technical problems associated with the absence of network (e.g. slow speed of 
replication and data transmission) were gradually solved at this phase. Technically 
speaking, BOC could then concentrate on developing application within Notes.
Two substantial changes occurred during this period of the time in BOC’s internal IS 
environment. First, Group IM made a decision about standardising and replacing
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different office software packages used in the company with a Microsoft Office 
package. This decision had certain impact on how users perceived Lotus Notes and will 
be discussed in the following section. Second, the responsibility of the project was 
taken over by Group IM from the marketing sector reform team. Group IM was the 
central information management department of the company. Its main responsibility 
was to look after global information systems infrastructure within BOC. It was 
perceived and run as a service centre and funded by local IMs. Therefore, its role was 
to cooperate with and run services required by the local IMs while the latter had 
discretion of their own IS policies.
Content
It is noted that two sets of frames were important to this phase -  the Group IM’s and 
Users’ -  as a number of decisions were made around them. In this phase two 
dimensions of technological frames associating with Notes project that led to further 
decisions about re-launching Notes96 project are perceptions of problems that occurred 
in the past and present, and their understandings of Notes. User Group’s perceptions of 
the technology, more or less, provided a framework with which users acted towards 
Notes.
Group IM
Perceptions of problems
Learning from experiences in the previous phase Group IM summarised several 
problematic areas which undermined benefits of Notes. Those areas include the radical 
change in the way of thinking of work, lack of proper introduction of Notes to the 
company, the absence of a global business process, a lack of regulation and control 
within the system, and a lack of user involvement.
Group IM believed that asking BOCs around the world to work as a global BOC was 
asking people to change their conceptions of their work radically. This is due to the fact 
that BOC was never a global company.
“The work culture is that people did not like to put things into words, well initially they 
did not like to share information, and also they did not put words in the public so they 
were not very keen on contributing at all. Besides, they got no recognition from their 
boss or company to do it then why should they do it?” (new development manager)
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“BOC is a traditional company meaning that the hierarchical system was rigid in the 
company. There were some people felt, some of our junior people, uneasy when they 
talk to our colleagues on the other side of the world through electronic medium. Because 
they worried about some senior people could see what they said to others.” (project 
manager).
“Notes got to reflect the culture. What you can do with Notes is to reflect what the 
culture is because working globally was the fact that company did not do before. Lotus 
Notes can help you to explore local teamwork not global teamwork if you do not have 
that culture to support it. I think that the first applications we put in were really working 
to against the culture in the company and that is the reason that it did not work 
successfully. If they put Lotus Notes in for different reasons for example to support local 
teams, business unit, it might have succeeded.” (project infrastructure manager)
Group IM saw that users misused Notes as another e-mail system and “irresponsible” 
behaviour (e.g. chatting) within discussion groups was due to the fact that they were not 
introduced to the concepts of groupware/Notes properly at the beginning and were left 
alone to explore the system.
The launch of Lotus Notes by the marketing sector reform team was to support the 
reform in order to become a global company and be customer-focused. However, the 
aims and objectives given by the management group in its statement of marketing sector 
reform were too general and vague when specific applications needed to be designed 
within the system to support them. Group IM saw the fundamental problem that Notes 
did not take off in the first place partly because of unclear objectives of the adoption and 
undefined role of the system.
The lack of regulation and control within the discussion groups was perceived as a 
cause of Notes’ bad reputation within the company as well as a waste of resources. For 
example, when Group IM looked into global databases and discussion groups, it was 
found that many of them were created and disused although the company spent money 
to support and maintain them.
Another area which Group IM perceived as a problem was a lack of user involvement 
which result in a low system acceptance and little support from local or regional BOCs. 
The interviewee from Group IM explained that the initial decision about Notes was 
made in the headquarters by the marketing sector reform team and local and regional 
IMs were not consulted and involved in planning and developing applications in Notes. 
In other words, the decision was made and the system was pushed out centrally. Group 
IM saw that it was not right not to involve local or regional IMs; after all, they knew 
needs of their users’ best.
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“[...] Notes implementation was done centrally. That did cause problems. Because from 
what I understand the market sector organisation itself was not effectively initially 
because it did not get right down to the local business. Although BOC tried to organised 
globally but it did not really affect locally. At the same really happened to notes 
implementation cause it was managed in the centre nothing was done with local IM 
people and help them to administer their servers properly” (infrastructure project 
manager).
Understandings of the technology
Based on their perceptions of the problems which were inherited from the previous 
phase, Group IM decided to re-launch Notes with an aim to introduce the system to 
users properly and to “getting Notes right” this time. A project team was set up for the 
launch. Group IM recruited new full time personnel to look after Notes infrastructure.
To tackle problematic areas the primary tasks of Notes96 project team were (1) to 
define the system clearly, (2) to define when and how the system should be used for 
what, and (3) to define rules in the system. These definitions were referenced to the 
ones given by the software industry as well as to BOC’s own experiences with it.
To the Notes96 team Notes was perceived as groupware:
“[...] h supports teams separated by time-zones and distance to help in sharing 
information in support of business processes such as Supply Management, Key Customer 
Development and Innovation” {Getting Notes Right, July 1996: 8)
Whereas e-mail was understood as the system that “supports communication between 
individuals and small groups on specific topics”. By definition, the principal difference 
between Notes and e-mail was that the former enables multidimentional information 
sharing and the latter allows only one to one or one to many communications to take 
place. The project team saw that the discussion groups were more structured (i.e. 
grouped according to topics) and accommodated more participants than e-mail does. 
Table 5.6 summaries the comparisons between Notes and other existing systems within 
the company.
Table 5.4: Comparing Notes to other systems
E-Mail 
MS Mail, 
cc:Mail, 
GEMS
Teamworking 
(Groupware) 
Lotus Notes
Transaction
Processing
Document
Management
Internal
WWW
Purpose One to one, 
few
messaging
Managing business 
process, projects, 
problems
Commercial 
systems, eg 
SAP
Libraries,
publishing
External
libraries,
external
publishing
Usage Group-wide Cross regional, 
cross business
By business 
activity, local
By department / 
function, group- 
wide
Global
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Content Alphanumer 
ic text
Text, graphics, 
spreadsheets
Alphanumeric
databases
Text and graphics, 
spreadsheets
Text and 
graphics
End-to-end
transmission
90% in 3 
minutes
Fastest time of one 
hour
Realtime Likely to be 
similar to Lotus 
Notes
Unpredictable
Functionality Directory 
synchronisat 
ion, external 
links
Interactive, index 
by field
Relational,
extensive
reporting
Reference index 
by document class
Reference 
index, variable 
quality
Application
Examples
Information 
request and 
supply
Issue management, 
project / 
programme 
management, 
global supply 
management
Order 
processing, 
stock control, 
business 
activities
Standards manual, 
sales proposals, 
technical reports
Supplier
directory,
government
policy,
company
advertising
Source: “Getting Notes Right", Version 1.0 July 1996
The Notes96 project team understood that to make Notes work effectively depended on 
not only technical solutions but also management. For example, disuse of global 
databases and discussion groups was partly because of the lack of ownership, with the 
result that data was not updated and discussion topics were not concluded. Together 
with the concern that databases and discussion groups should be established for 
business purposes the Notes96 project team decided to pass the responsibility of 
maintaining and managing the databases and discussion groups to individuals who 
created and initiated them. They defined these individuals as “owners’ of databases and 
discussion groups and their responsibility was to maintain and ensure that the contents 
of the databases and discussion groups were updated and controlled. The responsibility 
that Group IM maintained with respect to databases was to monitor the usage of the 
databases. If Group IM found that the databases were not used for a period of the time 
it would inform the owners to act and if these owners did not respond to Group IM’s 
request then Group IM had rights to delete the databases.
User Group
Perceptions of the technology
Users’ perceptions of Notes were largely influenced by the self-perception which 
emerged from the earlier decision of standardising office software packages, and the 
problems that they encountered in the previous phase.
In that phase a decision about reducing the number of heterogeneous office software 
packages in BOC was made and Microsoft Office was chosen as the standard interface 
on staff desktops. One consequence of this decision was that there was a common self­
perception held by individuals within the company that tcBOC is a Microsoft company”.
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Such a self-perception had a direct impact on individuals’ perception of Notes. 
According to the interviewee there was a general feeling that Notes did not belong 
there.
“some individuals felt that Notes was out of the place within BOC since it was not 
Microsoft product but Lotus and some even felt that it was wrong to choose Lotus 
product” (interview with the Project Manager).
“A couple years ago, everyone had his own technologies. We really push to standardise 
the technologies because heterogeneous technologies just wasted money. One thing we 
standardised on is MS products. So we all have MS Office package. We got rid of Lotus 
Smart Suit and the only thing we kept is Lotus Notes. People said that it is wrong you 
know, looking at Lotus Notes, you have Lotus mail attached to it, but we are using MS 
mail. People did not like it.”
This did not help the introduction of Notes to the company at all.
“[...] the strong preference for Microsoft packages not only prevent users from exploring 
Notes, but also as the base of the prejudice that Lotus Notes often got blame for all the 
communication problems between Microsoft and Notes platform” (interview with the 
Project Manager)
Apart from the self-perception which undermined the efforts of introducing Notes into 
the company, problems occurred at the beginning of the roll-out as Notes had already 
formed a certain image among the users: that for example, it was difficult to use (e.g. 
slow speed, unfriendly user-interface), unprofessional (e.g. led to social chatting in the 
discussion groups), and useless for their work (e.g. contents in the databases and 
discussion groups were out of date in most cases). The new development manager 
said: “some people just did not want to know about the project, and some did not even 
want to hear the word ‘Notes’”.
Perceptions of the work
One area that the market sector reform project wanted to change in Gases was to 
encourage collaboration between different offices around the world. This was why Mr. 
Sanderson saw that Notes could support the project. But the concept of working 
together, regardless of national and regional boundaries, was alien to most people in 
BOC, let alone sharing information with “unknown” colleagues on the other side of the 
world.
According to the interviewees the unwillingness of staff to share information and 
collaborate with unknown colleagues was partly because of the absence of a global 
business process.
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“Problem was that, I think, to put Notes in to support these teams but BOC did not really 
have any business processes to actually require to use Notes. It was just put in as a 
communication tool so people in different regions could talk to each other. Really, there 
was no process to support ... so they did not need to communicate or collaborate really, 
applications were not used that much.” (infrastructure project manager)
Also, the absence of an incentive scheme in the company to encourage people to share 
their information was a reason why the system was not used often.
“People cannot not see the point of sharing information because there was no need of 
doing so since there is never a global business process to require people to work together.
The absence of an incentive scheme was also a problem. For example, in general our 
British colleagues are good at planning strategies and working behind the screen while 
our American colleagues are good at selling products to the customers. Since the 
incentive scheme that we have is to reward those who sell products rather than those who 
plan the strategies, our British colleagues felt very negative about collaboration. They 
don’t feel that they are appreciated” (the project manager)
In addition to the lack of good reason for people to share information and collaborate 
across boundaries, the wish to remain autonomous and discreet over decision making 
could also be a reason why people felt hesitant to share information. For example, the 
IM manager in Taiwan said that the senior managers in Taiwan regularly reviewed and 
filtered communications that IM put up on Notes because they did not want to put 
everything in the network to share with others within the company and wanted to 
remain discreet.
Process
As the political environment changed within BOC the ownership of the Lotus Notes 
project also changed. When Group IM took over the responsibility of Notes from the 
market sector reform team it also took over the problems associated with Notes. Group 
IM reviewed and re-examined the problems (which discourage people to use the 
system) and came to the decision to re-launch Notes. The objectives of the Notes96 
project were derived from the problems inherited from the original previous phase. A 
fundamental problem which the Notes96 project perceived was that the purpose of 
having Notes was not clear to most employees in the company, and therefore the 
principal task of the team was to redefine and to make it clear to users when and how to 
use Notes and for what. But when examining user group’s frames it was noted that the 
reasons for not using Notes was rooted more in organisational issues. In other words, 
users did not use Notes simply because they did not like it or did not understand it, but
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rather because their attitudes towards the technology were affected by other attitudes 
they held and by actions taken by the organisation (Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4: Frames involved in Phase Two
G roup  I M
‘Perceptions o f  problems 
•Understandings o f  the Notes
Phase O ne I
User G roup
•Perceptions o f  the Notes 
•Perceptions o f work
Other User Groups
Phase T w o
•Group IM took over 
•having m ore experience 
with Notes
5.2.3 Phase III: Extending and applying the skills (the second half of 1996 
- )
A milestone which marked this phase and made it differs from the previous one is the 
shift in the interests from Lotus Notes to Internal Web accompanied by the Knowledge 
Management Program. It seemed that the Group IM’s interest in Notes gradually faded 
away while the Knowledge Management Program and the development of the Internal 
Web was gaining attention and support from the senior management in the company.
Context
The shift in BOC’s interest from groupware to Internal Web could be said to be 
influenced by the development in computer technology and the dominant management 
theme at that time externally, and by the appointment of a new Group IM Director.
Outer Context
The development of Information technology
The popularity of the Internet in recent years has more or less changed individuals’ 
conceptions of computer technology. The development of the Internet technology, 
together with the commercial sector’s and IT industry’s interest in some of the concepts
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behind groupware, led to the concept of an ‘Intranet’ being formed. The IT industry 
took this concept further and developed computer interfaces for Intranet building. It is 
evident that during this phase there was an increasing number of newspaper articles 
discussing the concept, and technologies for it. For example, searching the key word 
‘intranet’ on The Financial Times CD-rom there was no article mentioning ‘intranet’ in 
1995 but in 1996 the term began to appear and even became the headline of the IT 
section. 89 articles were published in this area in 1996.
Many of these articles drew general pictures of the Intranet by describing and listing 
potential benefits of the technology, which would occur if it was adopted. For example, 
the Intranet was perceived as a means to allow companies to “streamline their internal 
communication and productivity” as it enables “people to find information easily, work 
together and share the results of their work.” Even more, Rod Newing (April 1997, FT) 
claimed that the Intranet is the technology that organisations should consider in the 21st 
century and that they should forget about groupware since it is “dead”.
The dominant management theme
Around the time that the idea of exploring Internet technology and combining it with 
the principles of groupware (e.g. teamwork, information sharing, etc.) becoming 
popular, a parallel theme in organisational management was arising: knowledge 
management. Like Business Process Reengineering (BPR) and workflow systems 
earlier in the decade and teamwork and groupware previously, the notion of Knowledge 
Management also sees computer based information systems such as Intranet as a means 
to help organisations to capture, store and retrieve valuable organisational knowledge. 
In 1997 there were twenty articles published on the topic of knowledge management 
whereas prior to that year there was none.
Inner Context
New Group IM Director
In the past, Group IM Director was not invited to attend meetings at the Board level but 
the situation changed after the new Group IM Director took on the job in 1996. BOC is 
an industrial manufacturing company and most of its senior managers joined the 
company as engineers and their success within the company was due to their knowledge 
and skills in the field rather than their computing literacy. Also, according to the project 
manager of Notes96 the company could be described as a traditional manufacturer, as
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cost control was the main concern in terms of accounting, so high costs of computing 
equipment was not an accounting department’s favourite (interview with the Project 
Manager). Computer based information technology was paid little attention to and not 
perceived as a strategic tool to accompany the business strategy.
The new Director, Jennifer Allerton, tried to change such perceptions of computers and 
introduced concepts relating to IT strategy to the company. As she said in her 
presentation “BOC IM strategy”
“to gain sustainable competitive advantage through Information Management we must 
continue to invest -  but in a more imaginative and synchronised way.” (May 1996)
The Director’s efforts to attract the Board of Director’s attentions to IT strategy along­
side business strategy seemed to pay off as the New Development Manager pointed out 
“the Director can now represent us and speak for us in the Board level meetings.”
Content
In this phase, Group IM still attempted on the one hand to fix problems with Notes, and 
on the other hand initiate another IS project accompanied by another management 
concept. Group IM’s technological frames were important to the IS development within 
BOC at that time.
Group IM
Reviewing Notes
In spite of efforts to re-launch Notes in BOC Group IM did not go very far with the 
project. It received a clear message from users that they disliked Notes interface and 
felt that it was user unfriendly. At that time the standard interface in Notes was menu 
driven rather than button driven which meant that users needed to get familiar with the 
commands in order to use the system more effectively. It was all right for people who 
used the system often because they could pick up the commands but for those who only 
used it from time to time it meant extra work for them to learn. In addition to intrinsic 
technical problems within Notes, Notes’ bad reputation had planted certain images (i.e. 
unprofessional, out-of-date, useless, etc) in the management and user groups’ mind. 
One consequence was that some people did not even want to have anything to do with 
Notes.
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“Nah, no Notes please. That’s people’s reaction to the system in BOC.” (new 
development manager).
“Notes got bad name because of what happened in the initial stage. It is very clear that 
Notes will never be able to effective as be as tool for communication, since the board has 
the idea of that people using Notes to chat. Although people now talking about 
communication and virtual teams, in fact Notes isn not going to succeed, you almost have 
to start all over again. You have to give to people something which does not look like 
Notes.” (new development manager)
Group IM came to a conclusion that the only way that people would use Notes was if 
they did not know that they were using it.
During the same period, Lotus introduced Domino which has a Web like user interface 
-  point and click; Group IM looked at the software and thought that it could be a 
solution for users’ complaints about Notes’ interface. Also, it saw that having the 
Domino interfaces in front and putting Notes behind the ‘screen’ would give Notes a 
new identity.
“In the future we don’t say Notes’ interface, we will not keep that a lot people do not like 
it anyway because they think that it is too tacky. And people get used to browser 
interface. We think that majority of people will access to Notes databases via Domino 
without knowing that they are using Notes databases.” (new development manager)
The solution of putting Notes behind the interface of Domino seemed to work in the 
company. According to the New Development Manager there was an increasing 
number of people using Notes databases via Domino interfaces, and many people 
expressed their interest in the new system, including the Managing Director of the 
Health Care Division who had previously banned Notes from his division.
Expectations of the technology
Around this time both concepts of the Intranet and knowledge management were 
popular in the IT industry and commercial sectors. With its experiences with Notes and 
other technologies available in BOC, Group IM was confident that it could take 
advantage of the latest technology and implement the idea of knowledge management. 
In addition to this experience changes in the organisational culture also conditioned 
Group IM’s confidence with the Intranet:
“When Lotus Notes was set up, it was a new concept that people work together as a 
global team, well, now people are in the global teams, people are sending e-mail all over 
the place. Everyone is used to talk to others in the same company in different regions 
which certainly was not case before.” (new development project manager)
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Group IM launched a new project named “Internal Web” which aimed to leverage 
knowledge within BOC. Workshops were organised to discuss the project. A general 
expectation of the Internal Web project held by Group IM was that it would encourage 
people to share and exchange information and that human resources with such expertise, 
experiences, and knowledge could be leveraged within BOC. Another expectation of 
the Internal Web was that it could give BOC competitiveness within the industry. In the 
workshop of knowledge management it was once mentioned: “it would be BOC’s loss if 
the company failed to adopt the technology and the concept”.
The first knowledge management and Internal Web workshop was held in December 
1996; in this workshop objectives, software packages, and technical infrastructure were 
decided. An important workshop took place in July 1997. In this workshop Group IM 
publicly expressed their expectations of the Internal Web projects to a number of senior 
managers who were among the delegates. Group IM saw that the project would have 
impact on technology and individuals. In terms of technology they expected that the 
Internal Web would bring benefits in the following areas:
- Seamless access through PC to a wide variety of information sources which was 
easy to use/search and which helped people to informed decisions
Easy route for contribution of knowledge and expertise to the rest of BOC
- IM infrastructure that is easily supportable and provides access throughout the 
organisation
- Common structure and data attributes
In terms of its impact on individuals Group IM expected that the Internal Web would 
make differences in
- Culture change to sharing / “stealing with glee”
- Better informed decision makers, with reduced information overload
- Common understanding of critical processes, and 
Self service ethos (Workshop Minutes).
Group IM believed that the lack of management supports for Notes was part of the 
reason that Notes did not take off in the company, and it took its opportunity (i.e. the 
presence of the senior managers) to explain the reasons why the BOC had to move to 
the Internal Web. These reasons were as follows:
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A slow decline in BOC performance, resulting from an inability to maintain a top class 
organisation and loss of customers by migration.
Possibility of severe competitive disadvantage due to inflexibility and ability of 
centralised competitors to react faster. The Internet technology may force the 
breakdown of the regionalised structure of business.
Fragmented systems approach will continue, with multiple and different instances of 
objects -  leading to incomplete and ineffective global systems, unnecessary costs and 
negative impact on other BOC continuous improvement initiatives
BOC is unlikely to attempt such an initiative again for another decade and there will 
continued internalisation. Technological change will eventually be forced upon BOC 
by competitors, suppliers or customers.
The Knowledge Management Programme and the idea of Internal Web were widely 
supported by the senior managers this time. The pilot system of Internal Web was up 
and running in the summer of 1997. (Workshop minutes)
Group IM’s strategy seemed to work as the project was widely supported by the senior 
mangers this time, and the pilot system of Internal Web was up and running in the 
summer of 1997.
Process
Although Group IM re-launched Notes once it took over the project, it later found that 
damage had been done and it was difficult to make people change their minds about 
Notes. Group IM realised that the only way to make things work was to give users 
something which does not look like Notes. IBM introduced Domino to the market in 
time to solve Group IM’s problem. Domino’s Internet like interfaces gave Notes a new 
face, and inspired Group IM to initiate a new project: Internal Web accompanied by 
knowledge management. And both concepts of Internal Web (known to many as 
Intranet) and knowledge management were current themes in the industries. Under close 
scrutiny it was interesting to find that objectives of the Internal Web project and the 
expectations that Group IM had for the project evolved from those of Notes.
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figure 5.5: Frames involved in Phase Three
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5.3 Findings
Several issues emerged from the previous discussion including the lack of management 
commitment, course of action, interdependence of frames, industrial vision, and vertical 
and horizontal analysis. Each of these issues is addressed and elaborated in this section.
The lack of management commitment
It was noted that support from management group was not there; indeed, to some extent, 
there was resistance to the system within it.
An across countries survey suggests that management commitment is on the top of a list 
of software project risks (Keil, et al., 1998), in fact the lack of top management 
commitment is seen as a risk that overshadows all others. Walsham (1993) notes that “a 
major element of the social context for the design and development activity for any 
computer-based IS of organisational significance can be thought of as senior 
management attitude” (p i98). Similarly, Markus (1990) argues that a certain degree of 
management mandate is critical to mass deployment of innovation in organisations 
especially when there are substitutes for it such as telephone and facsimile machines to 
e-mail system.
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Notes project was initiated and rolled out by the marketing sector reform team which 
was established purposely to look after the marketing sector reform scheme proposed by 
the Managing Director of Gases. Drawing from the data gathered it was not clear 
whether the roll-out of the Notes project was proved and supported by the Managing 
Director initially, but it was clear that Notes itself was not popular among the 
management group (Section 5.2.1) and received minimum support from the 
management group.
Or the surface, the technology seemed to be the one to be blamed as it did not integrate 
well into the existing systems; it allowed people to perform “unprofessional” tasks; and 
it was least useful in terms of supporting people to do their jobs. But under close 
scrutiny, the problem of not being able to roll out Notes in the company successfully 
was in part due to the lack of a strong management commitment to thfc change not just 
due to the technology per se.
The Managing Director wished to reform the marketing sector to serve BOC’s 
customers better but the organisational structure and internal cultures did not support 
the reform. Although it was evident that the concept of being a customer-focused 
global company was recognised by the Board level, it was also evident that the 
company did not commit itself to more changes in the company in order to support the 
scheme. In fact, to avoid any radical changes within the company the Managing 
Director only reorganised the marketing sector around the existing structure and did not 
make other changes. Another impact of the lack of the management full commitment to 
the changes was that global teamwork never took off within the company as most 
employees saw no reason for doing so.
This led to a further consequence: a lack of support from the local and regional 
offices/business partners, and from employees. Without a global business process in 
place the concept of working together became a vague and even ideal concept to many, 
and the local and regional offices/business partners could not see the need for 
collaboration; most of them wanted to remained discrete. Another impact of the lack of 
full management commitment to the changes was that global teamwork never took off 
within the company as most employees saw no reason for doing so.
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Course of action
The above phenomenon is likely to lead to a concern that individuals would have a 
ctwait and see” attitude instead of taking any initiative to use the system. This was 
discussed in Chapter Three, for when individuals encounter a new technology they not 
only “consult” their technological frames but also observe others’ attitudes and actions 
towards it; then they confirm, modify and reform their frames and then decide their 
actions. The Managing Director of Health Division’s attitude towards Notes can be 
given as an example. The Managing Director waited and observed phenomena around 
the use of Notes in Gases and formed an impression that Notes was bad news because it 
allowed people to chat about things irrelevant to their profession. His technological 
frames associated with Notes in particular were negative and later he came to the 
conclusion to ban the system from his division. The Managing Director’s impression of 
the system was largely built upon individuals’ behaviours in discussion groups.
Individuals’ experiences with Notes were various. But their views and patterns of 
using Notes were strongly dependent on how others used the system. The project 
infrastructure manager once put it:
“when new people come into the company they see a long list of databases which they 
can access, they go into two or three of them and found out that there is nothing 
happening... so they would think that it is just waste of time and do not bother to go in 
again.”
Interdependence of users’ using systems has always been an issue in groupware 
(Grudin, 1988; Markus and Connolly, 1990). Markus (Markus, 1990; Markus and 
Connolly, 1990) argues that the success of any groupware relies on the number of users 
who participate in the system; this is what she called “critical mass”. She Observes that 
patterns of using groupware to perform teamwork or to share information are similar to 
those of using communication means such as telephone. To illustrate her point Markus 
uses a telephone conversation as an example and argues that in order to make 
conversation successful both ends have to be willing to initiate and engage in the 
conversation. Similarly, the success of groupware also relies on individuals’ 
motivations and initiatives to take and engage in actions. In this sense, it becomes 
apparent why Notes was not frequently used in BOC. It is in part because individuals 
were waiting for others to take initiatives in order to organise their own actions towards 
them.
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Interactions with other frames
Orlikowski and Gash’s technological frames analysis concerns only technological 
dimensions as if others are less significant. The story told here illustrates that the 
technology is not the only concern when an IS project is initiated especially when it is 
organised for business needs. Equally, the outcomes of technology adoption depend not 
only on knowledge and experiences with the technology but also on other aspects such 
as business frames, perceptions of work, company vision. Because other frames are 
involved in the process of technology adoption, each stage of the process is pulled into 
different directions, as a result the outcomes become difficult to be anticipated and 
predicted. This is what others have called emerging (Orlikowski, 1996b), drifting 
(Ciborra, 1996a), and evolving (Rogers, 1994). In the present case study it has been 
shown the project began with the company’s business needs but later became 
technology driven as the principal focuses moved to how to make the technology work 
and to persuade staff to use it, and then another project was organised to serve a similar 
interest (i.e. sharing information). .
According to Orlikowski and Gash the drifting or emerging effects can be minimised if 
individuals’ technological frames are changed. The BOC story, however, demonstrates 
that the above assertion presents only a partial view. The case study suggests that in 
order to make the project work changes in other frames needed to be made too. This 
would not only have involved changes in the context (i.e. organisational structure) in 
which the project took place but would also have involved changes in individuals’ 
business frames, perceptions of their work, and company’s vision. In this sense, even if 
the Managing Director of Gases had restructured and created a global business process 
and set up an incentive scheme in Gases there would be no guarantee that staff would 
have changed their attitudes towards Notes. This provides a reason why the 
headquarters in the UK sold the idea of being a customer-focused and global company 
successfully to the local and regional offices/business partners, but permitted these 
offices/business to remain autonomous. Therefore, the story suggests that it would 
only be possible to take advantage of the functions offered by the technology when 
individuals’ perceptions of their work, business frames, and company’s vision have 
changed. This is shown in the diagram below.
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Figure 5.6: Interdependence of frames
Technological Frames
Work
-*■ Business Frames
Company Vision
The diagram shows that frames, which are involved in business operations frequently, 
are highly interdependent. It is not possible to make one area successful without 
changes elsewhere. For example, in order to change individuals’ technological frames, 
organisations also need to consider making changes in their perceptions of work 
(Section 2.3). But, to convince people to change their perceptions of how to perform 
their work, changes in company vision as well as understandings of business operations 
within the company will also have to be made. This highly interdependent relationship 
between different frames suggests that organisations should recognise that to convince 
individuals to use a piece of technology requires more than changing their perceptions 
of the technology, as Orlikowski and Gash have suggested. Indeed, other areas of 
thinking should be considered too.
Incongruence of frames
An interesting phenomenon was discovered in this case study: that is, that various 
interest groups were involved in the project but that an across group shared frames was 
not there to bridge the gaps between each other’s understandings of the situations and 
technology. In fact, it was found that frames held by each interest group were rather 
discrete. So, in this instance, there were the problems perceived by the management 
group, expectations of technology formed by the marketing sector reform team, and 
understandings of technology held by the technologists; in other words, these discrete 
perceptions even more, at a later stage there were technological frames of Group IM’s 
and those of the User Group and these two sets of frames did not exactly match each 
other. It was at that time, when the Group IM discovered the gaps between these two 
understandings of the technology that efforts were put into building a shared
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understanding of Notes (Section 5.2.2). The efforts included standardising definitions 
of Notes and e-mails and setting up the rules within Notes with an aim to eliminate 
misunderstanding and to build a shared understanding of the technology. Moreover, 
Group IM began to communicate with local IMs and users with a hope to understand 
the technology and problems from their views. But the shared frames were created too 
late; individuals already had their mind made up regarding the nature of the technology 
and this determined their actions towards it.
Industrial vision
Examining the factors which influenced the organisation’s decisions about 
implementing particular management concepts (i.e. customer-focused, teamwork, 
knowledge management) and information systems (e.g. Notes, Intranet), it was found 
that industrial vision of management themes and technology was among others regarded 
as an influential driving force (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997).
It is worth noting that the timing of BOC introducing the ideas of being customer- 
focused, being global and working as a global team was within the same period when 
other companies in many sectors were interested in the same management practice 
(Bikson, 1996; Ciborra, 1996b; Failla, 1996). The action taken in order to keep up with 
the fashion with others was also observed in the choice that the project team undertook 
to adopt Notes. Results of a survey of newspaper and magazine articles published 
between 1981 and 1995 shows that the number of articles talking about groupware grew 
over the period; by the time when Lotus Notes was introduced in BOC the number of 
articles published was around 1076 (1994-1995) compared with 406 (1992-1993) and 
101 (1986-1991). In most articles groupware was treated as synonymous with Lotus 
Notes. This trend certainly had its impact on the marketing sector reform team’s choice 
of Notes. As Mr. Sanderson admitted, he and the team did not look into other potential 
products simply because they believed that groupware was Notes, and vice versa. 
Similarly, Group IM’s decision and choice about promoting Intranet and knowledge 
management seemed to be another effort put in to keep up with the rest of industry.
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Vertical and horizontal analysis
Although the initial decisions about both projects at BOC seemed to be driven by 
external forces, it was found that the forces did not consistently affect subsequent 
decisions made about the projects and the directions of the projects. It was also noted 
that once the projects were initiated and internalised, the external forces became less 
influential compared with the internal ones as the latter became the major force to push 
the project forward. These internal forces included consequences of actions, changes 
made around the technology, changes in organisation, and so on. It is interesting to note 
that these inner forces observed in the later stages of the project were mainly effects or 
consequences of actions taken previously. That is, there is a strong interlinking between 
actions taken and the consequences of the actions. In other words, what happened in the 
past becomes important to the present since it forms part of the current context and 
decisions made in the present are more or less on the basis of the past (Section 3.2).
This finding provides a dynamic view of contextual factors (Pettigrew, 1987). At the 
horizontal level it is found that most contextual factors are sequentially interconnected, 
and at vertical level they are interactive (Section 3.2). This finding informs the 
arguments made in the contextualist approach and notices the weakness of other 
research which treats contextual factors as independent entities no past and fixture.
5.4 S ummary
This chapter has presented the case study carried out in the BOC Group. The process of 
BOC’ s adoption of groupware -  Notes -  has been described and discussed together 
with the findings of the study. The story told here shows how an IS project was 
initiated with no well-defined objectives but gradually developed through exploration 
and then turned into another direction. This presents a process of an IS deployment 
through use of technology, reflection on use, and realignment of use, which is rather 
different from the conventional and traditional rational managerial model of IS 
deployment through analysis, formal design and accepting, and implementation. In the 
study it is observed that individuals accumulated information in the form of knowledge 
and skills through exploration and were then been able to make decisions with respect 
to the design or use of the system. This is in part the phenomenon of organisational 
learning as we see that people’s frames are created, recreated, modified, and changed
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through their experiences with the technology. It is learned from the study that the 
deployment of the technology needs to be viewed and analysed in a temporal and 
continuous mode, as decisions taken are not just influenced by current situations but 
also by history.
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CHAPTER 6
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
This chapter presents the second main case study, carried out in the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). In 1995 BIS launched the WORKGROUP Project 
within the Bank to replace its old electronic mail system. The result was claimed by the 
project team to be the most successful IS project in the Bank’s history. This case study 
then tells a story which is quite different from that at BOC, and yet, when it is explored 
in more detail, a complex and quite subtle process of managing expectations and 
matching organisational norms is revealed.
BIS was chosen as a case study for this research for two reasons. First, an offer was 
made by the General Manager of Information Systems Services (ISS), the Bank's IS 
department, to study a recently completed project in the Bank. The project, 
WORKGROUP, was said to be the most successful ISS project in the Bank’s IS history. 
This claim engaged particular interest because the experience offered a dimension of IS 
projects which differed significantly from the story told by the BOC case study and 
much of the CSCW literature; and there would be research interest in finding out how 
BIS managed to achieve their success. Second, BIS and BOC operate in different 
sectors and provided different service to different types of customers, these differences 
provide an opportunity to study the extent to which issues arising during the initiating of 
an IS project would also be different.
As in the BOC study, various data collection techniques were employed in this case 
study. The primary source was semi-structured interviews of between one hour and two 
hours in length. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed for subsequent 
analysis. Table 6.1 shows the time and date of the main interviews undertaken. Four
interviews were with members o f the WORKGROUP project team including the project 
manager, project co-ordinator (i.e. the person with the role o f co-ordinating between the 
ISS personnel and the User Group), the training officer, and a member o f the User 
Group. One interview was with the General Manager o f ISS and another one was with a 
member o f the ISS staff but in a different division within the ISS.
Table 6.1: Number of interviews
Date Time Title
September. 1997 1 hr Information Systems Manager
September. 1997 1 hr Project Co-ordinator
October. 1997 1 hr Project Manager
October. 1997 2 hrs Training Officer
October. 1997 1 hr Information Systems Service
October. 1997 2 hrs Training Officer
October. 1997 2 hrs User Group
Interviewees answered all types o f questions which were related to the project, but when 
the answers involved the Bank’s internal politics they would almost always shift the 
direction and sometimes change topic. For example, more than one interviewee 
mentioned that it took six months to get approval o f the WORKGROUP project from 
the Executive Committee (ExCo) and that this was due to politics within the Bank, but 
none o f them was willing to explore the matter further. Because interviewees were 
extremely careful with their statements, it was difficult to collect ‘unofficial’ data, and 
this could be said to be a weakness o f this case study. On the other hand, in developing 
and presenting the account here, have been retained the unanswered questions o f the 
closed off routes o f enquiry, and used as evidence themselves for processes and 
activities around the project.
Lunch in the canteen at the Bank provided another research opportunity, to meet and 
talk to other members o f the staff. It was natural that people were more relaxed in the
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canteen than in the meeting room13, and observations were made o f conversations 
between colleagues. In addition, after the case study period, some follow up questions 
were sent to the interviewees through e-mail after returning to UK.
Formal documentation was also an important source o f data in this case study (Table 6.2 
and 6.3). Since the project had been completed a year before this case study was 
carried out, some details o f the project might not be recalled although participants were 
interviewed. The documents, therefore, became useful sources to fill in contemporary 
detail since they recorded details o f the project that were not mentioned or recalled by 
the interviewees. In undertaking this kind o f case study there is, o f course, as much 
interest in recollections, opinions and attitudes (technological frames), as in the 'facts'.
Table 6.2: Titles of principal documents consulted
Date Document
February 1994 User Survey of the current e-mail services 
Evaluation Criteria
Management Diary System. Requirement & Design Document 
WorkGroup Specification 
Project Summary (AUTOFAX)
Management Absences System: Conversion to GroupWise 
ExCo Summary
Mission Statement Project GS01 -  Development of Communication Tools. 
Workgroup Implementation Project, submission of the project to ExCo 
(revision 1.4)
Guidelines for Electronic Mail & Telefax users 
Notes on information Classification Categories
March 1994
October 1994
December 1994
April 1995 
July 1995 
July 1995
November 1995
February 1996 
October 1996
13 The General Manager of ISS arranged a meeting room for the author to conduct interviews and use it 
as a study room during the stay at the Bank.
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Table 6.3: Numbers of documents viewed
Year Memorandum Documented e-mail messages User Group Minutes
1993 2
1994 3 2
1995 14 52
1996 40 33 3
1997 3
Total: 152
The next section provides an overview of BIS and an outline of the project history, and 
the section of analysis follows this. The section of analysis (Section 6.2) is organised in 
accordance with the synthesised framework and has three sub-sections: context, content, 
and process. Section 6.3 then presents the findings learned from the case study, and the 
chapter ends with a summary.
6.1 Bank  fo r  International S ettlem en ts
6.1.1 About the Bank
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was established in 1930 and is located in 
Basle Switzerland. The BIS is owned and controlled by its member countries’ central 
banks, and provides some specialised services to these central banks. The Hague 
Agreements (1930) established the BIS as an international organisation governed by 
international law with the privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of 
its functions. The BIS is subject neither to the Swiss Federal Law concerning Banks 
and Saving Banks nor to the provisions of Swiss Company Law as it is an international 
institution.
The Bank has the legal structure of a limited company with an issued share capital. In 
all, some 86% of the Bank’s issued share capital is registered in the names of member 
countries’ central banks, the remaining 14% being held by private shareholders. While 
all shares carry equal rights with respect to the annual dividend, all rights of voting and 
representation are reserved for the central banks of the member countries. Up to 1994 
the member countries were those (eleven countries) who comprise the Group of Ten 
namely Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. In 1996 / 97 an
-1 4 6 -
additional nine central banks in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East were 
admitted to membership14.
The Bank is managed by three senior administrative bodies: the General Meeting, the 
Board of Directors, and the Senior Management Team. The General Meeting takes 
place annually and only 41 shareholding central banks have rights to attend and vote in 
the Meeting. The Board of Directors is made up of representatives from eleven 
countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America). The Board of 
Directors elects a Chairman from among its members and appoints the President of the 
Bank; it also appoints the General Manager, and the other members of the Management 
Team.
Since its creation the BIS has been a central banking institution with its principal object 
to promote co-operation between central banks. In the eyes of its employees and the 
central banks, which use BIS services, the BIS is a forum for international monetary co­
operation, a bank for central banks, a centre for monetary and economic research, and 
an agent or trustee.
As well as hosting meetings for the Governors and other officials of the shareholding 
central banks, the BIS is also a more general meeting place for many other countries’ 
central banks around the world. The purpose of these meetings is to achieve a high 
degree of mutual understanding of monetary and economic questions and to facilitate 
international co-operation in areas of common interests. In the recent years, BIS has 
increasingly invited central bank officials from the emerging market economies to 
participate in discussions held at the Bank. Various countries’ central banks or official 
monetary institutions throughout the world regularly attend and contribute to the Annual 
General Meeting of the BIS held in June each year.
The Bank has two principal operating areas represented by two key departments. The 
Monetary and Economic Department conducts research into monetary and financial 
issues that interest central banks. The research and statistics are published in various
14 Information is collected from BIS web site: http://www.BIS.org.
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Economic Papers, Working Papers and Policy Papers, as well as in the Bank’s Annual 
Report. The Bank’s publications are considered to be a good source of broad-ranging 
reviews of international economic and financial developments.
The Banking Department of BIS provides a wide range of banking services to assist 
central banks with the management of their external reserves. Currently, around 120 
central banks and international financial institutions around the globe place deposits 
with the Bank. The BIS held US$113.1 billion deposits at the end of March 1997, 
representing around 7% of world foreign exchange reserves. The Bank carries out a 
wide range of banking operations, which derive in the main from its ability to assist 
central banks in managing and investing some of their monetary reserves. The 
substantial size of the Bank’s balance sheet reflects the importance of the functions of 
BIS as a bank for central banks. BIS also acts as Agent or Trustee in connection with 
various international financial agreements.
6. 1.2 Background of the WORKGROUP project
The WORKGROUP project was initiated with the aim to replace the Bank’s old 
workgroup (email) package, Higgins. Higgins had been in use in BIS since 1988 up to 
the date that the WORKGROUP project was organised. It had been first set up within 
the trading room for internal communication, but was made available to the whole Bank 
later. The old system potentially provided several functions including 
construction/editing facilities, electronic exchange of text, time marking and time 
keeping, and general office tools. Each function provided services as follows (Bullen 
and Bennett, 1991):
Construction/editingfacilitiesallow text creation and editing facilities.
Electronic exchange o f text includes electronic mail and conferencing, 
gateways to other systems, document transfer.
Directory provides a name and electronic address file to support data 
exchange by users of the system.
Time marking and time keeping provides a facility for recording events 
scheduled for a particular date.
General tools supports work in financial an budgeting areas and some 
project tracking capability.
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Despite Higgins providing various functions, people in the Bank used Higgins mainly 
for sending and receiving e-mails. Indeed, many did not know it could do more.
In the early 1990s Higgins’ incompatibility with the Bank’s standard desktop operating 
system for office automation applications (Windows 3.1) and its network operating 
system (Novell NetWare), together with some intrinsic technical problems and growing 
demands from users, drove ISS to review the system15. As a result, in October 1993, 
the Dealing and Office Information Systems (DOIS) division in ISS initiated the 
WORKGROUP project with the aim to develop and improve the workgroup software, 
and to provide enhanced user facilities such as a common, intuitive user interface, 
multi-tasking, data integration and better system efficiency and security16. Table 6.4 
shows the basic timeline o f the project development.
Table 6.4: Project timetable 
Time Events
DOIS began to initiate The WORKGROUP project
User Group established
First User Group meeting 
First draft of system specification
Survey to collect user opinions of Higgins and their wish list was drafted 
by the User Group and distributed to users 
Final version of specification for new system
Sent out invitations and system specifications to the selected vendors (14 
companies) and expected the responses by 12th April 
Suppliers invited to the Bank to give presentations
The project team withdrew Microsoft Mail from the list
The remaining three companies were asked to demonstrate their products 
including cc:Mail, Beyond Mail, and GroupWise.
The project team withdrew cc:Mail
15 The reasons will be discussed in detail in the next section.
16 Document: “Invitation to Tender for Electronic Mail and Workgroup Software Package” 17th March 
1994
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Phase I
End of October. 1993 
November 1993 
Mid December, 1993 
January. 1994 
Mid-March, 1994 
18 March, 1994 
May to Early June. 1994 
5 July, 1994 
July, 1994 
25 July, 1994 
Phase II
Events
User Group and DOIS project team had a provisional training on both 
Beyond Mail and GroupWise 
No decision was made by the User Group
Additional technical tests were carried out on both products by DOIS 
project team
Technical Report was completed and distributed to the User Group
Changes made in the senior management in the Bank the project was 
withheld for 6 months
The project team proposed to the ExCo.
ITTC approved and support the project
The project team rolled out GroupWise
Training on GroupWise
Discussions of possible applications which could be developed within 
GroupWise ____________________________________ ___
The WORKGROUP Project had three phases defined by the project team and each o f  
these phases had specific tasks and goals to achieve. The first phase was the project’s 
initiation stage in which a user group was set up and specifications o f new system were 
investigated, invitations to tender were prepared and sent out to potential system 
suppliers, and a review o f various products made.
Invitations to potential system vendors were drafted and sent out to fourteen companies, 
see table 6.5. Eight companies replied to the invitation and four were selected by DOIS 
for further investigation: Lotus cc:Mail™ direct from Lotus Switzerland, Beyond 
Mail™ from European Software Publishing, Microsoft Mail™ from local Swiss 
suppliers SYSG, and Novell WordPerfect GroupWise™ from another local supplier 
ComicroNetsys17
17 Memorandum: WORKGROUP project, product recommendation, 19th January 1995.
Time
End August, 1994
30 August. 1994
End of November and early 
December, 1994
22 December. 1994
Between December 1994 
and July 1995
13 July, 1995
23 October. 1995
Mid-March to Earlv August. 
1996
Late-June to late October,
1996
Phase III 
After October
- 150-
Table 6.5: The potential vendors
Vendors Short List
European Software Publishing V
Braid Systems Ltd
Lotus Development (UK) Ltd.
Lotus Development (CH) AG V
COMICRO-NETSYS AG
Novell (CH) V
Da Vinci
DATAWARE AG
Fisher International
Enable Software Inc.
Microsoft V
Soft Switch Ltd.
TimSystem Schweiz
WordPerfect
In May and early June these four suppliers were invited to BIS to give a presentation on 
their products. Microsoft Mail failed to fulfil a number of basic requirements defined in 
the specifications and was withdrawn from the short list18, and the remainders on the list 
were CC: Mail, Beyond Mail, and GroupWise. During the second half of July, the three 
remaining companies were requested to demonstrate their products live to the project 
team. Following this Lotus cc:Mail was withdrawn from the list as it would allow users 
to 'do things that they should not do'19, and besides, the two remaining products (i.e. 
Beyond Mail and GroupWise) were judged as relatively superior.
18 This comment on MS Mail was made in official documents, but the detail of why it was rejected was 
not mentioned. A member of User Group, an interviewee, did not know the reason and others in technical 
team did not give the author an answer either.
19 This statement was made by members of the technical team from DOIS. There was no document to 
triangulate the statement. Again, the member of User Group did not know anything about cc:Mail and 
what things the technical members referred to, since User Group was not involved in the selection process 
at that point of time.
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Phase Two was about selecting a system, obtaining support from the ExCo, rolling out 
the system, and providing training on the new system. This phase was organised into 
three stages. The first stage involved a process of choosing and making a decision of a 
future software system based on the final shortlist; the second stage involved 
preparation of a proposal to the Bank’s Executive Committee (ExCo) in order to get 
approval from the General Manager; and the third stage involved planning a system 
roll-out. At the end of this phase the project team expected to come up with a 
recommendation report on which products to implement and with details of migration 
and training plans.
In August 1994 the project team, including User Group members (UG) had an 
opportunity to try out both Beyond Mail and GroupWise and to evaluate them via 
hands-on experience. Although the user group representatives preferred Beyond Mail 
to GroupWise, when it came to finalise the decision GroupWise was chosen by the ISS 
to be the Bank’s new workgroup software. Once this decision was made DOIS began to 
prepare itself for proposing the WORKGROUP project in its final form to the Executive 
Committee (ExCo). The official proposal was submitted to ExCo in July 1995 and did 
not get approval until six months later due to changes in management in BIS, and some 
political issues20. Quite what these 'politics' were is not perhaps so important, but what 
is interesting is the strong sense that interviewees had that these decisions were 
enmeshed in the broader power struggles of the bank, and not just in a rational and 
technological domain, and that they choose not to talk to a researcher about them
The project team rolled out GroupWise in three stages. Stage one aimed to transfer the 
current Higgins users (about 300 people) to GroupWise; stage two targeted those who 
were non Higgins users but were users of office information systems (about 150); and 
stage three focused on the rest of the employees who were not put on GroupWise in 
stage one and two. One day of training on GroupWise was provided and it was 
compulsory.
20 All the interview participants refused to talk about the 'politics' which sometime slipped into our 
conversations. Usually, they noticed that the interviews or conversation was heading to the direction, and 
they normally changed the subject very quickly.
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The project was considered completed by the end of Phase Two. Phase Three was an 
enhancement phase which gave DOIS an opportunity to explore GroupWise beyond 
basic e-mail functions and to develop applications. The objective of this phase was 
stated in the memorandum21 as that it aimed to “introduce workgroup concepts into the 
BIS by implementing the enhanced features of GroupWise” (p2). The project team 
identified six areas where they believed GroupWise could be beneficial to the Bank. 
These areas included shared diary and calendar functions, share task management, 
bulletin boards, form creation and circulation, MAPI interface, and Workflow 
methodology. Among these six areas only shared diary and calendar functions22 and 
bulletin boards were developed and implemented. This phase was signed off with an 
end of project report and a user survey undertaken in 199623.
6.2 A nalysis
The organisation of this section follows the structure of the framework developed in 
Chapter Three and has three main parts: (1) content, (2) context, and (3) process. 
Content is the phenomenon that we are interested in which in this study is referred to as 
the roll-out of an e-mail system to replace the existing one. Context refers to the 
environment in which the phenomenon is studied. Contextual factors are both external 
(outside the organisation) and internal (within the company) and those that condition, 
constitute, or are shaped by the phenomenon will be considered. Process is to reveal 
dynamics of the phenomenon under investigation. In this case study the process is 
about how the project team went about their task from initiating the project and 
selecting a system, to rolling out the system. The process is examined and discussed in 
relation to the concepts developed in the technological frames analysis. Thus, the 
analysis will focus on those individuals’ technological frames that influenced 
individuals’ attitudes and actions towards technologies in particular, and how they 
changed (or not) over time during the project.
21 hMemorandum: WorkGroup project meeting, 15 July 1996
22 It was developed to schedule meetings and also known as meeting room booking system.
23 Memorandum: GroupWise Questionnaire, 1996.
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The Table 6.6 summarises content, context, and process discussed in this section.
Table 6.6: Content, context, and process 
Content
The roll-out of an e-mail system to replace the current one -  Higgins.
Context
Outer context.
-  Market force
-  The development of IT industry 
Inner context:
-  Character of the organisation 
IS management environment 
Desktop working environment
Process
The process of the roll-out of GroupWise from the initiation to the roll-out.
6.2.1 Context
As mentioned earlier, the WORKGROUP project was organised into three phases, 
project preparation, product selection and roll-out, and development o f workgroup 
concepts in the Bank. There was a specific timetable defined by the project team at the 
beginning o f the project to help the team to monitor progress o f the project and while 
the timetable was not stuck to, there was a clear sense o f progression along a planned 
path. This reliance on and adherence to a timetable differs from what was described in 
the BOC case study, which was determined along the way by critical events and by 
significant changes in contexts. Here there is a need to explore the overall context for 
the project in the Bank, and thus discussion o f contextual factors in this study is not 
organised around the phases o f the project, as was done in the previous chapter, but 
organised in two general categories: outer and inner. That is, discussion relates to the 
context o f the Bank itself in its environment and to the Bank as an established 
organisation with a distinctive attitude to change, technology and innovation.
Outer context
In order to discuss the outer context the concept is divided into two broad themes. 
Consideration is given first to the bank as a business and to exploration o f the market 
forces that shape its responses to business process innovation and technology; and then,
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second, consideration is given explicitly to the history of the IT industry and the role 
and position of the history in the Bank's IT structures.
Market forces
Unlike organisations in the commercial sectors, BIS does not need to worry too much 
about market competition in the usual sense due to its special organisational status. As 
an organisation BIS is unique in the world, providing banking and other financial 
services only to central banks around the world with its major ‘clients’ also its major 
shareholders. In this sense, there is no market competition which BIS needs to worry 
about and therefore BIS’ internal structure and business activities have rarely changed 
in its 60 year history. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of the emerging 
economies’ central banks in South East Asia established an organisation to serve their 
local interests and to provide a forum for these central banks to discuss and exchange 
their monetary policies. This movement alarmed the management in BIS who saw this 
as a potential threat to their uniqueness in the market. Subsequently it reviewed BIS 
membership policies and decided to increase the number of memberships to include 
some emerging economies’ central banks.
Another external force which has had direct impact on BIS decision making and internal 
activities has been the member countries’ domestic economies and politics. BIS’ 
annual budget comes from the money that member central banks pool together. If the 
central banks face any domestic financial crisis, and are short of money themselves, BIS 
may also face budget cuts that year. This has happened in recent years24 when member 
countries’ central banks themselves faced budget cuts domestically and subsequently 
BIS faced budget cuts too. If and when this does happen, then information systems as a 
'none core' activity of the bank (see discussion below) may very well be more 
threatened than other areas of the bank.
The development of IT industry
Another significant contextual factor for the bank as it considers IS issues must be the 
developments in the global IT industry. In this case, relating to desktop technology and 
office communications, the key issues that emerged were those that related to emerging
24 The interviewees pointed out the cut back in the budget began around two years ago but did not give a 
definite date; therefore we assumed that it was around 1995 onwards.
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standards and expectation in user interfaces, operating systems and networking, and 
groupware.
In 1981 Microsoft introduced their first version of the DOS operating system for IBM 
personal computers and in the next year the company licensed MS DOS to some other 
PC manufacturers around the world. With this the MS DOS era started. A quite long 
period of operating software stability ensued, with attention focused on hardware 
advances and applications software development, as well as rudimentary local area 
networking based on separate network operating systems. When in 1990 Windows 3.0 
was introduced as a general purpose graphical user interface, and in 1992 Windows 3.1 
became available in the market, many organisations had to reconsider many issues of 
current and future software plans for what had become known as the users 'desktop'. 
Both Windows 3.0 and 3.1 were extensions to DOS and needed the support of DOS, 
however the operating system allowed people to develop a new relationship with their 
PCs, to view and use more than one software package at the same time and to 
experience a common and consistent interface to software.
Applications developed for Windows 3.0 and 3.1 quickly seized the software market, 
since compared to DOS based applications their interfaces were user friendly and many 
software systems became significantly easier to use25. In addition software was 
increasingly developed to utilise a networked environment, and operating systems (such 
as DOS/Windows), and network operating systems such as NetWare, Vines or LAN 
Manger, became increasingly intertwined. In summary, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s standard operation systems changed from MS-DOS to Windows based, and user 
interfaces also changed from command oriented to graphic oriented, while network 
aware software became the expectation of users.
This trend was certainly observed in the Bank’s IS working environment and the 
standard desktop operation system and most office applications were Windows based at 
the time of the start of the WORKGROUP project. Indeed, the MS-DOS based 
Higgins, running in a DOS Box on Windows, was clearly out of context and represented 
an earlier era of computing. DOIS could have upgraded Higgins to a Windows version
25 Source: http://www.microsoft.com
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if Enable Software, which developed Higgins, had taken advantage of graphic interfaces 
and followed the trend of Windows. But they did not, developing rather a different 
product. People in the Bank, both ISS and users, became increasingly impatient with 
Higgins’ incompatibility to other systems. New recruits to the Bank would often 
question the out-of-date workgroup system they saw, and this reinforced the thoughts 
of replacing Higgins with another product.
Inner Context
In the section above it is suggested that the market forces were noted as having 
relatively little influence on the decisions about information systems in the Bank, or the 
initiation of this project. In contrast the developments of the software industry and the 
way in which they were taken up in the bank, and reflected into the bank from outside 
by new recruits, seems certainly to have acted as a trigger for change. As will be shown 
later, these contextual factors can be seen as either essentially technological, setting new 
standards for how technical things are done, or more broadly as working through 
organisational expectations and norms, how work is done. Nonetheless, the forces that 
can be identified that pushed the WORKGROUP project through seem to be rather 
more internal. In other words, the project was initiated and sustained essentially as a 
result of demand push and technology pull within the Bank. To explore this inner 
context three principal inner contextual arenas were identified: the character of the 
organisation itself, its established IS management structures, and the operational 
environment for email and desktop computing. Each will be discussed.
Character of the Organisation
As mentioned earlier, BIS’ annual budget comes from money clubbed together by the 
member countries’ central banks, described as an ‘old boy’s club’. With such a unique 
organisational background the Bank needed not to worry too much about the sources of 
money for most projects.
“ ... because it is an organisation which represents many other organisations, its service 
provided by the central banks themselves and to themselves, previously there is no real 
financial drive that you have to make profits and you have to be cost effective. In the past 
if you want some, here is some money. Or if you need some more money, here is some 
more money” (Training Officer).
“The money was never a worry to the employees in the Bank, because the central banks 
of the member countries always provides sufficient money for most projects” (ISS 
personnel).
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By law BIS is an international company, and there are at least twenty seven different 
nationalities among its five hundred employees. Nevertheless, BIS is also rather ‘local’ 
because most of its activities take place within the BIS Building in Basel Switzerland. 
Also, it does not have any overseas branches nor any expertise dispersed around the 
world, and its members of staff do not need to travel often either. Any contacts with the 
world outside the building can be done via communication means such as surface mail, 
e-mail, fax machine, telephone, telegraph, etc. This is why its employees call the 
building “the tower” not only because it is a twelve floor high round building but also 
because people inside have little contact with the world outside.
Another distinctive feature of BIS is its highly bureaucratic style in terms of dealing 
with paper. This is in part because its origins are found in the pre-war years when 
different styles of operation were found in public bodies. It is also perhaps because 
shareholders are central banks and the sensitive and confidential services it provides to 
them are often in the form of documents, circulated inside and sent out of the Tower, 
and undertaken with great caution. For example, all documents which are meant to be 
sent out of the building need to be sent to a central fax room first and are reviewed by 
staff there; all outgoing mails are unsealed and sent to a mailing room to be checked 
before being then sent off. Similarly, all incoming mail needs to be registered by the 
mailroom first and only after that are items distributed to addressees. Almost all paper 
documents within the Bank need various signatures from authorities before they can be 
sent out or distributed within the organisation. It is not uncommon that a one page 
document could take up to a month to be distributed to employees.
This distinctive and 'un-reformed' paper driven and control oriented working 
environment had significant consequences for the WORKGROUP project and many 
other IS systems in the Bank. Not least because it would be clear to many parties that 
groupware and network technologies could potentially present a challenge to the Bank's 
work culture and management structures. It is quite easy to see just how alien the 
standard notions of groupware (information sharing, flattening hierarchy, supporting 
team work etc.) would be in an organisation such as this, but equally just how enticing 
they might be too. People in ISS, in the senior management and in the user communities 
would need to find a way to respond to this challenge, either directly by taking it up (but 
who would dare?), or by diverting it into a safer domain (say a technological one).
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IS management environment
This question then leads to the second contextual element we focus on here, that of the 
Information Systems Services Department (ISS) and the Banks IS culture. ISS provides
the Bank with all IT services from a central department. It consists of four divisions
."0 ,
wiRh 75 staff in total tq serve 500 people in the Bank. These divisions afe: Dealing and 
Office Information Systems (DOIS), Monetary, Economics and General Secretariat 
(MEGS), Banking, Accounting, Fund Transferring (BAFT), and Central Computer 
Services (CCS). Each cjivjsion has its own division manager and looses after different 
nepds jp the Bank, an(| Ip all these divisions report to a General IV^pger. MEGS 
provides a wide range cj^  information services; BAFT looks after the systems related tq 
the Rank’s financial activities such as accountancy pnddealing; CCS is Responsible for 
thp mpjn|rame; and DOIS provides office automation generic applications such as 
word-pfocessing packages, spreadsheet, electronic mail systems, etc.
Collaboration between divisions is often required, but conflicts/rjyalry betweep 
divisions also exist due to the fact that each of them pursues its own interests and 
sohietjpjqs needs to ‘fight’ over control of common resources26. Ajthough it was 
mentjqped earlier that ISS in general need not worry about its budget, j) was none the 
less the case that having two major IS projects running at the same time farely happenecj 
in the Bank. The careful and controlled management of IS that the Bank undertook led 
to a cqpservative policy of systems development.
In ad^tion to fights for limited or common resources, a conflict between the divisions 
of ISS was explained by interviewees as being a result of divisions avoiding 
responsibility. There was a tendency that divisions would blame each °ther for any 
system failure and user complaints. The following quotation was a description given 
by one interviewee about how the divisions would react when problems arise:
“BAFT may say “Oh, we have not managed to achieve this because we have not got 
support from DOIS”, or DOIS may say “yes, we would have done such and such if 
MEGS has done XYZ” (Roll-out and Training).
26 Interviews with ISS personal and Training Officer.
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A consequence of the tendency of avoiding responsibility and playing off against each 
other was to re-enforce the conflicts and, more significantly, users’ dissatisfaction and 
cynicism about ISS.
More generally computing technologies and office information systems have been 
traditionally regarded as not so important to the business activities within the Bank for a 
number of reasons. First, the member countries’ central banks are less interested in 
technology and see BIS as having a low profile in this area. Rather, they paid more 
attention to financial, monetary and economic issues, and the quality of BIS services. 
Second, computers and office information systems have always been regarded as and 
used as tools to support people to do their jobs. People in the Bank use computers to 
process and generate data but do not emphasise their importance to their work.
A third reason for the low status of ISS and their poor position in the Bank's 'pecking 
order1 that we can detect, is that for the mainstream BIS employees ISS has always been 
thought of as a money spender, yet as never being able to provide the services that 
Bank people required (interview with a member of the User Group). Under 
questioning, interviewees traced this feeling towards ISS back to some early IS projects 
in the Bank. For example, it was explained that in 1979 (a full 17 years before the 
interviews for this case study) the Bank put in the first IBM mainframe and ISS 
developed the first system for Banking and Accounting but Banking rejected the system 
in the end and said:
“thank you very much, that was a every interesting lesson but “No” we won’t take it” (a
member of the User Group).
One reason that the Banking department rejected the system was because the system 
required a lot of resources to run and therefore was slow. However, the most important 
reason, it was hinted, was the internal politics between the Banking and Monetary 
Economic Department (MED) since part of the resources required to run the system 
needed to be shared between the two departments. MED was happy with the system but 
Banking was not. Although later ISS had another project with the Banking department, 
and the resulting system ran quite successfully, the feeling that ISS did not do anything 
for them was still there. This image of ISS stayed within BIS up to the date of this
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study, and it was not uncommon to hear people make comments about ISS and say: 
“ISS never delivers services that we want.”27
Desktop working environment
As mentioned earlier, the current operating system that the Bank has is MS Windows™, 
though of course there are other financial systems which run on different environments, 
but most offices operate within a Windows environment networked using Novell 
NetWare. Before the WORKGROUP project was started, Higgins 2.401 was BIS e-mail 
system, and had been chosen around the same time that Novell NetWare network 
operating system was put in as a first attempt at modernisation of the office automation 
platform in the Bank in 1988.
Higgins was originally installed in the Dealing Room for departmental communication, 
and was later made available to other departments. By 1994 more than 425 users were 
registered in Higgins' directory, and about 300 people were active users28.
As an MS-DOS application, Higgins’ in many ways was incompatible to the Windows 
working environment, which also meant that some functions in the system were not 
available in the Windows environment. These included the mail and appointment call 
function (i.e. notification of mail delivery and warning of approaching meetings), and 
printing. Higgins could not even make available the electronic mail service as a means 
of transport directly from a Windows application, whether a standard package (Word, 
Excel, etc.) or an in-house development.
Also, there was a lack of good quality management and reporting tools, particularly in 
areas of mail flow control and central database management within Higgins. There 
were no facilities for selective archiving and deletions, traffic statistics, extensive log or 
message tracing, and so on. Because of a lack of management and reporting, tools 
operation such as moving users from one workgroup29 to another required skilled
27 Interview with the member of the User Group
28 Interview with the project co-ordinator.
29 Users were organised into six workgroups and each workgroup was assigned to a specific server.
-161 -
technical control and intervention which increased pressure on DOIS30. Furthermore, 
Higgins did not have an automated function for filtering, filing and archiving incoming 
mails, and since most users did not file their mails into private directories, the central 
database easily became overloaded.
Security and reliability issues raised concerns too. Regarding the issue of reliability, the 
users experienced regular database corruption and loss of mail. Unauthorised data 
access and service unavailability was evident too, partly because the system database 
could not be properly protected at the network operating level. In terms of security, 
Higgins’ user identifications (ID) and passwords (directory) were totally independent of 
those of the Novell NetWare network operating system. As a consequence, DOIS had 
to run a restricted secure service as well, which required double user administration 
with the corresponding risks.
All the above problems, especially incompatibility of the operating environment, 
increasing traffic in the system, and overloaded central databases, made Higgins less 
stable and reliable and it kept 'falling over'. According to all interviewees, it was not 
uncommon that ISS needed to spend an average of one working day per week to 
maintain and fix problems which added an extra burden on ISS or DOIS normal 
working loads.
To the users, command driven software such as Higgins was not intuitive and did not 
attract them to explore the system further than the basic functions, such as sending and 
receiving e-mails. Many system users after several years experience with Higgins knew 
only how to read and send messages. The filing function was thought to be difficult to 
use; one interviewee described the complicated filing system in Higgins during the 
interview.
“users needed to file messages under key words set by themselves, and in order to 
retrieve these messages from the system they had to remember all the keywords and 
which message is stored under which key word. What happened normally was that 
people could not remember those keywords subsequently they could not find the 
messages” (member of the User Group)
30 Memorandum: WORKGROUP project description, 13th May 1993. And Mission Statement Project 
GS01 -  Development of Communication Tools, Workgroup Implementation Project, submission of the 
project to ExCo (revision 1.4), 6th November 1995. Memorandum: WORKGROUP project description, 
13 May 1993.
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Many users found that it was easier if they simply printed out important messages and 
files, and filed them manually. Indeed, such an approach was quite compatible with the 
Bank's traditional working practices.
Prior to the WORKGROUP project, when new recruits arrived in the Bank they were 
often surprised by the existence of Higgins, as to them the system was utterly out-of- 
date, a throw back to an earlier era. Some made comments such as “What is this? The 
E-mail system where I  was before could do this and that... ” The reaction that ISS had to 
instability and unreliability of Higgins in its later days in the Bank was shared by users, 
who also felt increasingly frustrated and demand for a new e-mail system to replace 
Higgins built up among users.
6.2.2 Process
The process of the roll-out the new e-mail system is examined and explored through the 
perspectives of interactions between three identified interest groups (stakeholders) 
derived from the case study and through a consideration of their technological frames: 
DOIS project team (DOIS), User Group (UG) and General Management (GM). In 
many ways the dominant group among the three was DOIS and their technological 
frames were the main references for most decisions made about the project. Thus, 
despite the fact that there was a User Group set up to represent users in the departments 
and to help the project team to select the right product, it was evident that the DOIS 
project team was in a strong position to control the direction of the project. And yet, as 
will be shown, other groups provided their own endorsement or acquiescence to the 
project at key points, and in so doing drew on rather different technological frames.
DOIS
The DOIS’ technological frames (i.e. understandings of problems and expectations of 
this new system) can be examined in three dimensions: issues around initiation, criteria 
of success, and issues around roll-out (section 3.1.3). According to Orlikowski and 
Gash definition of the initiation dimension includes knowledge and experiences 
involved in the initiation stage of an IS project and embraces background, participants, 
approaches to feasibility assessment, and perceptions of the technology’s objectives, 
utility, and importance. At initiation stage the DOIS was concerned about the scope of
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the project and use of the technology, and the character of the technology. The 
dimension of criteria of success involves exploring beliefs about how success of the 
technology is being, is expected to be, or should be assessed. The criteria of success in 
this case study refers to the rules that the DOIS believed should be followed if the 
project was to be successful such as establishing a user group, and providing a training 
program on the new technology. Finally, issues around implementation mean the 
knowledge and experiences of implementation processes involving issues such as 
background, participants, stages, design issues, and support from various groups. As 
regards DOIS to avoid interrupting the Bank’s preparation for the annual report, issues 
around training program, and rules for the use of e-mail were the main concerns. Table 
6.7.
Table 6.7: Technological Frames of the DOIS
Issues around initiation
-  Scope of the project and the use of the technology
-  Character of the technology
Criteria of success
-  To set up a user group
-  To provide training program on the new technology
Issues around the roll-out
-  To avoid interrupting the normal business operation (when to roll out)
-  Issues around training program (how to provide training program)
-  To set up the rules of the use of the e-mail.____________ _________________
Issues around initiation 
Establishing the project scope and system specification
The WORKGROUP project can be seen as initiated as a result of the demand from both 
users and from ISS to replace Higgins. This was demand push, but at the same time 
there existed technology pull because the project was driven by a technological force 
(i.e. the developments of the software industry). The primary problem that DOIS 
conceived was that Higgins was insufficiently robust to perform the job. By ‘robust’ 
DOIS meant system stability and reliability. DOIS was upset with the situation in which 
users complained to them all the time and which required them to spend much time on 
repeatedly fixing the same problems.
“It could just about manage the internal e-mail requirements all the time. It was just 
running the DOS Box within the Windows, it was not stable enough. I had to spend half
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day to a day a week to keep the system active. And you could not put external mail on it 
because of the large number of users and traffic would break down the system. So we 
realised that Higgins was not robust enough to meet the requirements of today’s 
situation.” (Project Co-ordinator)
The WORKGROUP project was then organised by DOIS to discuss possible solutions 
for the problem, because Higgins was primarily used as an e-mail system, DOIS 
decided to address the problem as a technological issue, and its solution for the problem 
was to have new e-mail software better integrated into the technology platform.
E-mail, as DOIS understood, was a means of office communication that was equivalent 
to telephone, pagers, or internal mail31, as the team defined:
“Electronic mail is appropriately viewed as a store-and-forward transport for electronic 
objects across a heterogeneous environment, among people, among people and
32applications and among applications ” (pl4).
The above overtly technological definition, together with their keen sensitivity to the 
problems of Higgins, led the project team to define the scope of the WORKGROUP 
project, as follows:
-  To overcome current weaknesses of the existing mail system in the areas 
of availability and security
-  To provide a robust platform for future development;
-  To simplify and automate the administration and maintenance of the 
system
-  To provide a proper integration with the Windows environment in order 
to take full advantage of the data interchange and link with other 
applications.
-  To simplify the use of overall package (electronic mail messaging, filing, 
diary, to-do list, etc.)33
But, despite this very narrow definition of scope, the project manager saw e-mail 
systems differently from the rest of the team, and his personal scope of the project 
differed from that that the team defined and placed on paper. For the project manager,
31 Memorandum: WORKGROUP project description, 13th May 1993, p3.
32 WorkGroup Specification
33 Memorandum: WORKGROUP project description, 13th May 1993.
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e-mail was groupware. It was a means to enable people to exchange and seek 
information more efficiently. By ‘information exchange’ the project manager meant 
sending and receiving files from colleagues, an activity that was supported in the Bank 
at that time, but by other means. Thus many employees in the Bank would pass 
diskettes around. As he said of the Bank in interview:
“it has most essential office information systems and sophisticated banking systems but it 
does not have a system which enables people to work together.”
Based on his definition of e-mail (i.e. as groupware) and problem definition (i.e. the 
Bank needs a means to let people work together 'groupware’), the project manager 
formulated his own expectations of the new system and concluded that the project 
should aim to roll out a groupware like system34. The project manager presented this 
view in his presentation to employees in the Bank:
“...improving the efficiency of a group of people working together by automating 
organisation and coordination tasks within this group”
“ ... enhancing, simplifying and automating the flow and availability of the information 
within this group and with other groups inside or outside the institution.”35
And while this view was not reflected in the formal scope above, it was reflected in the 
specification of the new system sent out to vendors, an activity which enabled him to 
operationalize his technological frame more easily:
- Messaging 
Scheduling of meetings
- Electronic data interchange (EDI)
- Editable document exchange
- Electronic report distribution
- Network library and archive systems
- Forms routing
- Workflow36
34 Interview with the project manager.
35 The presentation slides provided by the project manager.
36 WORKGROUP Project: Invitation to Tender for Electronic Mail and WORKGROUP Software 
Packages, 17th March 1994.
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It is thus evident that there was a gap between the project manager’s and the rest of the 
team’s scopes of the project at this early stage, since the former saw the project as about 
groupware while the latter saw the project as about replacing an old e-mail system.
Selecting products
Once the DOIS team decided on the specifications for the new system they sent out 
their invitations to potential vendors to invite bids for the new system. Two products 
were left on the list at the end of the selection process: Beyond Mail and GroupWise. 
Each of these two products had strong support both from within the user group and 
DOIS. DOIS therefore carried additional technical tests based on the system 
specifications. A number of areas were examined including technologies, service 
suppliers, software companies, and costs of products. Speaking from a technical point of 
view, DOIS argued that GroupWise was relatively easier to maintain and administer, 
and its diary/scheduler function was better.
In terms of service suppliers and software companies, DOIS evaluated the products 
using the criteria of whether technical support could be provided locally, as well as the 
market reputation and market share of -the software companies. Having technical 
support locally was seen as important to the team to avoid difficulty in the future if the 
system went wrong. In respect of, having technical support from a local company, 
GroupWise had a Swiss based software company, ComicroNetsys, to provide technical 
support, while Beyond Mail’s technical support was based in the UK and provided by 
European Software. In terms of manufacturer’s market share the team’s concern was 
how well the system was doing in the current market and whether it had room to be 
expanded in the future. Their survey showed that GroupWise had 24 per cent, and 
Beyond Mail together with other systems had 20 per cent of market shares (Figure 6.1).
In terms of the costs of the two systems, including the initial charges and annual 
recurrent costs, the team believed that GroupWise was relatively cheaper then Beyond 
Mail. Table 6.8 displays a summary of the contents and results of the above criteria.
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Figure 6.1: M anufacturers' M arket Shares
20% 21%
24%
35%
□  Microsoft 
Mail
□ Lotus cc: 
Mail
□  GroupWise
□  Others
Table 6.8: Summary of evaluation elements37
Technical
Installation of a customised Beyond Mail was in three parts whereas GroupWise can be 
installed in a single stage
The configuration of Beyond Mail had to be performed separately but GroupWise 
configuration allows the administrator to configure all Post Offices from the single 
domain messaging file server
The Maintenance and Administration tools of GroupWise are superior
There was no mechanism for secretary/boss working relationship, task requests, etc in 
Beyond Mail but GroupWise fulfilled all of them.
The diary/scheduler function of GroupWise completely outclassed the On-time application
Suppliers (Reputation)
European Software Publishing (Beyond Mail) is a software house based in UK and has a staff 
of 45 people and its turnover of £3 million. Comicro-Netsys (GroupWise) is based in Wangen 
Switzerland has staff of 40 people and its turnover of Sw.fr. 160 million.
Manufacturers (Market shares)
Microsoft Mail (21%); Lotus cc:Mail (35%); GroupWise (24%); Others (20%)
Cost
One-off cost (purchase, installation, consulting, user training, contingency): Bevond Mail: 
Sw.ff 809,600; GroupWise Sw.ff. 708,400
Yearly recurrent cost (software maintenance, system maintenance and administration, user 
administration, on-going user training): Beyond Mail: Sw.ff.203,700; GroupWise: 
Sw.ff. 174,050
37 Memorandum: WORKGROUP project, product recommendation, 19th January 1995.
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Based on the above evaluation results, the DOIS team came to a conclusion and a 
decision at the same time, that the Bank should select GroupWise.
Criteria of success
Another dimension that the DOIS project team considered during the initiation of the 
WORKGROUP project was the criteria that were established to measure the success of 
the project. The DOIS team believed in a set of rules that they needed to follow if they 
were to make the project work. These rules included involving the user group through 
the entire project, providing training courses on the new system, having the 
management’s public endorsement, and choosing the right name for the project.
Setting up the user group
The reasons for involving a user group, according to DOIS, were no different from the 
ones given in the textbooks, the primary reason being the objective of reducing 
resistance to the system. It was also the case that, in the Bank the establishment of such 
a group was a part of the procedure needed if any IS project required management 
group approval and budget.
The user group of this project consisted of representatives from all the main user 
department; it had 10 members38 as shown in Table 6.9. Its role, as understood by DOIS 
was to act as a bridge between the DOIS team and the wider community of users. As 
DOIS defined the user group’s role:
“[...] This group will be actively involved in the preparation of the functional 
specifications, in the different evaluation phases, and in the user acceptance of the 
product.” (Memorandum, 13 May 1993:4)
Table 6.9: Member department of the User Group
Department and/or section_____________________________
Banking department__________________________________
Monetary and Economic Department_____________________
General Managers Office______________________________
Maintenance, Supplies and Equipment____________________
Personnel__________________________________________
Accounting, Budgetary Control_________________________
Electronic Communication_____________________________
Internal Audit_______________________________________
Typing Pool________________________________________
38 thMemorandum: To the members of the Executive Committee, 10 July 1995.
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Department and/or section
Information Systems Services 
Legal Service____________
The group was involved in making final choice of the new system for the Bank and as 
will be discussed in more detail later to a limited degree developing the roll-out plan. 
What can be said here is that the notion of 'active involvement' was not in any 
leadership role, but rather more in the 'hostage' mode.
Training Courses
Providing formal training courses on GroupWise was taken as a critical factor 
contributing to a successful system roll-out. This positive attitude towards providing 
formal training to users was partly due to the beliefs of the Training Officer (DOIS) and 
his experience with training programs. As the training officer stated in interview, he had 
always believed that training leads to good practice with software systems. Despite the 
new system 'just' replacing Higgins as an e-mail system, and despite many employees 
knowing how to read and send mails, DOIS still believed a general training course 
should be provided because GroupWise was Windows based and the jargon used within 
it and the functions it supported might be new to users.
“Higgins and GroupWise are different products which means that different skills and 
working concepts were required to use GroupWise.” (The training officer)
Other than the concern about skills and knowledge acquired to use GroupWise, DOIS 
project participants explained that providing a training program was an important 
opportunity to prevent people from making mistakes and doing things which they are 
not supposed to do by educating and introducing ground rules during the training. 
Training to them, thus, was not an open invitation to come to know the product and 
explore its potential, but rather an opportunity for giving explicit directions as to what 
should and should not be done with it. This perception had a history in past experiences 
in the Bank, and is discussed in the next section (issues around implementation).
A public endorsement from the management
DOIS had a strong belief that visible management support was more important than any 
other criteria in contributing to a successful project, especially in an institution like BIS 
where computers and office information systems were not regarded as critical to the
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business. This belief was always made clear to the team, including the user group, 
from the beginning of the project:
“any project which hopes to introduce changes to organisation wide working practices
39must gain the active involvement and support management
It is worth exploring the meaning of “changes” used in the above statement. Here it 
does not mean organisational changes introduced by the new system; rather, it refers to 
the narrow changes in the e-mail working environment (i.e. from MS-DOS mode to 
Windows environment) and assigning new users to the new system40. This narrow 
understanding of introducing changes to the organisation was carefully adhered to 
throughout the project, notwithstanding the project manager's wider ambitions noted 
earlier.
Through the management’s public endorsement DOIS hoped that more users would be 
encouraged to use GroupWise, especially people in senior positions41. Such senior 
managers are relatively old and their success and reputation in BIS was not because of 
their ability in using computers but because of their expertise in economics, finance, 
banking, and policy. To encourage senior bankers and managers to use e-mail to 
communicate, DOIS understood that to introduce some top down pressure was 
necessary. It was important to DOIS to convince these senior bankers and managers to 
use the system because the team saw that once they used the system their subordinates 
would be likely to use it too.
“this organisation (BIS) is not particularly comfortable with information technology.
Senior bankers and managers although they use information generated by information 
systems themselves rarely use the systems.” (a member of UG)
“[...] it has to come from the top down in order to get everyone to use it. [...] the 
management has to publicly stand up and whether themselves use it or not they must 
endorse it because people below them have to use it.” (the training officer)
Above all, the most important reason that DOIS wanted to make sure that they had 
public endorsement from the management was to support the roll-out plan which the
39 End of project report (Draft 2.0), 21 August 1996
40 Currently, not everyone in the Bank had access rights to Higgins.
41 Interview with the training officer.
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team had in mind. This was to be a synchronised roll-out approach which was to install 
GroupWise on staff desktops when they were away from their desk for their training 
course. The team knew that this approach was, as they put it, “doing things behind 
people’s back” and would provoke strong reactions among users if they were not 
careful. DOIS saw that if the project could have the management’s public endorsement, 
then the approach would become more or less acceptable.
To have a strong public endorsement from the management group the project manager 
believed that they had to choose the right name for the project. By having the right 
name the manager referred to one which would convince the management group of the 
importance of the project and entice them into providing an endorsement. The name 
WORKGROUP was chosen with certain ideas in mind:
“the word “work” means enhancing, simplifying and automating the flow of information 
and its availability between a group of people inside the institution and other groups 
inside or outside the institution. “Group” is about improving efficiency of a group of 
people working together by automating organisation and co-ordination tasks within this 
group.” (the project manager)
According to the project manager this term was one of the most popular themes in the 
software industry at the time, as well as in the commercial sector. This was a name that 
could give an impression that the project was about group/team work. This was the 
impression that the manager wanted the management group to have and reflected, as we 
have seen the project manager’s own ideas, but it was by no means the essential purpose 
of the project to actively foster team/group work as understood by the CSCW literature.
“the notion of “working together” may be considered in DOIS’ next IS project but it was 
definitely not a part of the WORKGROUP project.” (the Project Manager)
But by adopting this name the manager said that it would be easier to gain support and 
funding from the senior management.
Issues around roll-out
A number of aspects were addressed by the DOIS team as they developed when it a 
system roll-out plan. The planning had two parts: when and how to roll out GroupWise, 
and how to organise and deliver the training to the users. Each part involved various 
issues.
The first thing that the team thought of was the Bank’s internal calendar. There was an 
unspoken rule that any activities carried out in the Bank must not be allowed to interrupt
- 1 7 2 -
the Bank’s preparation of its annual report. BIS annual reports differ in many ways 
from reports prepared by the average commercial company. For example, the annual 
report serves public interest (i.e. to report its activities, to reveal its balance sheets to the 
general shareholders and potential shareholders), but it also focuses on discussing 
various monetary, financial, and economic issues. The Monetary and Economic 
Department conducts research particularly into monetary, financial, and economic 
questions which directly serve the member central banks’ interests. The research results 
are partly published in the BIS annual report. Thus, the organisation of the annual 
report differs from the average annual report, and below is an example of a table of 
contents of a recent annual report (1999)
Chapter I Introduction: the darker side of market processes
Chapter n Developments in the advanced industrial countries
Chapter HI The spreading crisis in emerging markets
Chapter IV Monetary policy in the advanced industrial countries
Chapter V Turmoil in asset markets
Chapter VI Developments in foreign exchange markets
Chapter VII International financial maikets
Chapter VIII Conclusion: finding light among the shadows
Activities of the Bank
Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account at 31 March 1999
Board of Directors
Senior Officials of the Bank
It is evident that the focus of the Bank’s annual report is on discussion of market 
phenomena and, unlike other annual reports, that BIS begins its annual report with a 
series of research data and discussion instead of with its business activities in the past 
year. Because the Bank sees the annual report as a key part of its service to central 
banks, it is important that nothing should disturb or delay the publishing schedule.
In this context, the DOIS team has to check the calendar of annual report preparation 
and make sure that the system roll-out would not interfere. Other than not to interrupt 
the preparation of the annual report, the team also needed to be careful not to disturb the 
Bank’s daily business operation. These factors led to a decision not to adopt a ‘big 
bang’ approach as it could cause interruption if they were not careful and would be 
unacceptable in the Bank. An alternative, namely an incremental roll-out approach, 
was chosen.
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In terms of thinking about how long the system roll-out should take, especially the 
period of changeover which would lead to some instability in this most stable and 
bureaucratic of organisations, the team had a strong belief that a compact approach was 
necessary. This view was reasons were mainly based on past experiences with other IS 
projects in the Bank. First, it is expensive to keep two systems running at the same 
time. Second, if the roll-out period lasts too long people who cannot have access to the 
system are likely to lose their enthusiasm which was a lesson learned from the Bank’s 
earlier project to put PCs on staff desks. Lastly, the team felt that the sooner the roll-out 
could be finished, the less likely it was to interrupt business operations. Or put another 
way, the sooner they could retreat back into their technological role.
The next issue that the team needed to consider was how exactly to put GroupWise 
physically on staff desktops. The team first thought about putting it on during the 
weekend, but usually CCS worked on system maintenance at that time, which meant 
that the team would need to negotiate with CCS. As noted earlier, such negotiations and 
relationships had a history of disputes. The team was also concerned about the gap 
between having GroupWise on staff desktops and having staff on training courses. If 
the gap is too long, people tend to forget what they learn from the training course by the 
time they are able to have access to the system, or people tend to lose interest in using 
the system. A similar situation, it was explained, had happened in the past when ISS 
rolled out PCs. ISS provided training to the employees before PCs were put in place, 
but by the actual time PCs were on people’s desk many had forgotten the contents of the 
training and some lost their initial enthusiasm. Keeping these issues in mind, the team 
decided to roll-out the system when individuals were away for their training course. 
The team believed, in particular, that this could maximise benefits of the training; as the 
training officer put it:
“The effectiveness of any training is severely undermined if the product is not made
available to delegate immediately following training.”
Issues around training
Training was regarded as an important element contributing to a successful system roll­
out and the person who was responsible for planning and organising it (the Training 
Officer) had a strong belief in the impact of training on roll-out. Thus, the means of 
providing training was taken into consideration from several perspectives. Issues such 
as who should receive the training, where the training should take place, how long the
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training should be, who would provide the training, and what would be taught, were all 
considered.
The DOIS team considered two main ways to provide the training to users. One 
approach was to train representatives of each department, namely super users, and 
through them the knowledge and skills learned in the training could be passed to the rest 
of the users: this is known as a cascade approach. The other approach was to provide 
training to everyone in the Bank. The former is relatively cheaper than the latter, but in 
terms of risk the former was higher than the latter. The risks that concerned the team 
were that there was no guarantee that super users would be able to pass everything that 
they learned to the rest of the departments that they come from.
Once the team had decided to put everyone on the training course they then had to 
consider how to provide such a quantity of training but, at the same time, not affect the 
Bank’s normal business activities. To achieve this DOIS organised users into groups 
and assigned to each of these groups specific time slots. One or two people from the 
same department would be assigned to a specific group and time slot to receive the 
training. DOIS limited the number of users from the same department to attend the same 
group and time slot because it tried not to “empty” the department and thereby affect the 
prepare performance of ongoing business activities.
According to the team’s experience, users’ computer literacy was another area that they 
needed to take into account when organising the training. In the past, people had often 
complained about “mixed level” training courses because they could appear to be too 
basic or too advanced depending on participants’ knowledge of computing. It would be 
ideal, the training officer said, if the training could have been provided on the basis of 
the level of people’s knowledge and their skill in computing. But in practice, taking 
cost and time into account, providing tailored training courses to meet individuals’ 
needs was not possible. Hence, despite the team being aware of users’ complaints, and 
knowing that users would be better off if tailored training sections could have been 
provided, it discarded this option and chose to provide a standard day of training to 
everyone.
Since the training was to be provided to everyone in the Bank and would not be tailored 
to meet individual needs, the content of the training on GroupWise focused on basic
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functions such as sending and reading mails in GroupWise. The more advanced 
features within the system were then left for more competent users to explore by 
themselves, or if users were interested in learning about them they were invited to 
attend special workshops.
Once this training strategy was chosen and the content decided, the next thing that the 
team was concerned with was who would provide the training. BIS traditionally had 
minimal commitment to any in-house computing training, and there were no in-house 
professional trainers in ISS. Therefore outsourcing the training seemed to be the only 
way. But before deciding on outsourcing the DOIS team had to decide in what 
language the training would be provided. In section 6.1.1 it was mentioned that BIS has 
about five hundred employees with twenty seven different nationalities, and because the 
Bank is situated in Switzerland, all the documents circulating in the Bank are in four 
official languages: English, German, French, and Italian. German is the local language 
in Basel but not all employees speak German, instead most employees speak English. 
Indeed, English is the Bank’s unofficial "official” language among employees. In this 
context the training section decided instruction should be provided in English. This led 
to another issue: where to find a software training company that could provide training 
in English. Mr Ward came to the UK to look for a suitable company rather than recruit 
in Switzerland. He explained:
“To some employees it was not an easy task to learn a new software in the language that 
is not their mother tongue, so whoever was going to provide the training section should 
be able to speak English without any difficult accent. That was why we did not go for a 
local company as we were afraid people may have strong German, French, or Italian 
accents when they spoke English.”
And the team chose a provider based in Essex UK.
Rules of using e-mail
Another issue that concerned the team was establishing etiquette for email. In the past 
people had used Higgins to distribute business irrelevant messages to the entire Bank 
and this had upset and frustrated recipients, especially since it was difficult for people to 
switch between Higgins and other applications. Those who worked in the trading room 
suffered most from such unnecessary interruption, and in the end they switched off 
Higgins when they were making transactions.
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In the survey42 carried out to collect users’ expectations o f the new system at the 
beginning o f the project (discussed below), a user made a comment on this issue and 
said:
"private messages should not be allowed, unless on a person-to-person basis.”
In order to prevent users from “abusing” the new e-mail system, the team decided to set 
up various 'discussion groups' which would allow people to post general messages. The 
idea was to provide an electronic space where people could post general announcements 
such as information on selling and buying household equipment, sports events, etc. 
Only users who subscribed to the discussion groups would automatically get the 
message. By doing so the team expected to reduce the number o f general or private 
messages distributed in the Bank.
User Group
The User Group attitudes towards the project and new system were based on the 
expectations which they had for the new system; these expectations were mainly 
generated from the users’ experiences with Higgins. Involving not only technological 
frames the User Group also referenced their knowledge o f organisational issues when it 
came to implementing applications based on the office tools provided by GroupWise. 
Table 6.10 presents two sets o f technological frames held by the User Group. The rest 
of this section discusses each o f these sets.
Table 6.10 : Technological frames of the User Group's
Expectations of the new system
-  With a replace of a better and more user-friendly system.
Issues around implementation
-  Organisational issue
42 Surv ey of the Current E-mail Service, February 1994.
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Expectations of the new system
The User Group was set up to assist the DOIS team to select an appropriate workgroup 
product for the Bank, to understand user expectations, and to report the progress of the 
project to the user departments.
For most users their expectations of the WORKGROUP project was to replace Higgins 
with a Windows based (modem) and reliable e-mail system. Whether the system was 
cc:Mail, MS Mail, Beyond Mail, or GroupWise was not so important to them. Despite 
the user group knowing the general feeling about Higgins in the user departments, it still 
carried out a survey in user departments with the aim to identify problem areas of 
Higgins and expectations of a new system more specifically. Two hundred and fifty 
copies were prepared and distributed to the current Higgins users and one hundred and 
fifty seven people replied (60%). The survey questions revolved around functions that 
were expected by users but were not provided by Higgins, and their expectations of the 
new system. The results showed that the majority of users felt that Higgings needed to 
be improved or even be replaced (see Table 6.11 for an extract of the survey). 
Moreover, the mail function was used by most people and other functions such as 
Diary, To-Do-List, and the Meeting Scheduler were not used or even known about by 
many.
Table 6.11: Current e-mail service
Excellent Need
improvement
Satisfied Don’t
know
Easy to use and understand 14.4 56.8 28.1 0.7
User directory easy to use, contain all 
the people I wish to send to
22.3 50.4 20.9 6.5
Password protection, normal mail and 
private mail
12.2 46.8 21.6 19.4
Answer mail service 13.7 58.3 21.6 6.5
Re-route mail service 7.9 44.6 20.9 26.4
Group membership and private list 7.2 30.2 33.1 29.5
Transfer of document 11.5 34.5 42.4 11.5
Transfer of messages or documents to 
your local hard disks
9.4 36.7 36.7 17.3
Storage and retrieved of messages in 
correspondences
7.2 23.7 39.6 29.5
Message received and/or viewed feature 7.9 66.9 18.7 6.5
Indication of type of message 5 55.4 17.3 22.3
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Source: Survey o f the Current e-mail services.
The user group summarised the survey and highlighted the areas that they considered 
the DOIS team needed to address in the WORKGROUP project, as follows:
- e-mail is only another tool to help them to do their jobs
- Higgins is not user friendly
- Users expected to receive a replacement soon and they also expect that the 
new system would be easy enough for them to pick up without investing 
time or effort
- Users feel strongly about having as minimum training on the new system as 
possible because they have “real” work to do43.
In the light of the above, when the user group had a chance to select between two 
products -  Beyond Mail and GroupWise -  it chose the user friendly Beyond Mail after 
it had experiences with both systems. But the user group’s preference for Beyond Mail 
was later changed as the result of a comparison between the two products made by 
DOIS, and the user group then agreed with the DOIS to opt for GroupWise. Another 
reason for agreeing with DOIS’ choice was that the user group felt less confident with 
its own choice and believed that DOIS was in a position to know what technology was 
good better than the user group did.
“a reason that the Group gave in in the end was that members did not know very much of 
computers so they relied on DOIS’ technical knowledge... they knew what they were 
doing and we trusted their technological expertise” (member of UG).
This is an interesting situation and would seem to show that the users, while attempting 
to exercise their own initiative in the project and represent their constituencies, very 
rapidly acquiesced to the dominant technological frames of the DOIS. It is as though 
they almost wanted to be over ruled!
43 Survey of the Current E-mail Service, February 1994.
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Issues around the implementation
Phase Three of the project was intended to discuss the possibility of taking advantage of 
the advanced features that GroupWise offered. At the time DOIS was interested in 
document automation, intending to transform hard copy documents to electronic form in 
order to speed up document circulation within BIS. But the user group saw document 
automation required not only additional software to run it, but also some radical 
changes within the organisation. As mentioned earlier (Section 6.2: organisational 
context) all documents circulating within or sent outside BIS were treated with caution, 
and many of them required signatures from various authorities before they could be sent 
off or distributed. Document automation could thus mean two things: that the Bank 
replaced hard copy documents with digital format including signature or that the Bank 
changed its current practice to adapt to the new system. The user group saw neither of 
these two would work in the Bank; the technique of digital signature was not mature at 
that time and it would be difficult to convince the management and central banks to 
accept it. Also, the user group felt that it was not the WORKGROUP project’s aim to 
make radical changes in the Bank and about this point the DOIS team shared the same 
view. Therefore both the user group and DOIS team decided to dismiss the idea. We 
could say that neither of these groups had technological frame that admitted directly 
addressing organisational change.
The management group
The management group involved in this project in particular consisted of the steering 
committee and project sponsor, Executive Committee (ExCo.), and a General Manager 
of the Bank. Usually, when an IS project is initiated in the Bank, the project needs to 
find itself sponsors from managerial level. If the project affects only one department, 
then it needs a manager from that particular department to sponsor and support the 
project, if the project involves more than one department; the sponsors then should 
come from the departments which are involved. This is the steering committee and 
project sponsor. Once the project has sponsors it needs to propose and report to ExCo 
in order to be allocated have necessary budget. ExCo was made up of managers from 
the higher managerial level in the Bank to assess the necessity of projects. In general, 
the management group was concerned about the questions such as costs and necessity of 
the project, the benefits of the project, and risks and sensitivities. Above all, the
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management group was also interested in seeing the new e-mail system become a 
formal means o f communication at the Bank44. So the identified dimensions o f the 
management group’s technological frames were issues around initiation and 
implementation. Table 6.12 summarises the technological frames involved.
Table 6.12: The technological frames of the management group
Issues around initiation
-  Scope and effect on the organisation 
Necessity of the project
Benefits and costs
-  Risks and sensitivities
Issues around implementation
-  Changes in the new e-mail working environment
-  Expectations of the use of e-mail______________ ______________________
Issues around initiation
After six month delay the project team finally came to propose the project plan to ExCo. 
in July 1995. During the meeting the ExCo demanded to know more about issues 
regarding project initiation -  for example, it wished to know how necessary the project 
was to the Bank, the benefits in relation to the costs, effects on the organisation, and 
risks and sensitivities45. Above all the ExCo was concerned for cost. They wanted to 
see separate cost implementation for (1) simple replacement operation for Higgins & (2) 
taking full advantage o f the new functionality that new programs could offer with a 
clear appraisal o f operational benefits. Simple replacement meant only replacement o f  
basic functions within the e-mail.
Issues around implementation
Another area that the ExCo demanded more details about was the changes that would 
accompany the installation o f the new system. For example, the ExCo wanted to know 
‘Svhat enhanced facilities will be made available in various phases, i.e. phases 1, 2 and 
3? Do these include access to external electronic mail?46” “How will the old mail stored
44 rdMemorandum: WORKGROUP Implementation Project, outcome of the submission to ExCo. 3 
November 1995.
45 Memorandum: WORKGROUP implementation project, answers to comments received to date 
(revision 1.1). 20th October 1995.
46 Currently there was a limited number of people could access to external e-mail via Higgins.
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in Higgins be made available in GroupWise?” tcBetter qualification of the saving 
realised with the introduction of GroupWise?” “Clarification of the differences between 
the workgroup function available in Higgins and those available in GroupWise”
Answers to these questions were prepared by the team after the meeting and the ExCo. 
agreed to fund the project. In fact, the ExCo not only agreed to fund the project but also 
showed strong support for the project.
“ExCo endorses the project and accepts the recommendation to proceed with all three 
phases. Furthermore, ExCo endorses electronic mail as a formal means of communication 
at the Bank.”47
The pubic endorsement from the ExCo was said to come from the newly appointed 
General Manager (GM) of the Bank, who personally was keen on making e-mail 
become an official communication medium in BIS. This interest was interpreted by 
others as due to the fact that he was an American.
“He is an American and he must have been using e-mail to communicate and appreciates 
the technology. This differs from his European peers as they often see that using e-mail 
to communicate as an alien idea.” (the member of UG)
In order to show his full support and interest to get GroupWise used as a 
communication medium, the GM distributed a formal note in the Bank to announce that 
e-mail would in future be an official communication channel in BIS once it was rolled 
out. His message clearly indicated his interest and expectation of how the technology 
should be used in BIS:
“Electronic mail (e-mail) is an essential means of efficient communication, both within an 
organisation and, increasingly, on a global scale... I expect e-mail to become the normal 
form of communication in the Bank for short notes and memos.”
The GM also addressed possible misuse of e-mail in the organisation such as the 
distribution of private announcements and pointed out that the behaviour was not 
allowed:
“e-mail should no longer be used to send private announcements to large lists of 
recipients. Instead, a new bulletin-board facility (discussion groups) will be introduced 
for this purpose”.
47 .
Memorandum: WORKGROUP Implementation Project, outcome of the submission to ExCo, 3 
November 1995.
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Although the GM supported the project on the basis of his experiences with the 
technology and own interest, the support incidentally matched what the project team 
perceived to be a criterion for a successful IS project.
6.2.3 interactions between contexts and the Bank and between interest 
groups
This section bring together contextual factors identified earlier and the technological 
frames of the three interest groups in order to examine the impacts of these contextual 
factors on the development of the project and on individual technological frames, as 
well as the impact on the project of interactions between the three interest groups.
When Higgins was chosen (in 1988), the standard operating system in the software 
industry was DOS, but when the Windows operation system and Windows based office 
tools came to the Bank then Higgins could no longer meet user’s requirements, not least 
due to the users’ technological frames shifting from a DOS oriented view to one 
oriented to Windows and GUI. DOS based Higgins seemed to users as an out o f date 
system and was unacceptable. We have also seen that DOIS was not happy with 
Higgins either, since the system increasingly failed to integrate into the Bank’s IS 
working environment and caused technical problems (i.e. system crashes) which 
increased DOIS’ workload in terms of maintaining the system.
The scope of the WORKGROUP project was fairly clearly defined, even if there 
remained a distinct divide between the project manager and the rest of DOIS and the 
user group as to what was expected of the project in terms of work practices. Based on 
their interpretations of the problem, their sense of knowledge and skill, and their 
relationship with the user group, the DOIS project team was confident in what they 
were doing and what they wanted to achieve. In this context, together with no critical 
events occurring to change or transform the project, the perceptions and expectations of 
the project and system were fairly consistent throughout.
Still, we must acknowledge that during the product selection there was a conflict 
between DOIS and the user group in terms of preferred product, yet the former managed 
to convince the latter that one product was better than the other from various aspects. 
Again, the DOIS perception of the new system was not influenced by the user group’s
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choice, instead through social interactions (e.g. conducting an evaluation, lobbying) 
DOIS successfully changed or nullified the user group’s preference for Beyond Mail.
DOIS’ expectation was to make GroupWise become one of the Bank’s main internal 
communication mediums, but still in very technical terms:
“the new workgroup package will be a key component of the information system 
architecture of the Bank. It will become the standard user firont-end for electronic mail 
facilities and workgroup tools and a key mechanism for transporting a large number of 
electronic items between users, but also between applications. The new workgroup 
system will provide the basic components to support a number of new facilities such as 
facility booking, bulletin board, facsimile, forms routing, work flow management, access
48to wide area mail networks, remote access, voice and telephony integration, etc.”
This idea was at one level very consistent with those of the newly appointed GM, 
though as we have seen the GMs idea of communications was rather different. Even so, 
and while these are not identical ideas, the GM’s support for the idea was not limited 
only to allocating necessary resources to the project for he also made it clear to the rest 
of the Bank that that was what he would like to see happen.
We have seen that the DOIS team did not have an ambition to change the culture of the 
Bank and indeed did not see this as part of their role. Even so, after the GroupWise roll­
out it did observe some emerging changes in the Bank. First, there was an increasing 
number of people using e-mail compared with the number before, and people were 
sending e-mail messages more rather than passing memos or internal mails. Second, the 
communication routes had been shortened by the system. People started to send e-mails 
to their superiors directly, instead of going through their direct boss. Still people were 
hesitant about acknowledging the meaning of such consequences. The project manager 
said in interview that this phenomenon should not be explained as a 'breakdown of the 
hierarchy' because there was no change made in the organisation’s structure but only in 
communication patterns.
For example, a significant change could be said to be the abandonment of the messenger 
system in BIS. Traditionally, there was a messenger system in BIS. People put internal 
and external mail in the outgoing tray on their desks and the messengers allocated to 
each floor would come to collect them at certain times, or if the messages were urgent
48 Memorandum: WORKGROUP project, product recommendation, 19th January 1995, p. 5.
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then people could ring a bell on their desks to call a messenger in to collect the mails. 
Although messengers still came to deliver mail and collect outgoing mail, shortly after 
GroupWise was in place the system was no longer used to deliver internal memos. This 
was in part the result of a budget cut but it was also acknowledged as because internal 
memos could be sent via e-mail and e-mail messages had become as legitimate as hard 
copy memos. This reduced services in the messenger system and also reinforced 
peoples' reliance on e-mail for sending internal messages.
6.3 F indings
Several interesting issues emerged from the analysis. These include congruence in 
technological frames, personal trait, and communication as a forum to achieve 
congruence or shared technological frames, expectations, and vertical and horizontal 
analysis. These issues cannot all be elaborated further on the basis of the ideas 
discussed in Chapter Three, and hence this section will discuss only the elements that 
can be developed further with the resource framework (Chapter Three). Elements in the 
analysis that need more investigation will be discussed in Chapter Eight -  possible 
further research.
Congruence or shared technological frames?
The WORKGROUP project might be seen as a typical technology pull project as it was 
organised and driven forward by the DOIS team, but user push played a part too, at least 
in legitimising and prioritising the project. Nevertheless, the necessity of the project 
was agreed and accepted at all levels of the organisation. This could be interpreted as a 
result of congruence in technological frames across groups which enabled people to 
come to the same conclusion about replacing Higgins. Yet, it is not sufficient to argue 
that the congruence in technological frames enabled people to understand and interpret 
the problems in the same way. The analysis suggests otherwise. It was noted that there 
was a general agreement to replace the system but there was no congruence of 
technological frames between the three interest groups.
The key elements or categories of technological frames held by the groups differed. To 
begin with the understandings of problem, the three groups understood problems 
slightly differently on the basis of their experiences with the system. Technologists
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understood the problems with a technological mindset so words like: ‘not robust 
enough’, ‘incompatible’, ‘fall apart’ were used to describe the problems of Higgins. 
Users on the other hand understood the problems with concerns of their own job 
performance, for instance they preferred not to be interrupted during the serious 
working hours (e.g. trading hours) and also preferred to retrieve and read message in 
their own time. Users felt that the instability of Higgins hampered their performance. 
The General Manager’s understanding of problems was neither technological nor 
operational but more organisational in that e-mail should be an official communication 
channel to replace some internal memos in the Bank.
Differences were also observed in the process of selecting the product. The management 
group worried about costs and benefit; the User Group was concerned about ease of use; 
and technologists assessed the system with concern about the existing information 
system infrastructure. Therefore the User Group chose Beyond Mail and DOIS chose 
GroupWise. The final decision was made on the basis of the technological 
consideration. Users reflected their unhappiness with the technologists’ criteria of 
choosing the system and made some comments relating to the decision. For example, 
the internal Audit Department made commented on DOIS’ choice and observed “the 
technical issues seemed to outweigh user issues.” Another member from the Banking 
Department said “our proposal and requirements were not listened to”. In addition to 
the comments made in the survey an interviewee from a different division of the ISS 
expressed a personal view and said:
“Some people felt the selection of GroupWise was orchestrated by DOIS. The 
impression exists in the Bank that DOIS has exhibited preferences for certain vendors and 
products in circumstances where it was not all clear why they should.”
In terms of expectations, the DOIS specified and embedded their expectations of the 
new system in the requirements of the new system (Section 6.2.2: DOIS) which were 
technological oriented. The users’ expectation of the new system was simple and clear 
that they wanted a new system which was more user friendly and easier to operate. The 
management group’s expectation was to make the new e-mail system a communication 
channel in the Bank. Table 6.13 compares the key elements of technological frames 
held by the three interest groups during the project initiation.
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Table 6.13: Key element of technological frames
DOIS User Group Management Group
Understanding 
of problems
Technological Operational Organisational
Selecting product Fit in the current 
infrastructure
Easy of use Cost effective
Expectations of 
the new system
Technological User friendly and 
easy of use
A new communicational 
channel
What synthesised these different sets of technological frames so the groups could come 
to achieve a consensus (to replace Higgins in the Bank) was ‘needs’. The ‘needs’ did 
not stem from business operation but from individuals’ frustration of having to deal 
often with crashes and interruptions. In the other words, the needs were, to an extent, 
emotional. It is interesting to note that although practically different groups had 
different reasons for welcoming a new system, emotionally they seemed to share a 
similar feeling. And this is that it was emotional needs which drove different parties to 
come to agreement.
Numerous studies have been undertaken to examine reasons for why and why not users 
adopt particular information technologies (Section 2.3). Most of those studies 
concentrate on rational reasons such as ease of use, usefulness (Adams, et al., 1992; 
Davis, 1989), peer pressure, management support (Karahanna, et al., 1999) and so forth, 
and emotional factors are hardly touched upon. Compeau et al (Compeau, et al., 1999) 
studied users’ reaction to computer technology and includes an emotional factor -  
anxiety -  and argue that users’ capability of self-efficacy strongly influences users’ 
personal feelings towards the computer technology. They illustrate several items 
associated with anxiety, as follows:
i. I feel apprehensive about using computers
ii. It scares me to think that I could cause the computer to destroy a large 
amount of information by hitting the wrong key
iii. I hesitate to use a computer for fear of making mistakes I cannot correct
iv. Computers are somewhat intimidating to me
These items were ad hoc and influenced by capability of self-efficacy. The emotional 
element -  needs -  is somehow stronger and instead of being influenced by other
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elements it influenced the Bank’s initial decision concerning the technology adoption. 
What the finding suggests is that at the operational level individual are likely to have 
different understandings of the technology and use it differently due to the fact they 
have different interests to pursue. At an emotional level similar anxieties that 
individuals have may lead to similar actions despite the fact that the rational and 
practical reasons for using or not using the technology are different.
Personal trait
Another important finding, which is in, more or less, the same dimension as the needs 
mentioned above, is personal trait. This element was not included in the initial 
technological frames analysis; in fact it was ignored and as a result of the analysis 
considers only those that have a rational dimension. It is believed that individuals’ 
personality characteristics influence the way that they predispose themselves to seek 
and filter information from the environment, and make certain decisions (Martin, 1998). 
Personal trait, on a number of occasions showed a strong influence on individuals’ 
behaviours, perceptions, and the way that they dealt with things in the case study.
Among the various numbers of people involved in the project, the project manager’s 
personal trait is said to have had significant influence on the direction of the project. In 
the eyes of some the project manager was a dominant, self-conscious, arrogant person, 
and impossible to work with because he did not listen to others and usually wanted his 
own way of doing things. This was also observed in some e-mail messages that the 
project manager sent to others. The strong personality and personal preference for 
Novell products was criticised, because it seemed that the whole project was a reflection 
of the project manager’s self ego and prejudice for a particular system:
“Chris, the project manger, is known as “Novell” man which means that he is in favour of 
any products related or developed by Novell. GroupWise was better than other products 
because it is Novell’s product”.
“...the project manager has been described as arrogant about the suggestions of others 
concerning infrastructure facilities and means of service provision. Many people felt the 
selection of GroupWise reflected this perceived arrogance.” (the member of ISS)
Despite the comments made by employees, some within the DOIS believed that Chris’ 
personal characteristics in fact helped the project to go forward. One team member 
said:
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“the quality like this (strong personality and dominant attitude) is necessary in some 
circumstances if you want things to be done.” (the training officer)
A strong personality was indeed a strength to push the project forward and keep it going 
in the pre-defined direction without any unanticipated drift.
Not only did the project manager show his strong personality during the process of the 
project development but so did the DOIS team members. They also were described by 
others as arrogant, and ignorant, as they often ignored users’ feedback and opinions49. 
The following conversation between two DOIS members and a user from the Internal 
Auditing Department took place in the staff canteen:
Eric (Internal Auditing): Why don’t we have Lotus Notes in the Bank?
Ken & Collin (DOIS): why do you want to use Lotus Notes for? It is crap!
Eric: ??? (looking very puzzled by what Ken and Collin just said)
Key & Collin were trying to explain some technical problems associated with Notes and 
said that the system was not compatible to the current network infrastructure. In their 
explanation, Ken and Collin used a lot of technical jargons.
Eric (was now getting upset): I am only a user and just interested in knowing why we 
don’t use Lotus Notes. I don’t understand and don’t want to know the technical jargon 
which you are using, so can you just explain the situation to me in plain English?
The above personality characteristics might given a negative impression that it can only 
hamper the “democracy” of the project, but it was found that personality characteristics 
can also have positive impact; for example, the General Manager’s background of being 
an American. Being American here means being exposed to computer technology and 
used to using e-mail to communicate. Martin (1998) writes: “working with someone 
from another culture is a useful way of experiencing the scope of a value system on 
person perception.”
Social interactions -  the shifting sharing and shaping of technological 
frames
Orlikowski (1992) argues that in order to alter individuals’ impressions and perceptions 
of the technology communicating ideas through informing and training is essential. 
This was described and believed as a milestone of BIS’ success with the project. It was
49 It was observed from the GroupWise Questionnaire.
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evident that communication occurred between the DOIS project team and users via the 
User Group, but a close examination told a slightly different story.
Although the User Group was set up to act as a bridge to help communication between 
users and the project team, it was, in fact, a hostage of the DOIS team and used as a 
broadcasting channel to inform the rest of the organisation about the progress of the 
project. Differently put, so called communication was a one-way message broadcasting 
from the DOIS to the Bank, for the function of the User Group was (1) to obtain 
financial support, and (2) to direct the project in the DOIS’ own way with the false sign 
of democracy. It is not true that users’ voices were not heard by the project team as 
users claimed, rather, they were heard but ignored, as the project team determined to 
have their own way.
The DOIS team not only used the User Group to talk to users (one way communication 
really) but also tried to shape people’s perceptions of the technology through social 
interaction by manipulating the situation. As mentioned earlier, most members of the 
User Group preferred Beyond Mail to GroupWise mainly for the reason of ease of use. 
Since the DOIS team wanted to have GroupWise instead, the team began intensive 
lobbying among the User Group. To rationalise the lobby the team first had to create a 
“forum” to discuss the “matter”. The “matter” refers to differences between Beyond 
Mail and GroupWise and why the latter should be chosen as such. The language used 
in this forum was not standard English, German, Italian, or French but computer jargon. 
This led the User Group to believe that the project team was more competent than they 
were in terms of choosing suitable system for the Bank.
The forum also served as a carefully constructed common ground that people referred to 
so as to believe that they were making decision rationally. For example, several items 
that the DOIS team used to compare the two products either had little to do with the 
project’s principal aim or were not mentioned again later in the project roll-out. It 
seemed that these items were there in the template to serve the purpose of making 
GroupWise look better than Beyond Mail. Using the Calendar function as an example, 
the team used this to reject MS Mail, cc:Mail and, similarly, Beyond Mail. But during 
the interviews with DOIS members all said that the project did not attempt to promote 
the Calendar function in the Bank and were generally of the opinion that they would be 
happy if staff used e-mail related function only. Through the above efforts the project
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team seemed to shape staff perception o f the technology, rather than create a shared 
understanding o f why GroupWise was chosen by the Bank. Figure 6.2 illustrates the 
social interactions undertaken by the DOIS to shape the User Group’s technological 
frames.
The diagram shows that DOIS first created a forum to allow itself and UG to have 
public discussion o f whether to have Beyond Mail or GroupWise (1). Through 
manipulating the forum by using technical jargon DOIS successfully shaped the original 
understanding o f the technology that the UG had to be inclined to its own frames (3). 
On the basis o f the shaped understanding the decision was then made about the new 
system (4).
Figure 6.2: Creating a shaped understanding through social interaction
F o r u m
1*
Control over the translation process
The findings also suggest that the project was successful because o f realistic 
expectations o f the technology. This supports other researchers’ findings that, if the 
purposes of adopting information systems are well defined, the likelihood o f having a 
successful system development is greater (Bullen and Bennett, 1991, Caroll and Perin, 
1988, Ginzberg, 1981). In this study one saw that the scope o f the project was 
extremely narrow: to replace an old e-mail system. Besides, the project team claimed 
that it did not want to change anything other than the old e-mail system and it did as it 
promised50.
50 Here, we mean intended changes not unintended ones (i.e. changed communication patterns in the
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But reading between the lines another version of the story emerged. This version of the 
story tells that the real reason that the scope of the project was narrow was not because 
individuals were being rational but rather that the process of translating the project into 
something else was tightly controlled by the team (including UG). The project team 
constantly pursued frames of how things should be done and thought about, and gave a 
clear guideline and direction to the project. Any expectation which diverted from the 
initial one was rejected with “reasonable” reasons (i.e. the creation of the forum). The 
tight control over the process of the project development ensured that there was little 
chance that the purpose of the project could be interpreted otherwise. A possible reason 
for doing thus could be that DOIS could obtain power over other departments including 
other divisions within the IS S.
The power of direction (of that is what DOIS sought) was denied from the DOIS 
expertise of managing the office system, which others did not really want to challenge. 
This attitude from other departments might be because of the culture of the Bank and 
individuals’ perceptions of information technology and system. As mentioned earlier, 
to most people in the Bank “only banking and finance is real work”, activities which 
were not directly involved in these two areas were not paid much attention or valued 
highly. One consequence was that as long as the ISS could provide services which the 
users required and not making any changes which would change or threaten their 
current working practice or jobs people would not be over concerned with other details. 
This is also because individuals perceived that information technologies and systems 
were merely tools to support them doing their work. Since the ISS was given limited 
power in the Bank, the DOIS made sure that within the limited power range everything 
was under the control and eliminated any possibility of losing the control.
Although it was suggested earlier that the UG was a hostage of the DOIS, nevertheless 
it did once voice concern about the direction of the project, in that DOIS would like to 
present further development of applications within GroupWise. For example, DOIS 
prepared to automate the current manual documents circulation by using GroupWise, 
but the UG objected to the idea and argued that the goal was too ambitious and, above
Bank, speed up the process to get rid of the messenger system).
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all, involved radical changes in the Bank. Therefore, although the proposal was 
mentioned and discussed, it was stopped at that point.
The above discussion reveals a tightly controlled translation process in which the 
technology can only be translated one way and in a context of not intentionally trying to 
change organisational settings.
Vertical and horizontal analysis
Having a unique background and mission, BIS was not as much exposed to external 
forces as other commercial organisations. Usually, on-going IS projects came from the 
needs within the Bank and these needs were not necessarily generated from outside 
pressure. Moreover, to member countries’ central banks whether the Bank was 
technology sophisticated or not was not an issue as long as it provides services which 
met their requirements. In this context, IS projects could be developed slowly and 
deliberately in a fairly steady environment and the direction of any development would 
not be subject to the external environment.
The concept of time in this case study is seen as a mechanism to connect the past and 
present, but if one uses it to examine changes in individuals’ technological frames in the 
Bank then time seems to be “moving” but at the same time it seems to be “still”. It is 
motionless because technologists’ and users’ technological frames remained more or 
less the same throughout time; for example, the technologists’ preferences for certain 
products did not change much over time and the users’ feelings towards the ISS 
departments and information technologies/systems were not very different at the end of 
the project from what they were is the past. Nevertheless, time does show motion in 
individuals’ technological frames. It was mentioned by the interviewees that users’ 
feeling about the ISS department did not change in nature but was re-enhanced and 
became stronger in degree. For example, the projects undertaken two decades ago still 
had influence on how people thought about the ISS department, in fact, together with 
other projects undertaken during the past decade the negative impressions that people 
have about ISS had become stronger. A puzzle may come into one’s mind that 
employees come and go, so that what happened two decades ago should not be 
remembered and still influence how people think about the ISS. It has been a norm, 
however, that most employees stay with the Bank until their retirement, and thus the
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technological frames seem to span across a much longer time line than one would 
expect and would take longer and require much effort if any changes are to be made.
6.4 S ummary
In this case study it is shown how the initiation of a project was organised and pushed 
forward by DOIS as the necessity of the project was agreed and accepted at all levels Of 
the organisation. Most decisions and choices related to the project and product were 
based on a single technological frame, which was exemplified by the team’s preference 
for a particular vendor and product. In contrast, some of the decisions made about roll­
out and training scheme took far more notice of organisational and social contexts for 
even then in a defensive manner, but in general the project was dominated by pre­
defined and strong technical oriented frames held by the technical team.
This is different from many other case studies in the literature from which one can often 
learn about so-called emerging or drifting phenomena taking place during the decision 
making process or shortly after the implementation. This case study also reveals an 
interesting situation where there was a distinct distance between the users’ and the 
technical team’s perception of a suitable product, and between the real aim and the 
‘cosmetic aim’ of the project (i.e. the one the project team intend to which and the ones 
proposed to the ExCo.).
This case study tells a rather different story from the one found at BOC. First, the 
project was “technology pull” and not “business push”. Second, the project was carried 
out according to the DOIS team’s technological frames and developed in a steady pace 
and experienced very little diversion from the initial plan. Third, the team’s 
technological frames were not changed during and after the project; indeed, the team 
managed to make its frames relating to e-mail become part of the organisation’s own 
frames as the 'most successful' tag that led us to the project in the first place indicates.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
This chapter brings together the findings from the case studies. Discussion of the 
findings is based on the ideas developed in Chapter Three with further elaboration 
derived from the analyses of the case studies in Chapters Five and Six. The chapter 
begins (Section 7.1) with a re-examination of the findings from the case studies and 
provides a re-interpretation which is related to other IS research. The second part of the 
chapter (Section 7.2) is dedicated to discussion of the findings which emerged from the 
studies and which are further developed. This is followed by a conclusion (Section 7.3).
7.1 Re-interpretation of the case  study  findings
Before discussing the re-interpretation of the findings it is useful to revisit the argument 
made so far. Based on the observations made in the preliminary case study and the 
literature review of CSCW research, this study discovered (with surprise) that little 
attention has been paid to the investigation of processes and activities undertaken 
between problem identification and the post-implementation period (Section 2.1), and 
the consequences of these processes and activities on the subsequent direction of a 
project. This thesis focuses special interest on how the perception and expectation o f 
individuals influence the decisions taken with regard to the initiation and acquisition o f 
a specific information system. The findings from the preliminary case study suggested 
that choices and decisions about particular systems, and steps of an IS project, do not 
necessarily reflect the interests of the organisation as a whole. Instead, they were much 
influenced and determined by how individuals perceived the problems, how much they 
understood the technology, and what expectations they had for the technology. It was
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also noted that perceptions, understandings, and expectations changed over time 
especially as individuals’ circumstances changed and as individuals engaged in social 
interaction.
Bearing the above observations in mind the technological frames analysis and 
contextualist approach were chosen to pursue the research interest further. Building on 
both approaches, the arguments and assumptions of this study were then refined, as 
follows:
-  Individuals’ choices and decisions about IS projects, including detailed plans of the 
projects and new systems, are heavily influenced and determined by individuals’ 
technological frames rather than by an externally driven process of rational 
assessment of alternatives.
-  Individuals take actions towards the meanings that the technology has for them and 
these meanings derive partly from individuals’ technological frames. Since a set of 
technological frames are unique to the individuals who own them, different 
meanings for the same technology must be expected.
-  Individuals in the same interest group are inclined to interpret technology in a 
similar manner since their shared group technological frames enable them to do so.
-  Individuals’ technological frames are time and context specific so individuals’ 
interpretations change through time and so does their behaviour towards an IS.
-  IS projects are ongoing processes with continuously reciprocal interactions in their 
environment. Choices and decisions are not snapshots of historical processes, 
isolated from other activities, and their consequences have continuous impact on 
subsequent behaviour.
The specific findings of each research case studies have been discussed separately in 
Chapter Five and Six and they broadly support the arguments listed above. This section 
aims to bring together and re-interpret the findings of the three case studies, including 
the one conducted in JF Taiwan, and by doing so to provide an interpretation of the 
findings in a broader context and to relate this study to others. The discussion in this
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section focuses on three issues: (1) ontological perspectives on technology, (2) 
epistemological perspectives on decisions; and (3) situated plans.
7.1.1 Ontological perspectives on technology
Both case studies have shown that decisions are influenced by individuals’ knowledge 
and understanding of the technology, that is, their technological frames. Orlikowski and 
Gash (1991) identified seven domains of technological frames in their early study and 
argued that individuals consider these issues when they come in contact with the 
technology. Later Orlikowski and Gash (1994) derived another three domains which 
were believed to be significant as most conflicts arise from individuals’ disagreement 
over them. This study has found its own account of the domains and issues that 
individuals are likely to take into account, depending on their assumptions about 
technology in general and their experience. In other words, individual response depends 
on an ontological view of technology.
As discussed in Chapter Four, the ontological perspective is concerned with exploring 
the question of whether reality exists dependently or independently from an individual’s 
consciousness and appreciation. Hence, the ontological perspective on technology 
concerns the relation between technology, organisation, and user. Four dominant IS 
schools of thought including technological determinism, organisational imperativism, 
socio-technological, and structurationism provide different ontological assumptions of 
this relation (Orlikowski, 1991).
Technological determinism suggests that technology is an exogenous force (and perhaps 
intrinsically good) thus individuals’ reasons for initiating an IS project and choosing a 
particular system are self-explanatory (Greenberg, 1991; Johnson, 1988; Opper and 
Fersko-Weiss, 1992; St John Bate and Travell, 1994). Organisational imperativism 
assumes that technology creates links between a business environment and a business 
itself, and its IS/IT strategies are simply business driven (Cross, et al., 1997; Earl and 
Feeny, 1996; Rockart, et al., 1997). Both of these schools have a strong belief in the 
impact of technology on organisational and human behaviour, but one (technological 
determinism) assumes technological superiority while the other (organisational 
imperativism) plays to business orientation.
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In contrast, socio-technical interactionism argues that, although technology has the 
capability to change organisational properties, so too can organisational and social 
structures change (or shape) understanding of technology (Hirschheim, 1985; Lin and 
Comford, 2000; Kensing and Blomberg, 1998; Mumford, 1999; O’Day, et al., 1998). 
The primary intention of technology adoption is then to enable socially desirable 
business changes through technology but, unlike technological determinism socio- 
technical interactionism is aware of (or pursues) changes in the technology reflecting 
social movements. As to structurationism, technology is seen as created and changed 
by people (human agents), not as an exogenous forces but rather as interpretively 
flexible, its use depending on how people look at it, and the role of technology becomes 
subject to individuals’ views (Barley, 1986; Jones, 1999; Orlikowski, 1991; Riley, 
1983). Both of these schools of thought are interested in individuals and their attitudes 
and behaviour, although socio-technical interactionism is more technological oriented 
and offers new opportunities for planned change, while structurationism is inclined to 
be socio-organisational oriented.
Since each school of thought has its ontological position regarding to technology and its 
relation with organisation and individuals, individuals are seen to associate with 
particular positions (when they are in contact with technology) and will naturally be 
concerned about certain issues. Table 7.1 summarises some possible issues taken into 
account by each school of thought in different dimensions. This synthesis of 
ontological views of technology held by different schools, and the issues that concern 
them in different dimensions, allows individuals’ technological frames to be examined 
at the level that some behaviour or reactions towards technology can be anticipated if 
individuals are assumed to hold particular views of technology.
Table 7.1: Ontological perspective of technological frames
Dimension Technological
determinism
Organisational
imperativism
Socio-technical
Interactionism
Structurationism
Issues around 
initiation
Advance through 
technology
Successfully 
identifying 
business needs and 
links it to choice 
of technology in 
theory,
Competitiveness
through
technology
adoption;
Re-design 
organisations or 
work around 
technology, user 
requirements
Long term effects 
of technology in 
organisations: 
structural changes
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Dimension Technological
determinism
Organisational
imperativism
Socio-technical
Interactionism
Structurationism
Issues around 
implementation
System 
installation, 
acceptance testing, 
conversion 
technical training
Strategic fit, 
management 
commitment, how 
to link business 
strategy to 
technology in 
practice
To optimise social 
and technical 
factors of jobs, to 
automate or to 
informate work, 
participation.
To harness 
changes made in 
organisational and 
technological 
properties, be 
aware of 
emerging, 
anticipated, 
opportunist 
changes
Issues around use Correctly use of 
technology, 
technical supports, 
integrity
Effectiveness,
productivity,
competitiveness
User satisfaction, 
customisation, 
usefulness, social 
cohesion
Interaction
between users and
technology,
customisation,
dynamic
organisational
change.
Criteria o f  success Compatibility, 
speed, stability
Market position, 
competitions
Social and
technological
factors are
optimised,
acceptance,
appropriation
Achieve 
anticipated 
changes and be 
able to manage 
unintended and 
opportunist 
changes
Concepts o f  
Impact
Efficiency Organisational 
position in the 
industry, 
efficiency
Changes in 
organisational and 
social properties
Organisational
changes made
through
interactions
between
technology and
organisation
An emphasis on the underlying ontology of technology highlights as well as helps to 
appreciate individuals’ tacit background (i.e. education, experiences, preferences) and 
assists in making sense of the reasons behind particular decisions and choices about the 
technology in a way that traditional rational decision making models cannot. For 
example, the ontological view of technology that the MD at JF Taiwan had could be 
said to be inclined to technological determinism as the MD had a strong belief in the 
technology’s ability to solve the problems. In BIS, it is this strong belief that drove the 
initiation of the project; and despite the fact that the intrinsic technological problems of 
the existing system created demand for a new system, decisions about the project 
reflected the DOIS team’s technological determinist position. Also, in BOC, Lotus 
Notes was initiated, as the manger’s personal belief in information systems together 
with business needs.
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We have also noted that individuals’ ontological assumptions of technology do not 
remain static, but shift dimensions according to the context in which individuals from 
themselves and experiences and knowledge that individuals accumulate. In BOC, the 
project was initiated on the basis of personal belief in information technology align to 
organisational needs (Arrow 1); and the choice of Notes was based on the match 
between the understanding of the system and business needs (Arrow 2). Experience 
with user resistance to the system led Group IM to see that technology in itself was not 
the fundamental cause of the resistance, but rather it was the conflicts between current 
and new working practice (i.e. being a global team). It was noted that Group IM’s 
decisions made about the project shifted towards the socio-technical dimension (Arrow 
3), and subsequently the decision about a re-launch of Notes in BOC was made. In 
BOC, Group IM realised that only when there was a global business process in place 
and certain changes were made in organisational structures and business operation, 
would users attitudes towards Notes change. Group IM’s understanding of technology 
finally moved from the socio-technical dimension into a structurationalist view, as 
reflected in the statements about the Internal Web (Arrow 4). There they emphasised 
that, in order to make the Internal Web project successful, BOC has to make certain 
changes in organisational structures as well as prepare for possible organisational 
changes made by the introduction of the project. Nevertheless, the technological 
determinism still largely dominated the project (Arrow 5). Figure 7.1 describes the 
movement of Group IM’s ontological views of technology in the context of Notes in 
BOC.
Figure 7.1: BOC's ontological assumption of technology and direction of the project
Organisational
Imperativism
Technological
Determinism
Socio-technological
InteractionismStructurationism
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In contrast to BOC, DOIS’ ontological assumption of information technology and the 
direction of the project remained far more stable throughout the project. Although the 
proposal to the ExCo. addressed the project as pursuing strategic issues (organisational 
imperativism) and a user group was set up to assist it to choose and roll out GroupWise 
(socio-technical interactionisim) the movements from technological determinism to 
socio-technical interactionism (Arrow 1) and then to organisational imperativism 
(Arrow3). The dotted line represents that the movement was more a tactic employed by 
DOIS to obtain support from the management group than the actual shift in their 
thinking of technology. For themselves, DOIS stuck firmly to its initial technological 
oriented plan. It was also noted that the introduction of GroupWise has initiated some 
changes in communication patterns and use of the system in BIS, despite DOIS trying to 
play down these structural phenomena (Arrow 4). Figure 7.2 shows the movement of 
BIS’s ontological assumption and direction of the project.
Figure 7.2: BIS' ontological assumption of technology and direction of the project
Organisational
Imperativism
Structurationism
Technological
Determinism
Socio-technological
Interactionism
While ontological assumptions of technology represented in the earlier literature 
surveyed in Chapter Two seems to be assumed as static and rigid, the above finding has 
demonstrated that they are better seen as dynamic and flexible. The issues that 
individuals consider during a project will be different at each stage since the problems 
that individuals face are different. Moreover, the experiences obtained during the 
project allow/drive individuals to modify their assumptions, and which in turn change 
their attitudes towards the technology, consequently a project may be driven into a 
different direction.
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7.1.2 Epistemological perspectives on decisions
Highlighting the ontological assumption of technology behind individuals’ perception 
and expectation of technological solutions leads to the issue of epistemology of decision 
about technology, which privileges individual or group knowledge of the situation over 
some general (public) definitions of the technology which are time and context 
insensitive; that is, decisions should be understood through participants’ knowledge of 
situations rather than procedures which offer global organising visions of technology. 
An organising vision refers to a set of focal community ideas for particular information 
system, application or technology in organisation (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997).
Organising visions certainly form a part of the cognitive structure (technological 
frames) and directly shape and constrain individuals’ perception of problems and choice 
of technology (Scott, 1995; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). A pervasive organising 
vision of groupware is that the system has capability to (i) provide a common platform 
to support groupwork, (ii) enable communication and (iii) facilitate information sharing, 
and (iv) remove time and place constraints. In this work it was noted that organising 
visions, on one hand, function as references to assist people to make sense of 
technology, and on the other hand limit people’s understanding of the technology in 
such a way that the technology itself may be undermined. For example, the business 
manager in BOC matched the concept of “global team” raised in the reform scheme 
with an organising vision of teamwork and was prejudiced to believe that only Lotus 
Notes could provide solution. Similarly, in JF Taiwan the project manager’s 
understanding of groupware (Lotus Notes) was constrained by the buzzword “group- 
ware” and Notes was thought to be able to serve small groupwork only.
Two of the case studies (JF Taiwan and BOC) have demonstrated that an organising 
vision serves as a reference to facilitate decision about technology adoption and has 
impacts on individuals’ choice about technology, however, Ciborra (1999: 84) argues 
that “choice is intrinsically subjective and transient”. Developing from the 
phenomenological perspective of choice, Ciborra (1999) distinguishes two types of 
actions: “in order to” and “because o f’. The notion “in order to” refers to the idea of 
individuals carrying out actions following the meaning embedded in the projects and in 
its constituent elements (i.e. plans, goals, means, etc.). In IS research “in order to” 
motives often relate to “the special object of the analysis and design of rational decision
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making processes in the field” (p. 84). In contrast, the notion of “because o f’
emphasises individuals’ personal experiences of the past in the current situations. 
Ciborra writes:
“... there are the actor’s past experiences selectively evoked according to the existential 
circumstances at the moment of making the decision. Such deeper and wide ranging 
motives are called the “because of’ components of the action. They convey the ultimate 
meaning and thrust to the devising and performance of the action” (1999: 84).
The concept of “because o f’ reflects a notion of epistemology of decision which 
emphasises that choices and decisions cannot be examined without focusing on 
individuals, for it is people who make decisions and people have a background and 
intentions.
Building upon the notions of “in order to” and “because of’ appropriation of 
technology then can be explained as a process in which people transform actions of “in 
order to” into actions of “because o f’. In this context, the phenomena observed in the 
JF and BOC case studies can, therefore, be interpreted as the result of absence of such a 
process of appropriation. That is, the participants in both companies simply followed 
the meaning embedded in an organising vision of groupware which is agreed by the 
community (in order to) and failed to transform the public meaning according to their 
situations (because of). But, it was also observed in the case studies that the ability to 
appropriate technology (to transform “in order to” into tcbecause o f’) depends on 
experiences that individuals or companies have with the technology.
Experience with technology has been argued to provide individuals or companies with a 
base of knowledge for guiding current actions (Caron, et al., 1994; Orlikowski, 1992; 
Robey and Newman, 1996; Robey, et al., 2000; Yetton, et al., 1994). According to a 
technological frames analysis, individuals are likely to reference their historic 
experiences that are similar to those currently being considered/adopted (Martins and 
Kambil, 1999; Robey, et al., 2000). As a consequence of the lack of experience of 
managing groupware and client-server computers, the project teams in JF Taiwan and 
BOC did not have the ability to transform the public meanings of Lotus Notes into 
meanings of their own. Even more, the project teams sought to make the companies 
adapt to the public vision. Nevertheless, it was observed in BOC that once staff 
became familiar and had some experiences with the system, they were then able to re-
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interpret the organising vision of groupware and appropriate technology to meet their 
own needs.
On various accounts, BIS appeared to be more organised than JF Taiwan and BOC 
were, and the project team seemed to rigidly follow the planned procedures throughout 
the project. On the surface, DOIS’ behaviour can be interpreted as following pre­
defined procedure embedded in the projects and in its constituent elements (i.e. plans, 
goals, and means), that is, taking actions and making decisions according to “in order’ 
to” principles. However, under a close scrutiny the procedures and actions undertaken 
indeed derived from BIS’ and DOIS’ past experiences with other information 
systems/technologies. That is, behind every “in order to” action there is a history (i.e. 
because of), which refers to experiences.
The above discussion has sought to demonstrate that individuals’ knowledge and 
experiences of technology has direct impact on the expectations for and decisions made 
about technology. The evidence shows that lack of knowledge and experience force 
people to depend on the organising visions of technology without interpreting the vision 
and appropriating technologies according to the circumstances. As a consequence 
technology adoption may not reflect and support actual needs or organisations’ 
situations. Knowledge of particular technology may be obtained externally (i.e. 
through an organising vision), but it presents what the technology is supposed to be in 
an ideal world and does not represent the situation. In contrast, knowledge obtained 
through experience with technology reflects not only the current but also the historical 
situation, and it supports people in making sense of technology and decisions in context.
7.1.3 Situated p/an
It was suggested in the previous chapters (Chapter Five and Six), and earlier in this 
section, that a rigorous project plan may derive from an organisation’s understanding 
and knowledge of both situation and technology; but a different interpretation can also 
be offered. An alternative interpretation will emphasise the origin of the impetus for 
technology acquisition. Grudin and Markus (1997) argue that where the impetus for a 
technology acquisition comes from may be able to explain different attitudes to a 
project plan. According to Grudin and Markus (1997: 1463-1464), when the driving 
force behind the project initiation and acquisition comes from powerful organisational
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decision-makers, then the project is unlikely to be subjected to rigorous justification, 
review and approval, because the initiators are more likely to have access to the 
resources required. In contrast, when the impetus for technology acquisition comes 
from less powerful work groups in an organisation, then the initiators are required to 
prepare and go through a formal procedure to sell their ideas to decision makers. 
According to Grudin and Markus, without a formal project plan “there is no guarantee 
that the technology will address real organisational needs, fit the organisation’s 
preferred ways of working, and actually be used” (1997: 1464). In other word, a more 
“strategic” approach may be less successful. The data collected from the fieldwork 
supports this observation. This can, in part, explain the absence of a formal process of 
review before the decision was made to adopt Notes and the lack of documentation of a 
project plan in JF Taiwan and BOC. In each case the origin of impetus for Lotus Notes 
acquisition came from the senior managers . In contrast, DOIS had to follow the formal 
procedure (i.e. preparing a feasibility study, sending invitations to potential vendors, 
project plan) to propose (to sell the project to) the ExCo. in order to obtain necessary 
resources.
However one must also recognise that much research evidence shows that the direction 
of a project may not necessarily follow the way it was portrayed in the project plan 
(Ciborra, 1996; Gallivan, et al., 1994; Jackson, 1995; Orlikowski, 1996); hence the 
question of whether a rigorous plan is needed must be asked. Traditional system 
development lifecycle models assume that development is a sequential process so the 
actions and decisions can be articulated in advance and outside “time” (Avison and 
Fitzgerald, 1999: 273-276; Iivari and Lyytinen, 1999: 63-68). These models also 
assume that planned decisions and actions will lead to anticipated or intended 
consequences. But a growing body of research demonstrates that planned decisions and 
actions can equally lead to unanticipated and unintended consequences; even more, 
individuals are required to respond to contingencies during the development and after 
implementation (Harper, et al., 1991; Nardi, 1996; Orlikowski, 1991; Orlikowski, 
1996a; Randall, et al., 1995; Rouncefield, et al., 1994; Suchman, 1987).
A popular contemporary account of this phenomenon is the “emergent and drifting” 
school, which argues that the direction of an IS development cannot be fully controlled 
and anticipated since not all actions guarantee intended consequences. Building on this
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approach, this thesis sees IS development as a continuously situated process and argues 
that participants in development need to deal with contingencies constantly as it is 
difficult to maintain planned actions as each breakdown (unanticipated event or 
consequence) shifts development to further deviations from what was planned, 
expected, or intended (Latour’s translation loss” see Appendix I for more details).
The notion of situated actions emphasises “the emergent, contingent nature of human 
activities, the way activity grows directly out of the particularities of a given situation” 
(Nardi, 1996: 71). Hutchins (quoted in Orlikowski, 1996a: 66) writes about situated 
changes made in organisations and argues that “several important aspects of new 
organisations are achieved not by conscious reflection but by local adaptations”. 
Orlikowski (Orlikowski, 1996a: 66) argues:
“each variation of a given form is not an abrupt or discrete event, neither is it, by itself, 
discontinuous. Rather, through a series of ongoing and situated accommodations, 
adaptations, and alternations (that draw on previous variations and mediate future ones), 
sufficient modifications may be enacted over time that fundamental changes are 
achieve... Each shift in practice creates the conditions for further breakdowns, 
unanticipated outcomes, and innovations, which in their turn are responded to with more 
variations. And such variations are ongoing; there is no beginning or end point in this 
change process.”
The idea of situated change is apposite to the present argument and similar ideas were 
found in the research case studies. It was observed in the case studies that individuals 
needed to modify their plan from time to time in order to respond to unanticipated 
consequences of their decisions and actions, current situation, as well as to reflect or 
respond to the current state of technological frames. In general, an IS project within a 
commercial organisation is exposed frequently to the uncertainty of the environment 
(both internal and external) and in turn the direction of the project requires constant 
monitoring and modification to reflect the changes in the environment. In JF Taiwan 
and BOC, market competition drove the managers to re-examine the companies’ current 
practice and the projects were initiated to support and respond to the market. However, 
internal uncertainty such as resistance to learning (JF Taiwan) or to use the system 
(BOC), and changes in management group (Mr. Chow’s departure), forced the project 
teams to review the projects regularly. It was observed that the situated actions and 
decisions undertaken during the projects shifted the direction of the project away from 
the initial idea. The project in BIS, on the contrary, was initiated in a relatively stable 
environment in which market competition and uncertainty about the organisational
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structure were almost non-existent. The only major uncertainty that the project team 
faced was their low status and the appointment of a new General Manager of the Bank, 
but although this delayed the project for about six months, the content and direction of 
the project remained unchanged. In this context, the project was not affected by its 
environment and team did not need to review and modify its project plan.
Despite the above finding suggesting that a project plan and direction of a project may 
shift due to uncertainty in the environment, which leads to local contingency or 
breakdown, the case studies also show, to some extent, that a project having clearly 
defined aims and objectives operates better compared with one without such support. 
Participants involved in the project at BOC worked with a general and less-defined 
business objective (being a global company); hence they not only had to make sense of 
the project but also had to respond to the subsequent (and broadly unanticipated) 
consequences of their actions. Even more, there was no plan to guide their actions and 
monitor the direction of the project, so the project team had little idea whether or not or 
how far the direction of the project had deviated from the initial idea. In contrast, in 
BIS the project team had a rigorous plan and followed this plan throughout the project 
most of the time. It was observed that with a plan the project team in BIS seemed to be 
able to cope with unanticipated events better than the team in BOC. Indeed, in the case 
of BOC each breakdown seemed to drive the project further away from the initial idea 
of the system.
The above discussion highlights the relation between plan, local contingency (situation), 
and experience. It is evident that the uncertainty of the environment not only makes it 
difficult to execute actions and tasks articulated in the project plan, but also requires 
people to take situated actions to respond to it. In order to respond to the situation 
effectively experience is required to serve and construct basic knowledge of how 
situations should be dealt with. So, what marks the difference between BOC and BIS 
was not just that the former had no project plan in place while the latter had, rather it 
was that the former was relatively less experienced with the technology and had to deal 
with new business ideas compared with the latter. Indeed, Ciborra’s (1996) “taking care 
o f’, Orlikowski’s (1996b) “opportunistic”, and Rogers’ (1994) “evolution” all build on 
the principle that individuals are experienced enough to take advantage of the situation, 
within the situation and make the situation work for them.
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This section has presented a re-interpretation of the findings from the research case 
studies introduced earlier in this thesis. Three themes have emerged and been discussed 
-  ontology of technology, epistemology of decision, and situated plan. The first two 
themes stress the issues of knowledge and experience of technology and their 
importance to an IS project. This re-interpretation of the findings, and organising them 
into broader themes, allows one to go beyond the framework of technological frames to 
examine other cognitive elements which contribute to IS projects. The third theme of 
situated plan brings together the first two themes as well as taking into account the 
situation in which individuals are situated, technology is perceived, and decisions are 
made. These three themes are elements of the research framework developed in 
Chapter Three, but provide an expanded analytical view so they can be employed to 
investigate similar issues in different domains. The above discussion has, however, left 
one critical element of the synthesised research framework untouched -  the element of 
time. The evidence collected from the case studies suggests that this element deserves 
lengthy discussion and therefore the following section will be dedicated to the issue of 
time.
7.2 Further  finding s : Co n c epts  of  tim e
This section is dedicated to a discussion of various concepts of time, revealed in the 
cases and already identified as a component of the synthesised research framework 
developed in Chapter Three. Time has always been a concern to systems design (e.g. 
processing time, transaction time) and to system development (e.g. lifecycle, deadlines). 
Even if it is not discussed explicitly, time is also often seen as a reason for adopting 
information technology; for example, information technology is regarded as being able 
to increase efficiency and effectiveness (i.e. reducing transaction time and increasing 
productivity), to compress time and alters the rhythm of work, to enable asynchronous 
and synchronous communications (i.e. removing time and space constraints). Time, in 
this context, can be seen as a metric a measurement to evaluate whether the technology 
is “value for money” (i.e. investment returns equals to reduced production time and 
increased productivity) discounted in an NPV calculation. It is evident that much 
modem business practice, as well as management studies, simply assume that time is 
quantitative by nature. That is, they take for granted that “time is a quantity which can 
be measured [by clock and other instruments] allocated and cut in a controlled,
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structured and planned fashion” (Ciborra, 1999: 86). Time is treated as an entity which 
can be manipulated by various quantitative methods (i.e. BPR, just-in-time approach). 
These views of time are, however, “limited in scope and superficial in depth” (Lee, 
1999:16), and fail to recognise that time is equally a relative and subjective concept and 
can only be explained and meaningful through events and personal experience. In other 
words, time is not an external entity existing outside the person, context or object, but 
built-in with events and consciousness.
The initial awareness of time in the present study came from the case study of JF 
Taiwan. It was firstly noted that individuals’ technological frames changed when the 
circumstances changed. It was then noted that the IT history in the company, and past 
performances of the IS department, contributed significantly to how people perceived 
the problems and formed expectations of the new technology. These two observations 
were the simple and perhaps uncontroversial understandings of time that this study had 
at the beginning, and from which the decision to adopt a contextual approach was made. 
Developing the following case studies it became apparent that time was a more 
substantial issue, with a more complex and subtle character. Thus, the initial 
understanding of time needed to be extended and elaborated to reflect what has been 
discovered in the case studies. The rest of this section will, therefore, discuss various 
concepts of time that emerged from these case studies. Table 7.2 summarises these 
concepts.
Table 7.2: The notions of time
Concepts of time Issues concerned
Time as a research 
component
Chronological analysis 
Time-series analysis 
Contextual analysis
T ime-place/ space Local time vs. global time
Equilibrium of time Stability and discontinuity
Time and change Change involves time, and vice versa
Being-in and time
Time is context which conditions and constitute
activities and events
Timing
7.2.1 Time as a component of research design
Markus (2000) points out that IS research faces a serious problem which needs to be 
brought to the surface and to be dealt with: the time boundedness of research findings.
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Markus argues that most empirical findings of IS research have built-in expiration dates, 
and writes:
“almost any research study is at best a snapshot of a moving target, and our specific 
findings are almost certainly likely to hold only for short periods of time” (Markus, 2000:
45).
One way to deal with the problem is to ensure that the element of time is taken into 
account when it comes to research design such as when the research is conducted, how 
long the study is carried out, what is the history of the subject under examination. 
Treatment of time in research design not only has impact on expiration dates (Markus, 
2000: 45) but also on accuracy of the research findings. In practice the element of time 
in research design has usually been taken for granted and is seldom touched upon in IS 
research. Indeed, all frequently employed research methods in IS come with built-in 
principles regarding time. For example, time series analysis requires data to be 
collected over a defined period of time; historical studies require correct chronological 
ordering of time; longitudinal studies require data collected cover a long period; and 
ethnographical study require researchers to stay on sites for a longer period of time.
The case study method as used here, like other methods, has its in-built assumptions of 
time, but unlike other methods the element of time is not discussed much by scholars in 
their research design. Yin (1994:113) suggests that the case study research method has 
an ability to trace changes over time and is not subject to the limitation of cross- 
sectional or static assessments of a particular situation. Hartely (1994) makes a similar 
comment about such an ability to track time:
“Case study analysis has allowed the tracking of change over time, as a response both 
to historical forces, contextual pressures and the dynamics of various stakeholder 
groups in proposing or opposing change” (p. 211).
Hartely concludes that this ability allows those that are interested in organisational 
change in particular to be able to reveal the dynamics of process of change which other 
methods such as a survey cannot achieve:
“Case studies can be useful in capturing the emergent and immanent properties of life 
in organisations. A survey may be too static to capture the ebb and flow of 
organisational activity, especially where it is changing very fast” (Hartely, 1994:213).
But the experience that this research had with the case study method demonstrates that 
the method in itself does not have the ability of directly tracking time and changes;
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rather, the ability comes from careful research design which intentionally includes the 
element of time. The present thesis considers time as a contextual factor, which not 
only needs to be analysed alone but also needs to be analysed together with other 
factors. Thus, different analytical strategies were adopted: chronological, time-series, 
contextual analysis, to deal with the issue of time differently.
Chronological analysis was employed to illuminate a sequence of events in the 
organisations, as it has an ability to expose potential causal relationships between events 
over time (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Miles and Huberman (1994) argues 
that chronological analysis helps to “display data by time and sequence, preserving the 
historical chronological flow and permitting a good look at what led to what, and when” 
(p. 110). Such an ability is important to the present study in particular as the study tries 
to establish what and when events happened, and which in turn lead to what.
The chronological method was particularly useful to the BOC case study in terms of 
displaying, describing, and analysing the data. The data and the analysis of the BOC 
case study was organised into three phases which follow neither the calendar time nor 
the project plan but the development of the project and individuals’ experiences and 
attitudes towards the technology. Through the chronological data arrangement we were 
able to show the salience or significance of preceding events for subsequent events and 
establish the direct and explicit links between them. Moreover, through the 
chronological analysis some time-specific contextual factors were identified and then 
actions can be explained on accounts of these factors.
Although the chronological analysis made significant contributions to the data 
arrangement and analysis in the BOC case study, its significance was not found in the 
BIS case study when came to analyse the case. It was noted that in BIS it was the 
events and the quality of the events which were more important to individuals’ 
decisions about the project, not when (context) the events happened. We see the 
connections between events during the WorkGroup project as weak and the timeframes 
of each phase of the project development was planned and pre-defined by the project 
team before the project started. Therefore, the time or chronological orders of the 
events became less significant than the events themselves. In this context, a 
contextualist approach was thought to be more appropriate in terms of data arrangement 
and analysis than the chronology (see below).
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Chapter Two also reviewed CSCW literature in a chronological order with an aim to 
establish a research trend and trajectory of development in the field. It was then 
observed that there is a linkage between technology development in the IT/IS industry 
and development of a research agenda, as well as the trend of business practice for 
example, workflow systems and business process reengineering, groupware and 
teamwork, IS and knowledge management, web technology and e-commerce, and so on. 
Through the chronological analysis it was observed in BOC that the development and 
trend in the IT/IS industry and commerce might have influenced the company’s choice 
and decisions about Lotus Notes adoption and later, the Internal Web project. However, 
this .observation alone was not enough as evidence for a claim for such a relationship, a 
time-series analysis was, therefore, deployed to establish the trend within the IT 
industry and commerce. The result of the analysis strongly supported the observation 
made earlier, and additionally it provided an explanation for the choice of Lotus Notes 
made by the project team in BOC and for the decision about the project name (e.g. 
WorkGroup) made by the project manager in BIS.
Contextual analysis is not the same as chronology, but rather emphasises the 
temporality of a course of action, and the historical linkages between each course of 
action and its context. This was presented as part of the conceptual framework (Chapter 
Three) developed and used to analyse the empirical data (Chapter Five and Six). The 
approach provides an analytical tool to reveal a continuum between “now” and the 
“already been”, and even more between “now” and the “future” (Ciborra, 1999: 86). In 
other words, the concept of a continuum of time emphasises the temporal character of 
an event which allows one to track the origins of actions and examines the continuance 
of actions. Because the contextualist approach also has the ability to link context, 
content and process together, the observations made through the chronological analysis 
and data collected through the time-series analysis can be put within a broader picture 
and be examined in a broader context. Hence, we have observed that all participants 
and their choices and decisions made about the project and technology in JF Taiwan, 
BOC, and BIS were influenced by IT/IS history in the organisations. The observation 
supports the notion of “path-dependence” (Markus, 2000) which argues that all current 
decisions about information systems are in part the result of past decisions about 
information systems, infrastructure, and so on in organisations. As Markus argues:
there is a high degree of ‘path-dependence’ in organisations uses of information 
technology. The problems they are trying to solve with technology today are not merely 
a function of currently available technologies and immediate business challenges and 
opportunities. They are also a function of the organisations’ long past decisions about IT 
management, IT spending, and IT infrastructure” (Markus, 2000: 45).
Similarly, in the analysis of a GIS implementation project in an Indian State 
government, Sahay (1998) notes that the past experiences with technology transfer 
projects remain vivid in the institution and influenced its new experience with a GIS 
project. He writes
“these past experiences contribute significantly to shape expectations of actors in new 
projects. Attitudes to documentation and formalisation of knowledge reflect a 
perspective of apparent indifference towards history, and of preserving social records 
overtime” (Sahay, 1998:180).
It was also observed in the three case studies that current movements in the IT industry 
and commerce created a context to adopt particular technology (here it was groupware, 
and more specifically it was Lotus Notes in two case studies). By using other research 
design a similar observation might be made, but the analysis which takes time into 
account tends to be more sympathetic to particular choices and decisions about the 
technology and a project made by the organisations within a certain timeframe (Section 
7.2.4).
In summary, Markus’ concern about boundedness of time of research findings is indeed 
the issue of dealing with the research findings as representations of the relation between 
contextual factors, which are bounded by and sensitive to time. Incorporating time in a 
research design to reveal the boundary o f time is the first step towards the problem of 
boundedness of findings of IS research, and the following sub-sections will demonstrate 
how the element of time can be examined and interpreted in such a way as to assist 
analysis to be explicit about this boundedness.
7.2.2 Time-ptace/space
Time and place have been linked together as a concept in which neither term is 
dispensable from the other, and, more importantly one in which the relation has been 
regarded as a fundamental issue in understanding human activity. The concept is indeed 
at the centre of groupware and information communication technologies (ICTs) 
development and adoption, as the technologies aim to stretch the spectrum of time and 
place. In this sense, various functions have been developed within groupware and ICTs
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to enable communication in, at least, four modes: same time and same place, same time 
and different place, different time and same place, and different time and different place 
(Johnson, 1988). The four communication modes emphasise the technology’s ability to 
remove obstacles during a communication process caused by the physical boundary by 
providing a virtual space.
It is important to note the different concepts that the terms ‘place’ and ‘space’ pursue. 
Giddens (1997) explains that place refers to physical settings of social activities, so the 
geographical boundary is real and visible and often links to other concepts such as 
presence and absence. Space, on the other hand, is less attached to physical settings and 
is the linkage of two sets of factors -  “those allowing for the representation of space 
without reference to a privileged local which forms a distinct vantage- point; and those 
making possible the substitutability of different spatial units” (Giddens, 1997: 19). 
Most important, time is no longer bound with particular place (geographical time) but 
bound with the space which it associates with. It is this latter (space) that groupware 
and ICTs aim to achieve in order to enable communication to happen.
Groupware and ICTs not only transform physical place into virtual space but also 
integrates various local or clock times into one global or virtual time. Global time or 
virtual time, here, has two meanings. One refers to same time, and the other refers to 
uniform time. Based on this argument, the BIS’ adoption of GroupWise and decisions 
about setting up discussion groups within the new system is said to be motivated by the 
former, while the BOC’s decisions about Notes is said to be motivated by the latter.
It might have been seen that BIS’ adoption of the new e-mail was to allow activities to 
take place in multiple local time instead of in one global time. In BIS, local or personal 
time and space is more important than a single global time (indeed, the focus of the 
project was mostly on communications within the building, and far less on 
communication beyond e-mail as we would understand it today). The emphasis of the 
IS project, therefore, was on providing people with the tools to help them to manage 
their “local time” and to allow them to read and communicate in their “own time” -  
whereas with the old system, Higgins, people were forced to read and communicate in a 
global time when a notification of new message popped up on the screen. The new 
system empowered employees to make global time become individual and local time, so 
that individuals could have some control over time to manage their activities.
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In contrast, in BOC the expectation as well as the reason to introduce groupware 
(Notes) was to centralise (globalise) local times in order to match its customers’ time. 
The similar phenomenon has been found in the literature, with a single dominant motive 
to adopt groupware in such organisations being to globalise various local times in a 
virtual work space in which people work within virtual time (Bikson, 1996; Ciborra, 
1996; Ciborra and Patriotta, 1996; Failla, 1996; Harper, 1998). In this sense local time 
refers to two things. One refers to the physical nature of time which is understood to be 
characterised by geography. Local time can also be referred to social construction of 
time which is related to abstract time and only meaningful within context, for example, 
office hours, coffee breaks, working days. Large multinationals face a problem of 
standardising/centralising social construction of times created by local or regional 
offices regardless of removing physical local times. Information communication 
technologies (ICTs) are therefore thought to be the solutions by companies that wish to 
integrate local times into a single global time with an aim to co-ordinate activities, to 
harness R&D process, to speed up their response to the markets, and to build a single 
system interface between local offices. All of these efforts are to meet the time which is 
imposed by globalisation.
7.2.3 Equilibrium time
It was assumed at the beginning of the present study that individuals would constantly 
assess their environments, both external and internal, when they contribute to decisions 
about IS projects. There was, however, no evidence from the case studies to support 
this assumption. It was noted that individuals only assess their environments at certain 
critical stage during the initiation of the project or when a critical event takes place. 
During the initial stage of the project individuals are seen to scan and assess both 
external and internal contextual factors which may affect and be affected by the project, 
and then come to decisions which comprise all the factors. Once the project is 
formalised in the organisation, individuals’ attention shifts to local contingencies while 
external contextual factors are temporarily ignored until a critical event shifts the project 
to another stage. The period o f time between two critical events is what we describe as 
an equilibrium time (Gazendam, 1996; Gersick, 1991).
Gazendam (1996) summarises Fayol’s work relating to the concept of equilibrium in 
organisations and explains that equilibrium is a result of a dynamic process. Around the
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state of equilibrium there are fluctuations and instabilities. The concept of equilibrium 
that Fayol tries to depict is a balance of forces (interests), fluxes (of personnel), and 
phases (learning time and productive time). To achieve equilibrium, managers need to 
make efforts to balance these forces from different dimensions. Similarly, Gersick 
(1991) explains that equilibrium is a state of stability and defines punctuated 
equilibrium as “relatively long periods of stability [equilibrium] punctuated by compact 
periods of qualitative, metamorphic change [revolution]” (p. 12). Stability is broken 
when there are modifications in external or internal conditions, innovation, and so on. 
Gersick called such broken stability punctuated discontinuities, which is similar to the 
concept of fluctuations described by Fayol. Similarly, Gibson and Nolan (1976) in their 
stage theory describe external forces as critical events which disturb the stability of the 
IS Management process and shift the organisation to another stage and begin a new 
state of equilibrium. This is why, as they explain, the curve of EDP growth is S-shaped 
because the turnings of the curve “correspond to the main events -  often crisis -  in the 
life of the EDP function that signal important shifts in the way the computer resource is 
used and managed” (Gibson and Nolan, 1976).
Equilibrium of time therefore refers to period in which “not much happens”, time is 
motionless and frozen, and only moves again (or can be be observed) when punctuated 
discontinuity takes place (Karsten and Jones, 1998; Walsham, 1993). The findings of 
the BOC case study, however, suggest that this observation is somehow too simple and 
suggests that equilibrium time should be examined at two levels: macro and micro. It 
was noted in BOC, that stability with all forces including external and internal in a state 
of balance, observed at the macro level does not reflect actual happening at the micro 
level, where a series of small breakdowns and fluxes is constantly taking place (7.1.2). 
This challenges the concept of punctuated equilibrium in which changes are seen as big 
bang coming from “nowhere”. Similarly, Weick (1993) argues that equilibrium time 
misleads people to think as if activities are bounded and only occur at a fixed point in 
time. March (1981) notes:
“Because of the magnitude of some changes in organisations, we are inclined to look for 
comparably dramatic explanations for change, but the search for drama may often be a 
mistake, ... Change takes place because most of the time most people in an organisation 
do about what they are supposed to do; that is, they are intelligently attentive to their 
environments and their jobs.”
Orlikowski (1996a: 65), similarly writes:
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“organisational transformation is not portrayed as a drama staged by deliberate directors 
with predefined scripts and choreographed moves, or the inevitable outcome of a 
technological logic, or a sudden discontinuity that fundamentally invalidates the status 
quo.”
On the one hand data from the case studies suggests that individuals do not constantly 
assess their environments, but only at the initiation stage of the project and when critical 
events happen. Thus, the decisions made at the initiation stage, once made, represent an 
equilibrium, and actions are carried out accordingly for some time. On the other hand, 
the data also suggests that this equilibrium is a false impression because conflicts 
between forces exist all the time and cause breakdowns which need to be fixed and 
brought to a balanced state.
In summary, an equilibrium is not a symbol of motionlessness of time; rather, it 
represents a macro-level situation in which there is a balance between external forces 
and individuals’ choices and the decisions at that point of time. This balance will be 
destroyed when an event occurs and requires re-examination and order of different 
external forces. As a result new decisions would be made to restore a new balance. 
However, underneath this macro-equilibrium there are many undergoing micro changes 
and in respect, time is not motionless but flowing (Robey and Newman, 1996). This 
concept leads back to the discussion of situated plan presented earlier in the chapter that 
individuals have constantly to deal with local breakdowns and perhaps to make 
incremental changes. Dramatic changes in organisations which are expected to occur 
around information systems adoption are seldom observed when individuals encounter a 
new technology the first time, because changes need to be made in individuals’ 
technological frames first in order to facilitate further changes in their actions towards 
the technology. Changes in technological frames requires time as they are made 
through a learning process in which individual accumulate experience and knowledge of 
the technology. This argument then leads us to discussion of the relationship between 
time and change and which is presented in below (7.2.4).
7.2.4 Time and change
Time and change, similar to the notion of time and space (Section 7.2.2), are intimately 
bound together. The traditional argument of the relation between time and change is 
that time does not exist and cannot be observed if there is no change or motion (e.g. of 
the Sun, Moon, etc.). Put differently, time is something that belongs to movement and
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can only be observed in changes (Prior, 1997; Shoemaker, 1997). Topics about 
organisational and technological changes made around technology introduction have 
always been a main concern to many IS studies. These studies are especially interested 
in changes in properties of organisational and social structure due to the adoption of 
information technology, and to those of the technology because of socio-organisational 
interactions. Some established models of studying changes seem to implicitly believe 
that anticipated changes will occur at the time of an information technology 
implementation. But a body of work argues that not all changes occur instantly at a 
given time, rather they occur incrementally throughout the time (Ciborra, 1996a; Daft 
andWeick, 1984; Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1994;Weick, 1993).
Changes take time to make themselves visible, that is, through time changes reveal 
themselves. Thus, a different interpretation of initial resistance to the introduction of 
new information technology in organisations emerges. We have observed in BOC that 
there was an initial resistance to the decision about adopting Lotus Notes which notably 
came from the members of Group IM. The main reason was that Notes did not run on 
the existing mainframe which they were familiar with, but on server technology which 
they knew very little about. In other words, their technological frames which provided 
them with understandings, images, concepts, knowledge, and heuristics about 
“computers” were not up to date to prepare them to accept the decision. In this sense, 
the initial resistance to a challenge to existing working practice is perhaps inevitable, 
since it takes time to alter the existing technological and other relevant frames in order 
to adapt to changes. Zuboff (1982) writes:
“During a period of technological transition people are most likely to be aware of and 
articulate about the quality of the change they are facing. When people feel that the 
demands a new technology makes on them conflict with their expectation [my emphasis] 
about the workplace, they are likely, during the initial stage of adoption, to resist”
(p. 143).
This idea of allowing time to let change happen has methodological implications. The 
main concern here is when the examination of changes are made and how long the 
observations of changes last, as the answers of these questions are crucial to the 
conclusions drawn about the changes. That is, the timing has to be right (not too early 
or too soon) in order to let certain changes be recognised in their own time. For 
example, as reported some changes in communication patterns were observed in BIS 
since the implementation of GroupWise but the project manager was not sure whether
- 2 1 8 -
these changes were fundamental and permanent or not because it was too soon to make 
comments. The interviewees in BOC noticed that, since the market sector reform and 
the introduction of Notes, the company had gradually adopted the idea of working 
towards being a global company. According to them the changes might not be obvious 
or significant to other companies, but to a historically established company like BOC 
they were relatively significant. The project manager said, “you don’t expect BOC to 
change itself over night because it is not the culture of the company. The company 
prefers incremental and gradual changes.”
Whether a change is incremental, evolving, emerging, drifting, or improvisational 
depends on when and how it is examined. It means that how soon after the technology 
implementation the observations are made and what model is used to explain the change 
(i.e. static or dynamics). Psoinos (1998) notes this in a study of the role of information 
systems in support of employee empowerment. In the analysis of interview data and 
survey results a disagreement between the two sets of the data was found. The 
interview data suggested that time was a dimension for the success of empowerment 
while the survey result suggested otherwise, as explained by Psoinos:
“The survey indicates that a change initiative that is not designed to enhance 
empowerment will not culminate in empowerment over time, while the interview findings 
refer to the fact that a change designed for empowerment will require a long period of 
time to show positive performance results” (p298).
Similarly, Gallivan et al. (1993) conducted a case study in a customer support 
department at a software company headquarters in the Midwest of the States. The 
department had just introduced Lotus Notes to replace its existing old databases used for 
customer support. Gallivan et al. suggested that the system was successfully adopted in 
the company for a number of reasons: user-centred development strategy, a phased 
implementation strategy, and compatibility of the groupware applications with the 
department’s cooperative culture. The case study (1993) was carried out in the 
company about a year after the adoption (1992) and the changes noted by Gallivan et al. 
were mainly made intentionally. A follow up study was carried out by Orlikowski 
(1995) two years after the Gallivan et al. (1993) study and this time changes made 
unintentionally, and opportunistically, were observed together with other changes that 
emerged during use of Lotus Notes. The length of time involved in a study determines 
the types of changes observed. As Orlikowski (1996b: 57) writes, “changes will evolve 
over time out of the practical experience of using groupware technology to solve
-2 1 9 -
particular and ongoing organisational problems and from initiating innovation and 
adaptation of both the technology and the organisation as appropriate.”
Another phenomenon of time and change observed in the case studies is that changes 
may be driven by the change o f time which refers to the changes in environment caused 
directly by changes of time dependent contextual factors. For example, the decision 
about replacing Higgins with GroupWise in BIS can be interpreted as necessary to 
reflect the change of time. The introduction of Microsoft Windows 3.1 in 1992 had 
shifted the software industry and IS design to another era, and the DOS based Higgins 
and other similar products became increasingly unacceptable by their users. 
Consequently, DOIS was forced to make a decision about replacing the existing system. 
Similarly, the idea of being a global company and working together as a global team 
which in turn led to the decision about marketing sector reform can also be interpreted 
as the result of the change of time. It is that the change of time (i.e. being globalised), 
which forced BOC to re-examine the existing business strategy (i.e. local and regional 
oriented). This notion of time leads to an idea that time in itself is a context which 
constitutes and conditions events to take place.
Giving consideration to time, changes around technology adoption should be viewed in 
different stages and assumed to have different impacts on organisations. Changes 
which require a short period of time to be revealed usually are those that do not need 
fundamental changes to be made in technological frames. Likewise, fundamental 
organisational changes which requires individuals to alter or even to adapt to new 
concepts and working practice usually need a longer period of time to let them emerge 
and happen. Hence, changes such as opportunist, appropriating, emerging, drifting, or 
evolving need a longer period of time to be revealed. Sometimes, changes are driven by 
changes of time, that is, changes occur naturally or inevitably when elements within the 
environment change. In this respect, to know when changes occur becomes important 
in order to identify the nature of changes and explain the actions undertaken.
7.2.5 Being in and time
It has been demonstrated in the above discussion that the initiation of an IS project is no 
accident (it has a history), and the decisions made about the project are time dependent. 
That is, the contents of the project and decisions are affected by when the project is
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initiated and decisions are made. When, here, is not what time but which period of 
time. This stresses the importance of the notion of being in and time for research 
findings. Being in is noted in the case studies not as physical presence but in an 
existential sense. Time, here, is marked and constructed by a series of significant 
contextual occurrences; and being in means in a particular situation at a particular time. 
To be more precise, the notion of being-in here is temporal bounded and can be 
illustrated by cliches such as “in that time”, “in that era”, or “at the right time”.
The idea of being in that time (at a particular point of time) is to argue that time is a 
context which constitutes and conditions individuals’ actions and social movement, and 
being right here at this point of time has different implications and impact from being 
here then. Based on Schutz’s work on phenomenology, Ciborra (1999: 84) writes 
“meaning of an action may be relative to a particular moment in time [my emphasis], 
and to the recollections the actor is able to perform in those particular circumstances.” 
In order to understand one’s actions Nardi (1996: 70) argues that to study a time 
specific context in which actions are undertaken is the key as it “means finding oneself 
in the thick of the complexities o f particular situations at particular time with particular 
individuals [my emphasis].” Similarly, Lave (1988) argues that a one-time solution is 
to a one-time problem, involving particular individuals and circumstances, and artefacts.
These case studies suggest that the position of time at which individuals are situated 
impacts on individuals’ actions towards the technology in two steps. It firstly affects 
individuals’ activities of reflexivity. Where individuals are situated now determines 
what past experience individuals are able to recall to assist to make sense of current 
situations. It is worth noting that this recollection is not how old the experiences should 
and will be recalled, but what similar experiences are there in the past to deal with 
similar present situations. Individuals also go beyond just recalling past experiences 
but monitor the recollections in accordance with the current situations (self-interaction) 
and then take action. Similarly, the position in time will affect the formation of 
anticipation as individuals project reflexivity in the future and form their anticipations 
of the technology. Therefore we know that to understand now is important as it 
provides the individual with an immediate context to link what has happened and what 
is going to happen.
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Figure 7.3 illustrates the above idea. Assume that an individual is situated at the point 
of time called now when he/she comes to face the technology. The individual recalls 
experience with the same or similar technology and re-interpret the experience within 
the context o f now. With the interpretation o f problem and technology which comprises 
the reinterpretation o f the past experience made in the current context, individuals then 
anticipate likely outcomes o f the technology adoption, project this perceived outcome 
into the future, and their expectations then are formed and decisions about the 
technology are made accordingly.
Figure 7.3: Being-in Time
Anticipation
Now
Past F u t u r e
R e f le x iv e
Source: Adapted from Ciborra (1999).
In the BOC case study, the point o f time at which the decisions about market sector 
reform and the choice o f Lotus Notes were made, was a period when the global 
economy was in recession, the IT industry was marketing groupware (i.e. Lotus Notes), 
and organisational studies emphasised globalisation and teamwork (the point o f now in 
the diagram). The Managing Director called upon the past experience o f dealing with 
the customers and took consideration o f the current situations, then formed an 
anticipation o f what BOC would like to be in the industry (i.e. still to be the industry 
leader) once the recession finishes. Based on such anticipation the Managing Director 
took a decision to reform the market sector. Similarly, the point o f time at which BIS 
was thinking o f replacing the old e-mail system was when the system was completely 
out-of-date in relation to the development o f the IT industry and where pressure from 
users was inescapable (the point o f now). The DOIS recalled their past experience such
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as solving the problems caused by Higgins and familiarity with Novell networks, and 
together with the current situation it then formed an expectation of what qualities of the 
new technology should have. The DOIS then took decision to implement GroupWise.
The emphasis on a given point of time “now” is to portray a context in which actions 
take place in order to understand them both in the context and position, which 
individuals then take. Moreover, it also allows changes and actions to be explained as 
"inevitable" or as a product of the situation, and provides more sympathetic views about 
consequences of some decisions or actions.
Another type of relationship between being in and time found in the case studies is 
being in that era. The idea of being in that era is built upon the ideas of time as a 
context as well as change of time (Section 7.2.3), and emphasises the movement of 
time. The movement of time is not about the movement of the Sun and Moon, rather it 
is about the shifts in industries, economies, or politics. It was noted in the case studies 
that the development in the IT industry (including software and hardware) has provided 
contexts and even pressure to commerce to adopt particular technology. Thus, the 
decisions about marketing sector reform (i.e. globalisation and economy recession) and 
choice of Lotus Notes (i.e. Notes was more publicised than other groupware) to support 
the reform in BOC and the decision about replacing Higgins in BIS (i.e. the era of 
Windows operation environment) then could be interpreted as products of being in that 
era.
Individuals’ attitudes towards technologies may change according to the shifts of time. 
In 1988 Grudin (1988) was discussing why groupware failed to live up to expectations 
but in 1995 Grudin and Palen (1995) discussed why groupware was succeeding. 
Although these two papers are separate and independent studies, the conclusions drawn 
from both studies might be seen in this sense as time (era) dependent. In 1988 or earlier 
groupware was still an innovation and ideas introduced by the technology were new to 
most people not to mention a lack of experience of managing the technology. By 1995 
groupware was no longer a stranger to many and the relevant experiences of managing 
the technology and the users had been learnt (Section 2.1.1 and 5.2.1). A similar 
phenomenon was found in BOC. For example, the popularity of the Internet in the 
recent year has changed the staffs attitudes towards computers such as the expectation 
of certain user interface (i.e. point and click) from BOC. Hence, Group IM’s proposal
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to replace Lotus Notes interface with Internal Web partially originated from the idea of 
the rising number of people browsing in the Internet (Chapter Five) and the proposal 
was warmly welcome by both management groups and users.
Finally, being-in the “right” time is equally important as being at a particular time and 
being in that era because good timing can provide a context which enables things to be 
achieved in a better fashion. At BIS there was a six month delay in the project time 
because of the reshuffle of the senior management. Initially, the project team was not 
too happy about this but the delay worked out in favour of the project overall. Because 
the newly appointed General Manager was interested in making e-mail an official 
communication means in the Bank, and because of his public endorsement of the 
project, the rest of Bank received a clear message of the importance of the project, that 
is, the project ends up in the right time.
In the case of BOC the timing with the introduction of Lotus Notes at BOC can be said 
to be inappropriate and too soon; as a result it caused the employees frustration and led 
them to reject the system. It was bad timing because the company had only just begun 
to perceive of itself as a global company and to ask employees to think of themselves as 
working in global teams instead of local or regional ones. The rush into the 
introduction of Lotus Notes only brought in additional unknown variables in the 
organisation, in addition to networked PCs and client-server computing being 
unfamiliar to employees and IM personnel. Therefore, on the one hand the employees 
needed to become accustomed themselves to the new corporate ideas and learn to work 
together across regions, and on the other hand they had to struggle to use and make 
sense of the new technology introduced to them. It is then no surprise that the use of the 
technology did not meet BOC’s initial expectations. Comparatively, the introduction 
of the Knowledge Management and Internal Web program seemed to have had better 
timing: by then BOC had gradually become used to the idea of being a global company 
and had become familiar with a number of innovations, the introduction of Domino by 
IBM, the popularity of the Internet in general, and support from the new IM Director. 
All in all, the program attracted better publicity and had a better profile in the company.
From the above discussion it is evident that there is a strong link between decisions 
about technology, being in, and time (i.e. at a particular point of time, in that era, and at 
the right time). The recognition of this link provides an alternative explanation as to
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why organisations choose to adopt one type of technology rather than others by 
examining the temporal characteristic of the decisions. Individuals’ attitudes towards 
technology (technological frames) change along with the movement of time. Thus, the 
timing of introducing new system into organisations become a crucial element for a 
successful technology implementation
7.3 C onclusion
This chapter has re-interpreted the findings from the case studies in a broader context to 
bring together the specific findings from each case study. Generally speaking, the 
research findings from the case studies have supported and enriched the initial 
understandings of assumptions and arguments made at the beginning of this thesis. 
Ontological and epistemological arguments have been discussed in various occasions in 
IS research including research methodology (Chapter Four of this thesis) (Baroudi and 
Orlikowski, 1989) and systems design (Hirschheim, 1989, 1999; Wilson, 1999), but this 
thesis employs these concepts to assist it to understand reasons behind the overt 
rationale of particular decisions.
The discussion of the concept of the situated plan has shed light on the idea that 
decisions are time and context specific. A situated plan can be portrayed as an 
emergent process which cannot be fully articulated and predicted in advance, but which 
involves acknowledgement of various actions that might be undertaken to respond to 
unanticipated subsequent outcomes of the previous actions and contingencies. Each 
action taken to respond to the local situation may create an awareness of different 
opportunities for action, which in turn affect the following actions. The idea of a 
situated plan provides an alternative view to examine unexpected and unintentional 
actions and outcomes during project development.
The discussion of various issues of time that emerged from the findings of the case 
studies could be said to be the most important finding of the present study. The issues 
include time as a component of research design, time -  place/space, equilibrium time, 
time and change, and being in and time. By taking these issues of time into account 
alternative interpretations of the findings are arrived at to enrich the initial 
understandings of the case studies. A number of important points have been made 
regarding time. First, researchers should be aware of the element of time during the
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research design and analysis because phenomenon under study is time and context 
specific. Second, time is no longer bound with the national or regional boundary 
(place) but with the space, therefore, to manage activities taking place in the virtual 
space requires understanding of different dimension of time. Third, most changes do 
not occur in a big bang fashion rather, they usually have histories and trajectories that 
must be studied. Thus in order to understand change to trace back to their origins is 
necessary. Finally, timing is as good as other attributions to a successful project. 
These concerns about time have brought attention to the role of time in research design, 
analysis, and development of findings, is more complicated and important than that it is 
currently assumed in IS research.
The next chapter (Chapter Eight) is the last chapter of this thesis; it will summarise the 
thesis; discuss the implications of this research for IS research and practice; report on its 
contribution to the current body of knowledge; comment on limitations in this research; 
and areas for further research.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This chapter is the closing chapter of this thesis. The first section (8.1) overviews the 
research and its findings and is followed (Section 8.2) by a discussion of the 
implications for IS research and practice. The third section (8.3) draws together the 
preceding discussions and assesses the contributions of the study in the wider scope of 
IS research; and the fourth section (8.4) discusses the limitations of the research. The 
chapter ends (Section 8.5) with suggestions of possible areas for further research.
8.1 Over v ie w  o f  the  research
This study began with a general interest in CSCW and groupware, and its focal 
objective was developed only after the preliminary case study (JF Taiwan) had been 
completed (Section 1.2). The study conducted in JF Taiwan was commissioned by the 
senior manager of the company to identify possible areas in which the company could 
benefit from Lotus Notes. Several interesting issues emerged from the study, but one 
finding in particular attracted attention because it did not support assumptions made in 
most CSCW literature.
The finding suggested that an organisation may choose to adopt groupware not 
necessarily for the functions that the technology provides or from business requirements 
but for other reasons. For example, JF Taiwan considered that implementation of Lotus 
Notes was not because it recognised or understood the potential advantages of using the 
technology, but because of political pressure from the HK office. Furthermore, the lack 
of knowledge of groupware and of Notes led staff to formulate expectations and 
requirements for the system on the basis of subjective perceived problems and personal
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experience with other technologies. In this sense, various expectations and requirements 
were articulated by the employees, each of which reflected individuals’ local situations. 
The finding challenged the general assumption shared in the CSCW domain that 
organisations realise the benefits offered by groupware (e.g. enabling team/group work, 
improving communication, allowing information sharing, and removing obstacles 
caused by time and place) and choose groupware simply because of these (supposed) 
benefits. The finding also sheds light on a long-standing and taken-for-granted issue 
that decisions about technology are not always made on an objective and rational basis 
but are situated and emerge out of a complex local and global context.
A review of the current CSCW literature was presented in Chapter Two. The review 
showed that most CSCW studies focus on three areas: application development, 
workplace study, and technology use study. The first one is research about “CS” 
(computer-supported) and the last two are about “CW” (cooperative work). Each of 
these focuses on a different stage of an IS project. For example, workplace study is 
conducted to understand the work process in a workplace which is considering adoption 
of technology. Technology use study, in contrast, is carried out after a system roll-out 
to study interaction between technology and its hosting company. Analysis of these 
three areas showed that research directed at the process of selecting a particular system, 
at the initial stage of IS projects, was missing from current studies.
Learning from the preliminary case study, it seemed that the process of determining 
which technology to put in place, has profound influence on the successive events or, at 
the extreme, directly on the outcome of the adoption. For example, it was observed at 
JF Taiwan that there was little consensus between departments and between employees 
about the purposes that the new system should serve, and there were also conflicts 
between various interests and expectations about the new systems. Further, it was 
noted that employees made decisions about system requirements on the basis of 
emotional feelings about problems and about the existing system. Several questions 
therefore emerged about: what would happen if a company chose an inappropriate 
technological solution and, in circumstances where the outcome of a chosen solution 
proved unsatisfactory, whether the technology should be blamed for this outcome. But 
such questions cannot be answered when the process of why technological solutions are
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sought after, or how a particular solution for a problem-situation is chosen, is taken to 
be a black box.
The focus of the present research, therefore, developed from the synthesis of the 
findings of the preliminary case study with those of the literature review; and was 
formulated to investigate the origins of technological solutions. The issues that 
emerged as needing to be addressed within such a research scope were, firstly, why a 
particular system is chosen by participants involved in the selecting process; secondly, 
how participants formulate the problems and determine the purposes of the system. 
These issues were approached from a social cognitive perspective which focuses 
predominately on individuals’ subjective perceptions and expectations.
The technological frames analysis developed by Orlikowski and Gash was employed to 
help to examine individuals’ cognitive properties concerning information technology. 
The underlying assumption of the framework is that people’s attitudes towards the 
technology are determined by the meanings of the technology for them personally. The 
meanings of the technology are derived from frames of reference with regard to 
information technology in particular, Orlikowski and Gash naming this specific set of 
frames as technological frames. Technological frames consist of a set of assumptions, 
knowledge, and experience of the technology. Technological frames differ from one 
individual to another. Because individuals interact with others at the workplace and 
because their personal circumstances change over time, technological frames change 
accordingly; so do the meanings that become assigned to the technology. In order to 
capture the dynamics of technological frames and the subsequent changes prompted by 
the changes in the frames, a contextualist approach was employed. The approach 
emphasises that the process of change is subject to the context in which the process 
takes place at particular points of time. It also stresses the links between a present event 
and its past and its possible future. A synthesised conceptual framework on the basis of 
the technological frames analysis and contextualist approach was then developed to help 
to understand the topic chosen (Chapter 3).
Examining the underlying assumptions of its arguments in four perspectives (ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology), this study views itself as falling into 
the interpretive paradigm (Chapter Four). The paradigm claims that reality is socially 
constructed (ontology); that reality is perceived through the lens of personal experience
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of the world (epistemology); and that a social science should not be studied in the same 
way as the natural sciences. For an interpretivist researcher, interpreting and 
understanding a situation is the process by which to generate knowledge of the social 
phenomena. Two possible methodologies within the interpretive approach are 
ethnographic study and case study, but for objective reasons (i.e. time scale, gaining 
access to the field, and the purpose of this study) the case study approach was chosen. 
The case studies were conducted at two sites: British Oxygen Company (BOC Group), 
and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).
The case studies (Chapter Five and Six) were organised and described according to the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter Three. The findings of each case study 
were discussed separately. Chapter Seven then brought together the findings of the two 
case studies and examined them in a wider scope in order to draw attention to both 
general and specific issues derived from the case studies. Overall findings of the case 
studies supported the assumptions and arguments made at the beginning of the study 
and illustrated the process of initiating technological solutions and determining 
particular technology adoption as, indeed, complicated and interesting. Also the case 
studies demonstrated that various activities taking place within the process could in fact 
directly contribute to successive activities. Deriving from the synthesis of the findings 
of the three case studies, this study re-interpreted the findings from the case studies in 
Chapter Seven to provide an interpretation across case studies and in relating to other 
studies. The re-interpretation of the findings covers three areas including ontological 
perspectives on technology, epistemological perspectives on choice- and decision­
making, and situated plan. These three areas represent two essential elements in the 
synthesised conceptual framework developed in Chapter Three -  technological frames 
and context. The discussion supports the arguments made earlier in this thesis that 
choice and decision about system adoption reflect individual/group knowledge and 
experience and human response to the context. Another element of the synthesised 
conceptual framework -  time, was discussed separately in different section (7.3) since it 
was discovered that this element in itself is far more complex and important than was 
originally assumed. The discussion illustrated a number of concerns about time that 
sheds light on how the issue has been overlooked in previous research; discussion also 
enriches current understanding of time in research design and analysis.
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8 .2  Im plic a tio n s
The research question which this thesis tries to answer has drawn attention to a new 
dimension for studying the origins of IS projects. It has recognised and identified a 
number of cognitive properties that play out when individuals encounter technology. 
The findings from the research case studies suggest that an ontological perspective on 
technology and its relation with an organisation and its staff, that an epistemology of 
decision making focusing on individuals’ own knowledge and experience, and that the 
situation in which events take place as well as the time at which a project is initiated and 
a research study is undertaken, all contribute and enrich understanding of how and why 
decision about adoption of particular technology are made. This research as a whole 
and its findings has, therefore, a number of implications for research and practice and 
the table below (Table 8.1) summarises them.
Table 8.1: Implications
Implication for research
Knowledge, experience, expectation and technology adoption
Organisational learning around technology 
Time in IS research
Implication for practice 
Managing initiation of an IS project 
Time and IS management
8.2.1 IS research
This thesis and its findings have implications for research on social cognition and 
technology adoption, organisational learning around technology, and the concept of 
time in IS research design. The findings of the present study show that individuals' 
choice and decision about particular technology are heavily affected by their 
knowledge, experience and expectations. When individuals need to make decisions 
about technology adoption, they tend to recall their past experience with other 
technology, rely on their knowledge of technology, and their perception of problems 
that the technology is supposed to resolve. In other words, decisions about adoption
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may represent some decisions makers' or a group of individuals' perceived not actual 
organisational needs. The establishment of the relation between knowledge, experience, 
expectation and information technology adoption stresses that studying decisions about 
adoption is indeed an ontological and epistemological issue. In such a context 
researchers are required to understand issues that surround information systems 
adoption from inside (participants' point of view) instead of from outside. That is, the 
organising visions should be employed with care when it is used to evaluate 
implementation outcomes of a specific information system. For example, the issues 
such as the level of appropriation of technology taken place in organisations, the degree 
of representativeness of organising visions in the context of particular organisations 
need to be taken into account in order to assess the outcomes in the context.
It is evident that knowledge, experience and expectation have a historical dimension 
(accumulated), a present (feedback from the consequence of current action), and a 
future (accumulating, changing, and modifying the existing frames for future reference). 
Technological frames analysis has demonstrated its ability to track changes in the 
contents of individuals' technological frames; and therefore, through analysis, the 
production and reproduction of meanings that technology has for individuals can be 
observed. The production and reproduction of meanings of technology, indeed, reflects 
a learning process occurring around the technology. In order to reveal the quality of 
the learning process within the organisation, researchers should be encouraged to record 
people’s thinking before changes (i.e. business process re-engineered, installation of 
new information system), differences between previous and current thinking, the 
reasons that people think differently, and so on.
The concerns about time that emerged from the re-examination of research design and 
analysis and research findings of the present research have a number of implications for 
IS research. First, the concerns alert us to the fact that the element of time can actually 
make a difference concerning what and how other contextual factors are seen and 
interpreted. This is particularly important to those studies that are interested in 
organisational learning or change, because different types of organisational learning or 
change require different lengths of time given to data collection and observation 
(Section 7.2.3). So, to avoid any ambiguous analysis and finding, researchers are first 
required to decide the type of learning or change that is under investigation in order to
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calculate and determine the length of time to be given to the investigation. Moreover, 
the notion of time draws attention to the issue of selection of an appropriate research 
framework which is able to capture and inform dynamics of time. The concerns about 
time have, to some extent, answered the questions which are raised by Markus (2000: 
45) as follows:
-  How can we deal effectively with the time-boundedness of our 
findings?
-  How can we meaningfully study the evolution of organisational IT 
efforts over time, while technologies, business conditions, and the 
names we give to concepts and technologies are changing 
continuously?
-  How can we deal effectively with path dependence: organisations very 
different positions with respect to given technology initiative today 
owing to their past choices?
The notions of change and time and being-in time and have implication for the 
argument of inevitability which argues that events are enabled and constrained by the 
point of time at which they happen. Put differently, the argument sees that a point of 
time, which is characterised by events happening, actually creates a special context in 
which things take place. Thus, some choices and decisions may be viewed afterward as 
irrational and inappropriate, although at the given point of time they can be seen as 
indeed appropriate. In this sense, it is salient to examine and perhaps separate out time 
dependent contextual factors found in the environment at particular points of time. To 
separate time dependent factors is necessary if an investigation is interested in finding 
out factors which affect organisations’ decisions about information systems adoption. 
The distinction between time dependent and (relatively) independent influences may 
help to establish a picture of whether the information systems adoptions is due to the 
fear of being left out the mainstream of technological development, “everyone is doing 
it” syndrome; or due to the political pressure at a particular time (Drury and 
Farhoomand, 1999; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). The conclusion drawn from an 
analysis of the two sets of factors (time dependent and independent) are likely to be 
different compared to an analysis which does not distinguish the difference.
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Another area that we believe the concept of time derived from the findings has 
implications for is Internet related research such as distance learning, e-commerce, e- 
business, and other e-related topics, all of which require us to broaden traditional views 
of time and space. In other words, the concept of time and space is less bounded by 
physical and geographical places but becomes more abstract. Various research issues 
need to be re-examined once we break away from the traditional thinking of time and 
place and move to cyber time and space. For example, “whether social relationships 
will change due to the lack of “real” time and place?”, “Has time in cyberspace become 
ever so important (i.e. expectations of instant response) compared to its position in the 
real world?”, “Is global time desirable or should employees be empowered with local 
time to manage their own activities?” To approach the concept of time and space/place 
differently and to investigate phenomena accordingly in today's e-culture society is both 
necessary and inevitable.
8.2.2 IS practice
This thesis and its findings also have implications for IS practice. It is noted that a 
project with less specific aims and objectives is more likely to invite different 
interpretations. The number of different interpretations can be assumed to depend on 
the number of interest groups involved, as well as responding to how general the aims 
and objectives are. In this sense, when the number of interest groups involved or when 
aims and objectives are broad and less specific, the number of interpretations of the 
project and system increases. The implication of having a large number of 
interpretations of a project or system is that the project can be driven into different 
directions and lose its initial aim (but there is an opportunity that a new and more 
appropriate one is formed). Project initiators and IS practitioners should either ensure 
that there are minimum possible ambiguities embedded in a project’s aims and 
objectives or to learn to live with a situated plan. IS practitioners should harness the 
interpretation process by ensuring that leveraging knowledge and perception of project 
and technology takes place.
Previous IS research argues that the conflicts come from individuals’ political and 
social differences within an organisation (Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Mumford and 
Weir, 1979), but the findings of this research add another dimension which argues that 
conflicts are caused by individuals’ personal beliefs in and experiences of technology
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(from ontological and epistemological perspectives). This means that IS managers or 
Chief Information Officers (CIOs) not only need to ease tension caused by political and 
social differences but also to “leverage” knowledge and perception of technology in 
order to achieve common understanding of projects and purposes of new technology.
To leverage knowledge and perception of technology within an organisation Orlikowski 
and Gash suggest that communication and training are the possible means through 
which individuals may be able to use the technology in a similar way. On the other 
hand, Marshall et al. (2000) argue that providing users skills and knowledge of the new 
technology through training adds only marginal benefit to the adoption since the use of 
technology largely depends on individuals’ knowledge of the tasks which they perform. 
In this sense, it is not only training on the new technology is needed but also tasks 
related to education and communication. These arguments have been supported by the 
findings of the research case studies presented in this thesis that illustrate that when 
people are confronted with the technology they consult other frames (i.e. business, 
tasks) too. The implication is that a collaborative relationship between IS, business, and 
human resource departments should be established to provide members of staff 
appropriate skills to enable them to use technology and knowledge to perform their 
tasks in order to optimise potential benefits of technology to work.
According to symbolic interactionism individuals perform self and social interactions 
before they take actions towards events, in this thesis, technologies. Providing training 
and education only enables people to form appropriate perceptions of technologies but 
whether individuals perceive that technologies are useful for their work depends on how 
other people act towards the same technologies. This explains the existence of “wait 
and see” attitudes towards technology when the technology is first introduced to people. 
The attitude is potentially harmful to the performance of groupware in particular 
because it relies on critical mass (i.e. the number of users using the system) which 
means that the more people wait and see the less people use the system and the less 
benefit of groupware will be realised and more people wait and see. The loop will 
eventually lead to abandonment of the system (Grudin, 1988; Markus, 1990). To 
reduce the number of people who wait and see therefore becomes an urgent agenda for 
IS managers and CIOs who wish to adopt groupware or another innovative technology. 
In order to avoid an undesirable outcome efforts to understand and resolve the wait and
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see phenomenon are needed, and if necessary changes in organisational properties (i.e. 
structure, reward system, process) and in system (i.e. interface) may need to be made.
The development of groupware and more recently the Internet has inevitably stretched 
the time and space/place spectrum, and the outcomes have gradually led companies to 
think and do business differently. This imposes increasing pressure on IS practitioners 
to- provide services to meet the changes. An immediate concern caused by the absence 
of physical time and space/place is whether managers can integrate local time into one 
global time and at same time provide local autonomy and discretion over activities This 
question/problem has created much distraction in some multinationals (Chapter 2.1), 
and sometimes it is distraction that can lead to disappointments. A reason for this found 
in studies undertaken by others is the power struggle over ownership of time. As 
discussed earlier, in many modem societies clock time has replaced task-oriented time 
and is used to evaluate individual performance. Hence, questions such as “Your time or 
my time”, and “Who controls the time?”, become political issues rather than a simple 
matter of time management within companies. Awareness of this problem is required 
and organisations may have to prepare for radical changes in this area in order to 
maximise technology capability.
8.3 Co ntributio n  o f  the  research
This study takes a special interest in the influences of individuals’ perception and 
expectations of technology on their decisions and choices about the initiation and 
acquisition of a specific information system. This research interest and its findings have 
contributions to three broad areas in IS research: theory, methodology, and practice. 
The discussion in this section is organised accordingly.
8.3.1 Contribution to theory
Theoretical contributions of this study to IS research are several. First, the research 
topic on in its own contributes to the current body of knowledge since it addresses an 
area which is less well researched. Second, it contributes to the IS domain as there is a 
possible application of social cognitive theory (SCT) in order to understand thinking 
behind decisions about adopting a particular technology. Third, the critique of the 
technological frames analysis contributes to the present knowledge of work on frames.
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What makes this study different from others is that it approaches the research topic from 
a social cognitive perspective, together with associated empirical evidence in order to 
support its argument. The findings derived from the case studies provide evidence that 
decisions about a technology in the initial phase can affect, for instance, the functions 
provided by the software package or system to be built or used; the scope of a project; 
resources to be allocated, and so forth. These decisions, it is suggested, have lasting 
effects on the downstream activities (Grudin and Markus, 1997). This insight 
contributes to the argument for the continuity of IS development as it demonstrates that 
the reflexive monitoring of IS development cannot be undertaken by using a segmental 
approach which views each happening or phenomenon as one-off and without a history. 
Rather, it shows that happenings have history and evinces that, in order to reflect 
current situations, it is necessary to track their origins.
Another theoretical contribution is the validation of social cognitive theory (SCT) and 
the demonstration of possible applications for IS research. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, only recently have people begun to realise that users’ attitudes towards technology 
are not always determined by environmental forces external to them but may be 
determined by individual cognitive properties. Some researchers introduce cognitive 
properties and emotions as a device to measure and predict user acceptance of 
technology, but applications of SCT deployed in IS research remain few. This study 
re-introduced the technological frames analysis as an analytical conceptual model to 
demonstrate that SCT can be expanded to take on board the social issues that sculpt 
individuals’ cognitive properties so as to understand and explain the phenomena from a 
different angle. The recognition of individuals’ cognition and emotion, and the 
influence this may have on individuals’ attitudes towards technology, gives an 
alternative explanation which rational models cannot provide. The power to explain the 
situations at an individual level makes SCT, as well as the frameworks built upon it, 
complementary to social theories that concentrate exclusively on 
contextual/environmental forces or factor models.
The study’s contributions to the technological frames analysis per se are twofold: firstly, 
the findings contributes to the research areas, identified by Orlikowski and Gash, which 
needs further investigation; secondly, its critiques of the framework enriches the initial 
assertions made by Orlikowski and Gash. Orlikowski and Gash pointed out a number
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of areas which need further investigation; and this study contributes to identification of 
the means used to reduce frame incongruence and to examination of the conditions 
under which frames change in particular (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994: 201). In terms of 
the means to reduce the frame congruence, this study demonstrates that techniques such 
as packaging and repackaging the image of the technology (BOC), framing and 
reframing the problems (BIS), borrowing power from the management group, talking in 
different languages, and so forth, all contribute to the process. Technological frames 
change, it was observed, over time, but in so far as the content was concerned the 
findings do not show that frame incongruence inevitably reduces, in fact, in the case of 
BOC frame incongruence was reinforced over time. Employment of the contextualist 
approach helps to capture the process by which technological frames are shaped and 
reshaped because of some internal and external triggers as well as changes that lead to 
further changes in individuals’ actions towards the technology.
The critiques of technological frames made by this study have contribution to the 
technological frames analysis. Based on some fundamental premises of symbolic 
interactionism the arguments focus on the neglect of self and social interactions that 
individuals have with themselves and with others, in achieving changes in technological 
frames. Building upon the argument this study suggests that these two components (self 
and social interactions) should also be analysed in the context of changes in individuals’ 
attitudes towards the technology. The expansion of the framework can now allow one 
to explain individuals’ “wait and see” regarding the use of the new technology and to 
examine the relation between social interactions and changes in individuals’ personal 
technological frames.
An unanticipated contribution that this study has for IS research is its discussion of 
various concepts of time with implications for IS research in general. The contribution 
is unanticipated because the element of time was considered and treated as a critical 
contextual factor which constitutes the condition under which the process takes place 
and time was not expected to play any other role in the study. Yet, at the end of the 
research it became apparent that time as a research context and a conceptual element of 
models of IS initiation is far more important than was initially expected. In fact, time 
deserves a forum dedicated to it in IS research. The discussion of time (Section 7.2.1) 
reviews and summarises the literature which may or may not make the role of time
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explicit in research, and together with experience derived from this study some 
implications for IS research are suggested. The study has brought the role of time 
which in the past has been taken for granted in IS to the surface; and has established 
some possible areas for further research (Section 8.4).
The finding contributes particularly to research which investigates learning around the 
technology, as it provides a micro-level analysis to understand individuals’ and groups’ 
perceptions of, and actions towards, technology. This study reveals a process of 
individuals’ or groups’ technological frames changing from one state to another because 
of changes in the environment, accumulation of knowledge and experience with other 
technologies, and because of interactions between individuals. The process can be seen 
as a learning process in which individuals accumulate their knowledge and experience 
of technology through interaction with the technology. The process of learning can be 
observed through examination of the changes in the contents of individuals’ and groups’ 
technological frames.
8.3.2 Contribution to research methods
This study claims three methodological contributions to IS research. First, the link 
between the research objectives and the research designs made by systematic review of 
the most frequently employed research methods in the CSCW. Second, it demonstrates 
how secondary data sources can be used to support the primary data. Third, it raises a 
number of concerns in relation to time within research design.
In contrast to the mainstream of IS, research methods have not been seen as a 
substantial issue in CSCW. Some researchers from the sociology discipline may have 
published a series of papers to discuss and promote the use of ethnographic (Section 
4.1) research approach in order to study work and the workplace, but in general 
discussions about research objectives and designs are not extensive. The systematic 
review discussed in Chapter Four is the first original study undertaken in the CSCW 
domain. In addition, the review of methodology in the CSCW domain has highlighted 
several issues which have not been previously explored. First, the research objectives 
and designs tightly link to the development of CSCW research. For example, in the 
early days when CSCW technologies were not widely available to the user community, 
laboratory or classroom based, experiments were popular; and case study method and
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action research method only became popular at the later phase of the development when 
technologies had become available for sometime. Second, although there is a lack of 
discussion about methodological issues in CSCW, researchers do not seem to worry 
about it. It was observed that scholars from different disciplines appear to adopt the 
research methods with which they are trained and familiar. Therefore, sociologists use 
ethnographical study method; IS researchers use case study; computer scientists use 
laboratory experiment and simulation. The above methodological issues have not been 
previously discussed in the CSCW domain, so this study can claim originality for these 
observations. When compared to the multi-disciplinary and high-profile discussions 
about research methodology in mainstream IS research, the phenomenon is seen as 
rather interesting.
The second methodological contribution is the demonstration of using secondary data 
sources to support the primary data in the case studies. The primary data source of the 
case studies was interview transcripts, but other data sources were also collected and 
analysed in order to triangulate and complement the primary data. Using documentation 
to support primary data or undertaking research solely on the basis of it is not new and 
has been discussed by researchers (Yin, 1994; Forster, 1994). Yin suggested that if 
documentation is closely analysed it can corroborate and augment evidence from other 
sources; and Forster (1994: 164) claims ‘The analysis of company documents can bring 
fresh insights to our understanding of organisational behaviour.” The experience of 
using this method to track the pattern of individuals’ perceptions of their situations and 
attitudes towards the technology over a period of time has proved that documentation 
analysis is particularly useful for the studies that are interested social cognition because 
of its ability to provide historical evidence of individuals’ attitudes then up to now. In 
this study, documentation analysis is also proved to be a method to interpret 
interviewees’ “rewriting” of history in later oral accounts.
Despite the significant benefits that can accrue, it is evident that the nature of 
documentation has been downplayed in most IS research. It is common for the 
reliability of a study to be determined by the number of the interviews conducted (the 
more the better); and to legitimate this practice most published research papers stress 
the number of interviews only, the quantity of documentation reviewed being rarely 
stressed. This lack of appreciation of company documents may be because of a general
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misconception of what documentation can do. For example, to some researchers 
company annual reports may be regarded as serving the purposes of public relations 
(PR) and providing accounting figures to satisfy shareholders. In contrast, this study 
has demonstrated that, by closely examining reports from Chairmen, Chief Executives, 
and Managing Directors (the case of BOC) over a period of time, the process of 
organisational changes can be perceived. The demonstration undoubtedly sets an 
example for future research of how the annual report can be employed to serve a 
research purpose.
This study also took advantage of on-line information to conduct a survey to define 
trends in the development of groupware in commerce. The technique follows the 
citation analysis (Culnan, 1986; Orlikowski, 1991) principal to search on-line databases 
(i.e. ABI/Inform, Financial Times on-line archives) for published articles which discuss 
groupware and relevant concepts. Data collected via this method can be used to 
establish conditions under which a process takes place, as the periodic data reveals a 
dynamic process of how a concept/technology arises, grows, matures, and even 
declines. Also, collecting data by using the on-line survey, a larger sample size can be 
obtained at relatively lower cost compared to the traditional distributed survey method. 
Relying on on-line information to conduct survey has not been widely adopted in IS 
research but it has potential. Students who have limited time and resources to conduct 
primary research could be encouraged to employ the method; and so should researchers 
who need to establish the scope of a particular development.
The discussion of the notion of time in research design and analysis is another important 
contribution to research methods in IS. The notion of time, as shown by this thesis, is 
critical to research findings since it is not only a contextual factor which sturctures 
phenomenon studied, but is also a element built-in with other contextual factors. The 
experience of adopting different analytical strategies (i.e. chronological analysis, time- 
series analysis, contextualist analysis) to deal with the problem of time, and the 
incorporation of these strategies as part of research design to manage data collection and 
analysis, has been proved to be useful in terms of identifying and distinguishing 
whether time is a context or a contextual factor contributing to a phenomenon. The 
contribution of the discussion of time is its efforts to make time explicit in research
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design of case study method in IS research, since the issue of time has been taken for 
granted in the method in the past.
8.3.3. Contribution to practice
This study claims contribution to IS project management in particular. Three areas to 
which this thesis contributes are: (1) the scope of project management at each stage of a 
system life-cycle; (2) appreciation of individuals' ability to interpret a project; and (3) 
differences of attitudes towards a technology.
The argument that an IS development is a continuous and open-ended process has been 
stressed several times in this thesis as it informs the concept that every phase of a 
systems life-cycle is important to an IS project and that no one stage should be seen as 
more important than any other stage. This concept is not new and has a long history in 
IS management, but there has been an institutional bias as the majority of published 
research is seen to be more interested in certain phases of a system life-cycle, for 
example, post-implementation. As a consequence, misconceptions of what is and what 
is not important are formed, and research continues to be carried out in such a way. 
This thesis provides theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to illustrates the 
relations between actions and the historical links between the phases and brings 
attentions to the fact that an IS development is a continuous process not a process made 
up with a number of small projects. Therefore, as for practitioners, the perception and 
method of management of IS development then should be readjusted to avoid 
opportunity that the IS development drift away51 from the initial objectives.
A noticeable phenomenon that remains is that even when the lesson has been learned 
and theories have been developed to take into account socio-cognitive issues and the 
issues have been incorporated into systems design and management, dissatisfaction with 
technology or with the outcome of technology adoption will still occur. This thesis 
offers a possible explanation for this phenomenon. Through the lens of technological 
frames analysis, a fact which has been forgotten but is now apparent, is that individuals 
possess the ability to think. This issue may have been addressed in studies using
51 Drift away here is not the same as Ciborra’s (1996) argument of drifting.
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structuration theory (reflexive monitoring) but it remains untouched in many studies. 
Recognition of individuals’ ability to think prepares IS practitioners for further learning, 
drifting, emerging, or evolving with the technology.
Bringing to the surface individuals’ subjective perceptions and expectations of problems 
and technology and their relation with individuals’ decisions about technological 
solutions, highlights the fact that conflicts between people in terms of technology 
adoption may be more fundamental than has been previously thought. Conflicts have 
been explained as being caused by socio-economic and socio-political reasons within an 
organisation; but, supported by the technological frames analysis and the findings of the 
case studies, this thesis has demonstrated that conflicts also emerge from personal 
cognitive properties. These properties serve as references that individuals use to take 
actions towards the technology and situations that they are in. Hence, unanticipated 
actions undertaken by participants are the result of an interplay between individuals' 
cognitive properties, actions, and the technology. IS managers need to recognise 
individuals' ability to think and engage in reflexive monitoring (Giddens, 1984; 
Orlikowski, 1991) in order to appreciate the explanations behind the actions, and from 
there to deal with the conflicts.
8.4 L im itations  o f  the  research
Owing to the nature of the chosen research method, an interpretive case study approach, 
the analysis and findings presented in this thesis may be limited by the researcher’s bias, 
as well as limited by the ability to generalise the findings to other organisations. It has 
always been argued that the interpretive approach is not rigorous and that the approach 
reflects the researcher’s bias since the interpretation of the data largely relies on the 
researcher’s conceptual apparatus and theoretical position within the research area. This 
in-built limitation of the chosen method was attended to by presenting a variety of data 
from different sources and by continuously creating dialogues between the researcher 
and interviewees to get feedback on the interpretation. Thus, the risk of bias has been 
reduced.
Another limitation related to the chosen research method is its ability to provide a basis 
for generalising the findings to other organisations. As stated earlier in Chapter Two 
the intent of this research is to provide alternative explanations for the phenomenon as
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well as to highlight the issues which have not been well-presented in the literature. The 
purpose of each case study is to illustrate how the origins of information systems 
projects can be explained by the social cognitive approach (i.e. technological frames 
analysis). Therefore, the present study his generalised in the form of principles some 
of the findings (i.e. ontology and epistemology of technology) yet it would not claim its 
findings to be regarded universal explanations for similar situations in other 
organisations.
A possible limitation of this study relates to its determination to study the origins of 
organisations' IS projects. Data collection was the main problem during the case studies 
because the data needed was mostly historical. The difficulties encountered regarding 
collecting of historical data were several. In the case study of BOC, the initiator of the 
market sector reform had left the company when the case study was carried out, and 
therefore the information regarding the Managing Director's motives relied on 
interviewees' interpretations and on company documentation. However, even when it 
is possible to access the participants involved in the projects initially, it must be 
expected that some fine details of the project will be missing because of the nature of 
human memory and the situatedness of all human actions. The limitation is intrinsic 
because of the nature of the research topic; in order to overcome the problem, secondary 
data was collected to support the interview transcripts. However, there is no guarantee 
that all aspects will have been covered.
Another limitation is that the thesis deals with individuals' technological frames only, 
yet in reality individuals' decisions about the technology solutions are also affected by 
other frames, such as business frames (i.e. business intentions and performance). Other 
frames have been analysed and dealt with in terms of contextual factors. It should be 
remembered that technological frames analysis is a conceptual model to assist in the 
analysis of thoughts and actions related to technology in particular; analysing too many 
frames at the same time is likely to create unnecessary confusion and risk frizziness of 
the research scope.
Finally, there is some limitation in this research is regard to its research design. The 
research may have benefited from a longitudinal study: from project initiation, to 
implementation, to technology in use, and to outcomes. Such a study would, however, 
be extremely complex and would be more appropriate for post-doctoral research.
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8.5 S u g g estio ns  fo r  further  research
Some interesting issues have emerged from this work that deserve further research. 
Activities performed at the origins of IS development are not limited to decision­
making about adoption of a particular technology as many more activities are involved, 
for example, selecting an appropriate consulting company to provide advice, negotiating 
and justifying the necessity of the project, allocating resources, gaining support from 
elsewhere in an organisation, and so forth. Not only are these activities in themselves 
interesting, but they also are important to the entire project since they can “result in the 
selection of inappropriate solutions to organisational problems, or they can result in 
perceptions and decisions that subsequently have negative effects on system features, 
use, and impacts” (Grudin and Markus, 1997: 1464). Yet, details of these activities at 
the origin of IS development remain underexplored in IS research; hence this work 
strongly suggests that further research should be undertaken to investigate these 
activities and their effects on IS development.
A second suggestion is the further examination of the process of how individuals’ 
technological frames are affected by social interaction. Section 7.1.4 has briefly 
discussed and illustrated the effects of social interactions on the process of sense 
making about technology, and further research may focus on the issue of what types of 
social interactions (i.e. communication, training, management endorsement) effectively 
serve as catalysts for frame changes; and on the process of the interplay between social 
interactions and technological frames, and how these lead to changes in action.
The demonstration of using the synthesised conceptual framework (Chapter 3) to record 
and analyse changes in individuals’ technological frames and that lead to further 
changes in subsequent action has suggested a possible approach to investigation of 
organisational learning around technology (Section 8.2). Future research is suggested in 
order to build and develop a conceptual framework similar to the one used in this work 
to record changes in individuals’ frames of references and changes in actions, in 
particular to track learning around a technology.
The discussion of time has also opened up interesting issues that need further 
exploration. As discussed (Section 7.2), time is still viewed by many as operating in the 
background of a research design and is not paid much attention in IS. But the
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discussion presented in Chapter Seven has demonstrated that the concept of time not 
only affects how one arranges and analyses the data but also affects how one interprets 
events. Additional research is required in order to explore further issues raised in 
Section 7.2.1 by acquisition of enriched empirical data. Evidently, resource devoted to 
the specific issue raised by this thesis is still necessary.
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Framing Implementation Management
Abstract
The research reported in this paper explores IS implementation in the early stages of a 
project as a process of social translation of ideas about technology. The research 
employs a technological frames analysis to examine how human agents translate public 
or global accounts into things that they are familiar with and are of interest, filter out 
alternative meanings and engage in social interaction in order to pursue their images of 
a technology coming into use. The paper is based on a case study of the early stages of a 
new e-mail system in an international banking institution. The findings of the case study 
suggest that a translation process which takes place at both individual and 
organisational level at the initial stage of an IS project can have significant 
consequences for the overall implementation process.
Keywords: implementation management, technological frames, translation process, case 
study.
Introduction
This paper offers a distinct perspective on implementation, one that is less well 
represented in the literature, which focuses on the early stages of a project as ideas and 
notions of what is to be achieved, and what technology offers, are explored and shaped. 
If information artefacts are seen as independent entities with functional and planned 
uses, but no wider impacts on or responses from host organisations, implementation is a 
technical and project bound issue with a scope limited to questions such as preparation 
of data, training, acceptance testing and conversion (Avgerou and Comford, 1998). 
Such a simple view of implementation management has been challenged both by 
academic studies and by reported experiences in recent years. For example, alternative 
accounts of implementation can be found in the literature on resistance to change (Keen, 
1981; Keen, 1991), IS failure (Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Poulymenakou and 
Holmes, 1996), escalation (Drummond, 1996; Keil, 1995; Markus and Keil, 1994), 
incremental development (Gallivan, et al., 1994; Jackson, 1995; Orlikowski, 1996) and 
drifting (Ciborra, 1996, 2000). In each case, the narrative of implementation of a system
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is seen as problematic, at times conflictual, and bound up in a complex set of political 
actions and reactions, situated accommodations and learning. This paper examines the 
issue from a contrasting perspective and argues that implementation management is a 
process of managing social translations of technology (see also Whitley and Pouloudi, 
2000). This is achieved through a social cognitive approach that provides important 
countervailing insights when contrasted with more techno-managerialist accounts of 
implementation.
Various distinct theoretical positions underpin all these more complex accounts of 
implementation activity. The school of technological determinism assumes that these 
artefacts are potent external forces with instrumental power over organisational and 
social properties (King, 1991; Siegel, et al., 1986; Sproull and Kiesler, 1986). 
Technological determinism sees implementation as a part of a larger process of 
historically driven organisational change achieved through the characteristics of 
available information artefacts. Implementation management is then about facilitating 
the initial entry of the technology. The related school of organisational imperativism 
sees the artefacts as equally potent but capturable, as a means to an end, with their 
power at the disposal of wise planners, managers or reformers (Hammer and Champy, 
1993). This views implementation as the introduction of changes via a choice of new 
artefacts with the purpose of creating strategic and sustainable links between the 
business environment, business processes and organisational forms (Porter and Millar, 
1985; Randall, et al., 1995; Taylor, 1995). In contrast to the above, the school of socio- 
technical interactionism, consider information artefacts as (to some degree) multi-valent 
and plastic; and needing refinement, shaping and situating within the social structures of 
the organization (Lin and Comford, 2000; Mumford, 1987), with implementation as, 
ideally, an explicit, creative and contextual process of linked and mutually sustaining 
social and technological shaping negotiated within the organisational setting (Ackoff, 
1967; Kling, 1980; Markus, 1983). Managing implementation then means to sustain and 
harness changes simultaneously in both the social and technological arena.
More recent structurational work, influenced by the work of Giddens (Giddens, 1984) 
suggests that the above approaches all provide an incomplete view of implementation 
and change, and emphasises that changes in either organisational or technological 
properties are the consequences of situated human actions (Barley, 1986; Jones, 1999;
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Orlikowski, 1991; Poole and DeSanctis, 1990; Riley, 1983; Walsham,1993). 
Structurationism gives a more prominent role to agency (human action) and the 
modalities (including information artefacts) through which agency influences, and is 
influenced by, organizational structures. The assumption is that information artefacts 
themselves are socially constructed, and the uses found for such artefacts depend on 
meanings that human agents assign to them (Grint and Woolgar, 1997). The premises 
of technology made by structurationism (Orlikowski, 1991) are twofold; that technology 
is created and changed by human action; and that technology is interpretively flexible 
and its use (consequences and trajectories) depends on human agents. Because the 
structures of both organisations and technologies poses the capability to produce and 
reproduce, and human agents posses the capability to make sense of their surrounding 
environment and to reflect their knowledge in their behaviours, the distinction between 
intended (inevitable, planned, predicted or managed) and unintended (emergent, 
unplanned, unpredicted, unmanaged) narratives become far less clear.
The research reported in this paper is broadly within this structurational school and 
explores implementation management as a process of social translation of ideas about 
technology, with human agents translating public or global accounts into things that 
they are familiar with and of interest, filtering out redundant meanings and engaging in 
social interactions in order to pursue their images of a technology in use. Within this 
research framework we employ technological frames analysis to examine human 
agents’ knowledge of and experiences with technology, and the meanings which they 
assign to it. Our study, carried out in an international financial institution, reveals how 
through social interactions human agents translate, attenuate and eliminate meanings of 
technology to meet their own agenda. The study aims to provide pertinent implications 
for the management of implementation, both in theory and in practice.
Research approach
Various research studies in information systems have drawn on models that might be 
described as contributing to a school of social cognitive theory (SCT). Such studies 
have addressed individual reactions to and beliefs about information technology, as well 
as systems’ outcomes (Boland, et al., 1994; Bostrom and Heinen, 1977; Ginzberg, 1981; 
Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; Weick 
and Bougon, 1986). A recent methodological contribution to SCT is technological
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frames analysis (TFA); a generic conceptual approach for examining cognition when a 
new technology is encountered (Bijker, 1995; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). Orlikowski 
and Gash (1994) define technological frames as:
a set of assumptions, meanings, knowledge, and expectations that 
people use to understand the nature and role of technology in 
organisations. This includes not only the nature and role of the 
technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and 
consequences of that technology in particular contexts.
Bijker (1995) provides a contrasting definition, emphasising technological frames as a 
group phenomenon, a dynamic account of a technology formed and shared through 
interaction.
A technological frame structures the interactions among a relevant 
social group. A technological frame is built up when interaction 
"around'' an artefact begins.
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) argue for the importance of understanding people’s 
technological frames as references to their interpretations of technology, which then 
shape behaviour. In this they quote Weick (1986) “cognition and micro-level processes 
are keys to understanding the organisational impact of new technologies”, and offer 
technological frames as a "crisp and powerful lens for focusing ... on how people make 
sense of particular aspects of the world." For Bijker, technological frames offer, "a 
theoretical concept.. .used by the analyst to order data and to facilitate the interpretation 
of the interaction within a relevant social group" (Bijker, 1995).
The underlying assumption behind TFA is essentially structurational: people (or groups) 
act according to the meanings that technologies have for them, and their actions shape 
meaning of technologies for others and for institutions. As such, frames can be both 
enabling and constraining. They are enabling when they "structure organisational 
experience, allow interpretation of ambiguous situations, reduce uncertainty in 
situations of complexity and change, and provide a basis for action"; they are 
constraining when they "reinforce unreflective reliance on established assumptions and 
knowledge, distort information to make it fit existing cognitive structures and inhibit 
creative problem solving" (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). They argue that technological
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frames analysis, as a research construct, allows researchers to understand the thought 
processes and cognitive resources (frames) behind individuals’ behaviour, in contrast to 
research approaches that only record happenings.
TFA’s ability to expose the production and reproduction of individuals’ or groups' 
experiences, in relation to their attitudes towards technology and organisational 
understanding, provides a powerful framework to examine the process by which 
individuals try to make sense of technology. In order to examine how individuals’ 
technological frames and their attitudes towards the technology develop in relation to 
others’ and in an organizational context, we borrow here the concept of translation. 
Translation, as introduced by Latour (1987) is a process which offers new 
interpretations of a statement (a technology) and channels people in different directions. 
As defined in Latour (1999), a translation is "the work through which actors modify, 
displace, and translate their various and contradictory interests". Latour's use of the 
word translation is intended to convey a complex notion of ideas and facts moving and 
changing among a community; in part as a linguistic restatement in a new language, but 
also as a move in space or time, from one place to another. Latour (1987) further argues 
that an initial statement would (potentially) no longer be the same as an increasing 
number of interest groups become involved in a chain of translations, and he calls this 
phenomenon ‘translation drift”. Each translation associates with a transformation and 
after a series of translations and transformations an artefact becomes what it is now.
In line with other critiques (Brown and Capdevila, 1999; Lee and Brown, 1994), we 
hesitate at the indiscriminate treatment that some accounts of the notion of translations 
gives to subjects (people-actors) and objects (artefacts), and the positioning of entities 
(both subjects and objects) in a network. Our interest in translation is limited to its 
underlying semiotic approach, which tells us that artefacts achieve their form as a 
consequence of how and by whom they are interpreted. That is, we are interested in how 
translators’ positions and situations in relation to others’ affect their interpretation of the 
artefact. This process, by which individuals or groups try to make sense of an idea or 
artefact according to their relation with others, is termed here a process of social 
translation o f technology. This notion is used in conjunction with TFA to conceptualise 
the management of implementation as a process in which various interest groups are
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keen to construct and communicate their own interpretations of a technology as the 
definition of the technology.
Research site and method
Our research was conducted in an international financial institution, the Bank (a 
pseudonym), and studied a project to replace an old e-mail system with a new one. 
Data came from a number of sources including semi-structured interviews, 
documentation, memoranda, informal conversations, observations, and follow up e-mail 
questionnaires. Six people were formally interviewed and each interview lasted 1 to 2 
hours, and each interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. Over 163 documents and 
memorandums were also reviewed. Lunch in the canteen provided another research 
opportunity, to meet and talk to members of the staff. It was natural that people were 
more relaxed in the canteen than in a meeting room, and discreet observations were 
made of conversations between colleagues. After the fieldwork period, some follow-up 
questions were sent via e-mail to the interviewees.
Data was interpreted cautiously within the research framework chosen, thereby 
preserving openness to the data gathered in the field and remaining sensitive to the 
context studied (Walsham, 1995). We are aware of the limitations associated with this 
analytical approach and have no intention to claim gross generalisation of the findings. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the findings from this case study can help us to look at 
implementation management differently.
Research study
In 1993 the Bank was thinking of replacing its old e-mail software, in use since 1988. 
The old system had been selected at the same time as a new network operating system 
as part of the establishment of a desk-top office automation platform. In 1988 it had 
been judged as the best suited to the Bank’s requirements, but the coming of Windows 
made this MS-DOS based and command driven package be seen as increasingly 
problematic. Users had not found the software intuitive and this demotivated them to 
explore the system further; many knew only how to read and send messages although 
many other functions were available. As new employees came to the Bank and saw the 
system they often remarked negatively in terms of “What is this? Where I worked
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before the systems could do such and such...”, creating further pressure for a new 
'modem* system.
It was not only users who complained, so too did IS personnel, since the system posed a 
significant workload for them. The mail and appointment call programs and the printer 
drivers had to be developed at the Bank since the features were not available or did not 
run properly. The security and reliability of the e-mail database also caused concern; 
regular corruption, loss of mail, unauthorised database access and service unavailability 
were evident, partly because the system database could not be properly protected at the 
network operating level. Among all the technical problems and user complaints, it was 
perhaps the instability of the system that drove the Information Systems Department 
(ISD) to decide to launch a project to provide a replacement. For example, ISD needed 
to spend at least one working day per week to maintain the system and sort out system 
crashes.
Research findings
In this abbreviated account three interest groups involved at the early stages of 
implementation are identified: office information systems (OIS); the user group (UG); 
and the management group (MG). OIS was the division within the ISD responsible for 
providing office automation applications and formally owned the project. The UG was 
set up to contribute to the project, consisting of 10 representatives from user 
departments with a role as a bridge between OIS and the wider user community. The 
role of the MG in the project was to assess and allocate the required budget to the 
project, and to demonstrate its support for the project to the rest of the Bank.
In analysing our research material, documents and transcripts, four domains of 
technological frames held by these interest groups were identified. As in Orlikowski 
and Gash’s work, we used our data to generate these domains.
The nature o f problems -  understandings of organisational and workplace problems in 
relation to technology.
Requirements fo r the system -  positive expectations of the technology in organisational 
and workplace terms.
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Images of implementation -  understandings o f the process o f change that brings 
technology into the organization
Issues of use -  concerns about technology in use and impact on work activities.
As summarised in Table 1, each of the groups identified had their own technological 
frames, with distinct content in each o f the four domains. For reasons o f space, the rest 
of this section only examines in detail the technological frames o f the OIS as these 
operated at the early stages o f the project.
Tabic 1: Comparison of the key elements of technological frames at the early stages of the project
OIS User Group Management Group
The nature o f problems Technological, 
with user voices at 
some distance.
Operational, old
fashioned,
unusable.
Organisational.
Requirement for the 
system
Fit to the current 
infrastructure, 
overcome current 
problems; rapid 
deployment, user 
training, and 
management 
support.
User friendly, 
easy to learn; 
require minimum 
new skills; 
modern, up-to- 
date.
Cost effective, 
achieving what had been 
offered by the old 
system and offering 
enhanced facilities.
Images o f  
Implementation
Speed is the 
essence; stock o f  
skills; support in 
depth; training as 
transition.
Getting in the 
way, we have real 
jobs to do.
Risk.
Issues around use Easier to manage; 
reduced complaints 
from users; secure.
Seamless. Official communication 
channel, no misuse o f  
the technology.
The Nature of problems. OIS respondents saw the project as a solution to technical 
problems embedded in the current system such as “not robust enough”, “instability”, 
“unreliability”, “MS-DOS based”. OIS were also upset about a situation in which users
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continually complained to them and they spent much time on repeatedly fixing the same 
problems. The project co-ordinator recollected:
(The old system) could just about manage the internal e-mail requirements 
all the time. It was just running the DOS Box within Windows, (but) it 
was not stable enough. I had to spend half a day to a day a week to keep 
the system active. And you could not put external mail on it because of 
the large number of users and traffic which would break .. .the system. So 
we realised that the system was not robust enough to meet the 
requirements of today’s situation.
A survey carried out by the UG demonstrated users’ contrasting understandings of the 
problems:
-  The current e-mail system is not user friendly and is difficult to understand
-  The current e-mail system is out of date
-  The current e-mail system is unstable and crashes
-  Users expect to receive a replacement soon and expect that the new system to be
easy enough for them to pick up without investing time or effort because they 
have other real jobs to do.
Viewing the current problem as technological, OIS naturally sought for technological 
solutions, but at the same time they had to make some sense of users’ complaints. OIS’s 
conclusion was that a new e-mail system was needed. On the basis of this 
understanding the WORKGROUP project was initiated.
Requirements fo r the system. OIS had a clear and specific vision of what the future 
system needed to achieve, and had a strong feeling that the new system needed to be 
compatible with the existing IT infrastructure since they considered incompatibility of 
the current system as the origin of the problems that the Bank had encountered. Since 
OIS understood the problems as being technological and infrastructural ones, the 
requirements which they put forward were naturally technologically-oriented, too.
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To overcome current weaknesses of the existing mail system in the areas of availability 
and security
- To provide a robust platform for future development
To simplify and automate the administration and maintenance of the system
To provide a proper integration with the Windows environment in order to 
take full advantage of the data interchange and to link with other 
applications
- To simplify the use of the overall package (electronic mail, filing, diary, to- 
do list, etc.)
It was noted that users’ understandings were not strongly incorporated as part of these 
requirements.
Images o f implementation. OIS believed that managing the change implied in adopting 
the new technology (in their words roll-out) was critical for a successful project, 
including having sufficient technical skill and knowledge of the new system, user 
training, vendor’s ability to provide local technical support, and management 
endorsement. These criteria, which were strongly reflected in the OIS team members, 
were formed on the basis of past experiences. For example, concern with rapid system 
roll-out originated from earlier experience of introducing PCs into the Bank when a 
delay between training and delivery of PCs meant that, by the time the PCs arrived, 
users had either lost enthusiasm or could not remember what they had learned in 
training.
The issue of implementation (roll-out) was so key in the minds of OIS that most of their 
actions within the early project might be seen as driven by a concern with this 'moment 
of use' and haunting images of failure. This led them to take some very deliberate 
actions to shape and control the project's progress, as described below. However, we do 
not wish to place these actions within any strongly managerialist-translation model. We 
do not suggest that they 'attempted controlled translation', rather that we can see then- 
situated actions in terms of shaping technological frames through translation.
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Issues o f use. OIS had a firm idea of how e-mail should be used and for what purposes. 
OIS explained their view in project documentation:
Electronic mail is appropriately viewed as a store-and-forward transport for electronic 
objects across a heterogeneous environment, among people, among people and 
applications and among applications.
OIS saw e-mail as primarily a formal, business communication channel and not for 
personal use; behaviour such as distributing private and non-business messages around 
the Bank was not to be encouraged. However OIS was prepared to create some spaces, 
discussion groups, within the system to allow people to post general announcements.
A Translation Process
The above outline of OIS’ technological frames at the initiation of the project illustrates 
the issues which concerned OIS at that time. As such, OIS took necessary steps to act 
upon their interpretations of these issues. It is notable that, in general, the three interest 
groups did not share the same view, explained by Orlikowski and Gash as an 
incongruence of technological frames. Incongruence refers to differences in important 
expectations, assumptions, or knowledge about some key aspects of the technology. 
According to their research findings, the existence of incongruence is likely to cause 
failure, or at least a less successful technology adoption, but this is not the case here. 
This project was reported by senior ISD managers as being the most successful one in 
the Bank’s IT history. The different outcomes of the two case studies can be interpreted 
as being the result of the two organisations having different attitudes towards a 
translation process at the early stages of the project. The translation process in Alpha 
was loose and not closely monitored and managed, while the process at the Bank was 
carefully managed with active intervention by OIS to make sure that the progress of the 
project was (in their terms) on track. Here, we illustrate how OIS actively intervened to 
reshape different views between the interest groups by translating them into something 
else.
The issue o f usability versus infrastuctural fit. Based on these distinct technological 
frames, the UG and OIS selected different software for the new e-mail system. The UG 
chose what they saw as a user-friendly package, Beyond Mail, whereas OIS chose a 
technologically fit system, GroupWise. The OIS were happy to admit that Beyond 
Mail was more user friendly than their choice, an acknowledgement of others
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technological frames, but they then set out both overtly and covertly to change the 
frames. The overt action was to lobby UG members and to talk confidently and in 
technological language (jargon), about the superiority of their preferred product. Users 
were inclined, in the face of such confidence, and such mystification, to defer. The 
covert action was to set up formal evaluation criteria that expressed their own interests 
in an exaggerated way. Thus issues of diary and calendar functions emerged as critical 
criteria (and once selection was undertaken, never reappeared). In its conclusion to the 
evaluation exercise, the OIS suggested that GroupWise was better in terms of 
maintenance, costs and benefits, security etc. even though Beyond Mail was judged as 
considerably easier to use. At the end of the evaluation exercise the UG members, in an 
example of the Stockholm syndrome, felt that the OIS obviously 'knew what they were 
doing' and had better judgement compared to them, and hence agreed to the OIS’ 
choice.
Thus OIS deliberately and actively set out to engineer a process (through talk and 
evaluation criteria) to change the UG’s frames and expected that the UG’s initial criteria 
for a successful system would be changed. This is the first major conflict that the OIS 
and UG came across at the initiation stage and was resolved as the different versions of 
the project were translated and reduced to the one that the OIS had in mind, occupying 
their territory.
Three in one: managing different understandings. The three groups studied 
approached the issue of the Bank’s e-mail from different perspectives: technological 
(OIS), operational (UG), and organisational (MG). To manage these different 
perspectives, and at the same time to make sure that the project remained under control, 
OIS needed to work on translation in two different languages; to translate operational 
requirements into technological requirements for the UG, and to translate technological 
requirements into organisational requirements for the MG.
OIS did not have much power in the institution, it was identified as a support activity 
and associated with a number of failed projects going back over decades. Hence, in 
order to push the project forward on the basis of its interests, OIS deliberately translated 
users’ operational requirements into technological ones and reframed users’ problems as 
technological ones. By doing so, people would be less able to challenge OIS’ decisions 
about the project, giving an impression that their authority was being challenged in their
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own area of expertise. When OIS was confronted with users’ questions about their 
actions they spoke in technological terms in order to de-motivate further discussion.
In contrast, in facing the MG. OIS could not speak its own language but had to translate 
to the language of the MG, to translate technical rationales into organisational 
abstractions in order to make a link to business operations. For example, the project 
name was purposely chosen to reflect a current management theme, as the manager 
pointed out
When the project was initiated the idea of “working together” was regarded as one of 
the most popular themes within organisational studies. The term ‘WORKGROUP” was 
chosen purposely to draw the attentions of the MG.
Yet, at the same time it was made clear during the research that OIS had no intention of 
introducing the concept of “working together” into the Bank, despite suggesting to the 
MG that the project was about enhancing groupwork in the Bank. The project manager 
said:
The notion of “working together” may be considered in DOIS’ next IS project but it was 
definitely not a part of the WORKGROUP project.
Conclusion and implications
This might be seen as just a typical technology push project, well managed by a 
competent IS department. However, what our study shows is that there were potentially 
critical conflicting views and tensions between the technologists and users during the 
project’s initiation. By some accounts, the project should have failed miserably but 
quite the opposite happened. We argue that this successful outcome is made 
understandable as a translation process at the project initiation stage.
Traditional accounts of IS implementation refer to a discrete period of time and concrete 
activities which occur during or after a system is delivered to users. In this paper we 
argue that the idea of implementation should be expanded, and the findings suggest that 
the sense making process surrounding technology, and which is often thought to take 
place primarily only after a technology is put to use, indeed takes place at the initiation 
stage of the project. How people think about and evaluate technology at this stage
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substantially influences the course that the project takes. We describe this as a process 
of social translation of technology in which interest groups involved make sense of the 
technology and offer others their interpretations of technology based on their own 
interests. It is expected that the definition of the technology will derive eventually 
during the process. The challenge that IS management faces is how to appreciate the 
processes of translation that occur, and how to achieve an optimal balance between 
different versions or translations offered by interest groups. Neglecting this challenge 
may result in a critical lack of control and a consequence would be that the initial 
interests and purposes of the project are lost -  an acute case of Latour's (1987) 
“translation loss” that may lead to a system actually acquired being far from any actual 
needs.
As noted here, OIS constantly pursued their technological frames, how things should be 
seen and done, and any interests in the technology which diverged from theirs were 
actively reframed. The intention was that the changes made in frames would 
subsequently enable people to view the technology in a way compatible to theirs. 
Altering technological frames in order to enable people to think and act similarly and 
accordingly is, to an extent, a reiteration of Orlikowski’s (Orlikowski, 1992, p367) 
concluding analysis of the Alpha study: people’s technological frames often need to be 
changed to accommodate a new technology. The approach proved to be quite effective 
in the Bank.
But could the OIS really claim its victory? Viewing the project in a wider timeframe, 
we found that OIS might have achieve almost full control over the translation process 
prior to the system roll-out (and minimal translation loss), but it seemed to lose this 
control (or did not want to retain it) after the system was delivered to users. For 
instance, formal rules of using e-mail were established to prevent misuse of the system, 
but in practice people still distributed general and private message around the Bank 
despite being “educated” during the training and ‘"told” by the General Manager not to 
do so. Some began to send e-mail messages to senior managers directly instead of 
going through traditional channels. Such a development of was not planned or 
articulated by OIS, (indeed it was not in their technological frame), but derived from a 
growing sophistication emerging through an exploration of the new technology, which 
enabled people to translate the technology differently from the rules.
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In this we might see the nature of the translation process as different prior to and after 
the system roll-out. Prior to the system roll-out people make sense of the technology 
according to their needs and their problems, and this will affect their decisions about 
which technology to adopt and the further direction of the project. After system roll­
out, users in particular make sense of the technology in relation to their work, their 
position within the organization, and their relationship with peers’, and what they come 
up with in this local context will strongly influence their attitude towards the technology 
(reshape their frames). Thus, IS managers needs to reflect on different strategies to 
manage different stages in the process. The case study in this paper suggests that 
managing the process prior to system roll-out can be done by reframing the needs, 
'reengineering' the technological frames, and engaging in social interactions, even 
exercising political power. To manage the process in such a way after the system roll­
out could be problematic as numerous translations are undertaken by individuals. 
Orlikowski (1992) suggests using communication and education to ensure individuals 
think and act similarly. However, this is a short-term strategy since individuals (and 
disparate groups), through their personal experiences with the technology, will develop 
different understandings of the technology and seek to use it accordingly, and 
management action then needs to explore, assess, evaluate the opportunities provided by 
users’ translations.
In this paper, we have sought to present IS implementation as a process of translation. 
That people involved in implementation try, on the basis of their frames and interests, to 
translate a technology into something that they are familiar with. Managing an 
implementation process means appreciating this translation process as a basis for action. 
This is not to say that translation, any more than technological frames, can be simply 
engineered or constructed. But, building on these insights, we do suggest that there is a 
case for rethinking implementation management: to move beyond the prioritising of 
organisational or technological imperatives, and to characterise effective 
implementation management as the sensitive response to and careful managing of an 
emergent process of translation.
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